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PREFACE
Like many other historians of science, I began my
undergraduate education as a science major--physics, in my
case--and subsequently discovered that the conceptual
development of my field was more interesting to me than the
current state of research.

Uncertain about my future

career plans, I taught secondary science and mathematics
for a few years.

During this time my interest in the

history of science continued to grow, and the interaction
between science and religion became the primary focus of
that interest.

With the advice and encouragement of

Professor Richard Rosen, who had first exposed me to the
history of science at Drexel, I decided to pursue a
graduate degree in the Department of History and Philosophy
of Science at Indiana University.
I

have never regretted that decision.

The faculty at

Indiana grounded me solidly in the history and
historiography of science, raised my sights, corrected some
of my deficiencies, and tolerated my idiosyncracies.
Without their patience and expertise, my life would be far
poorer today.

I would like to thank them for supporting my

first year of study with an Indiana University Fellowship,
without which I could not have embarked on what has been
for me a great adventure.
Any list of contributors to this dissertation must

vi
begin with Richards. Westfall, who took to heart the
responsibilities he assumed in accepting me as a student.
His books and lectures on the personalities, ideas, and
institutions of the scientific revolution have been a
powerful influence on my own understanding of that period.
His expert guidance, constant encouragement, and profound
literary instincts have helped this project come to
fruition.

If he had done half as much for me,

he would

have done more than enough.
Other members of my doctoral committee have also
contributed to this project.

Edward Grant, whose

familiarity with medieval science is second to none,
steered me through the deep waters of Aristotelian natural
philosophy after the Condemnation of 1277.

Gerald Strauss

lent his considerable expertise in religious history and,
going well beyond the call of duty, intelligently
criticized each chapter as it was written.

And Frederick

Churchill, more than anyone else, taught me the meaning of
historiography.

Noretta Koertge, though not a member of my

committee, helped me revise my dissertation proposal and
was always happy to talk about my research.

Another

"outsider," James s. Preuss, read drafts of three chapters.
For roughly a generation, historians of science have
witnessed a debate within their discipline between
"internalist" and "externalist" approaches to
historiographical issues.

No doubt some will describe this

vii
dissertation as "internalist" because I argue from the
perspective of intellectual history, while others will call
my work "externalist" because I look "outside" of science,
to theology, for an ultimate explanation.

Though I do not

object to these l a b e l s ~ ~ ' I reject the debate with
which they are associated--! have no reason to assume that
the one kind of explanation is intrinsically better than
the other.

I would prefer that this work, and all others,

be judged on its own merits and deficiencies, without
regard to such historiographical biases.

Several scholars

have evaluated some of my ideas in this spirit, and I would
like to acknowledge them here: Dwight Bozeman, William J.
Courtenay, Gary Deason, Richard Greaves, and David
Lindberg.

c.

Margaret J. Osler, whose work closely parallels

my own, has been gracious and helpful.

Because she has

written so thoroughly about Gassendi and Charleton, I did
not include them in my project.

Her work on Descartes is

just as good, but does not make my own work superfluous.
A project of this magnitude could not have been
completed without the assistance of cooperative and
knowledgeable librarians.

The staff of the reference desk

at the Indiana University Library and their colleagues in
the rare book room of the Lilly Library all meet this
description.

They have been, at all times, courteous and

thoroughly professional.

Barbara Halpern deserves special

mention for promptly purchasing several dissertations at my
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request.
In recent years the history of science, like other
areas in the humanities, has suffered from a sharp decline
in the amount of funds available to support research.

The

appearance of any new sources of support is therefore all
the more significant.

In 1980 the Charlotte

w.

Newcombe

Foundation began to fund dissertations dealing with the
influence of religious values on society.

I would like to

commend the Newcombe Foundation for viewing science as a
part of society and for making grants to graduate students
in the history of science.

As a recipient of a

Dissertation Year Fellowship for 1983-84, I would like
personally to acknowledge their generous support, without
which the completion of this dissertation would have been
greatly delayed.
Finally I want to thank my wife, Kathy, whose
emotional and financial support made it possible for me to
spend five years in Bloomington working toward a goal which
often seemed elusive and distant.

I owe her a debt far too

great to be repaid simply by dedicating this essay, with
love, to her.
Bloomington, IN
30 July 1984
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CREATION, CONTINGENCY, AND EARLY MODERN SCIENCE:
THE IMPACT OF VOLUNTARISTIC THEOLOGY
ON SEVENTEENTH CENTURY NATURAL PHILOSOPHY
ABSTRACT
Could God have made it true that 2 + 2 = 5?
bound to make the best of all possible worlds?

Was he

Is he able

at this moment to alter the course of nature, either in
whole or in part?

Questions like these are often

associated with medieval theology, not with early modern
science.

But science is done by people, and people have

not always practiced the rigorous separation of science and
theology that has come to characterize the modern world.
Although many 17th century scientists sought validity for
their work apart from revelation, divorcing science from
religion was something they never intended.

Indeed most

natural philosophers of the scientific revolution assumed
without question that the world and the human mind had been
created by God.

This was no small admission,

for it meant

that both the manner in which and the degree to which the
world could be understood depended upon how God had acted
in creating it and how he continued to act in sustaining
it.

Fifty years ago the late British philosopher M.B.

Foster identified two different theologies of creation
which differ profoundly in their implications for natural
science.

Rationalist theology, which assigns to God the

activity of pure reason,

"involves both a rationalist

X

philosophy of nature and a rationalist theory of knowledge
of nature."

Voluntarist theology, which "attributes to God

an activity of will not wholly determined by reason,"
implies that the products of his creative activity are
contingent and can be known only empirically.

By a careful

analysis of four natural philosophies of the early modern
period--those of Galileo, Descartes, Boyle, and Newton--!
intend to show that there was indeed a connection between
theological voluntarism and empirical science in the 17th
century.
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INTRODUCTION:
TESTING THE FOSTER THESIS

Creative activity in God, material substance in nature,
empirical methods in natural science--how closely each of
these involves the other is made clear by an examination of
almost any of the great philosophies of the modern period.
A defect in the philosophical conception of God is
reflected in corresponding defects both in the doctrine of
nature and in the theory of natural science.
Thus it is a
mark of the philosophy of the Rationalist tradition that it
is unable wholly to digest the un-Greek element in the
Christian theology according to which God is endowed with a
voluntary activity in the creation of the world.
--Michael B. Foster, Mind 43 (1934), pp. 465f

The one God, the first and only Deity, both Creator and
Lord of all, had nothing coeval with Himself, not infinite
chaos, nor measureless water or solid earth, nor dense air,
nor warm fire, nor refined spirit, nor the azure canopy of
the stupendous firmament.
But He was One, alone in
Himself. By an exercise of His will He created things that
are, which antecedently had no existence, except that He
willed to make them.
--Hippolytus, The Refutation of All Heresies (ca. 230 AD)

[With regard to omnipotence,] the doctrine of Moses
differed from that of Plato and of all the Greeks who have
correctly approached the study of Nature. For Moses, God
has only to will to bring matter into order, and matter is
ordered immediately. We do not think that way~ we say that
certain things are impossible by nature and these God does
not even attempt~ he only chooses the best among the things
that come about.
--Galen, On the Uses of the Parts xi, 14 (ca. 190 AD)

2

"The relation of science to religion in the
seventeenth century," writes Richards. Westfall,

is "the

central problem in the history of modern Western thought."l
With this bold assertion I cannot but concur, yet I must
reject the terms in which it is couched.

To be sure, the

impact of science on religion in the seventeenth century
was significant, as Westfall himself has documented so
well, yet religion, not science, held the dominant position
in seventeenth century Europe.

The implied question ought

to be turned around: What was the relation of religion to
science in the seventeenth century?
Sociological aspects of this question have been the
subject of a great body of scholarly research, much of it
devoted to the influence of Puritanism on scientific
activity in England.

A survey of this work--even a survey

of surveys--would consume far too much space to justify its
inclusion here and, in fact, would lead us away from the
issue I

intend to explore.

Suffice it to say that the

relation of religion to science, when understood in social,
economic, and political terms, remains unclear, perhaps due
to the sheer weight of the evidence which needs to be
explained.

The definitive account, if such is possible,

1. This remark is found in the preface to the second (1973)
edition of Science and Religion in Seventeenth-Century
England (New Haven: Yale UP), which was first published in 1958.
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has yet to be written.2
The relation of religion to science can also be
approached from the standpoint of intellectual history:
though religion and science are a great deal more than
systems of thought, they are not less.

Edwin Arthur Burtt

and Alexandre Koyre, those distinguished students of the
history of ideas, both showed that early modern science
contained a non-trivial metaphysical dimension which often
rested explicitly on a strong theological base.3

As Koyre

2. Pioneering efforts to provide a sociological account of
the relation between religion and science include
A. de Candolle, Histoire des sciences et des savants
(Geneva, 1873): Dorothy Stimson, "Puritanism and the New
Philosophy in Seventeenth Century England," Bulletin of the
Institute of the History of Medicine 3 (1935), 321-34: and
Robert K. Merton, "Science, Technology and Society in
Seventeenth-Century England," Osiris 4 (1938), 360-632.
For an overview of the current state of the argument, see
Gary A. Abraham, "Misunderstanding the Merton Thesis," Isis
74 (1983), 368-87: Richard L. Greaves, "Puritanism and
Science: The Anatomy of a Controversy," JHI 30 (1969),
345-68: A. Rupert Hall, "Merton Revisited or Science and
Society in the Seventeenth Century," History of Science 2
(1963), 1-16: J.R. Jacob and M.C. Jacob, "Seventeenth
Century Science and Religion: The State of the Argument,"
History of Science 14 (1976), 196-207: Douglas s. Kemsley,
"Relgious Influences in the Rise of Modern Science: A
Review and Criticism, Particularly of the 'ProtestantPuritan Ethic' Theory," Annals of Science 24 (1968),
199-226: Theodore K. Rabb, "Puritanism and the Rise of
Experimental Science in England," Cahiers d'histoire
mondiale 7 (1962), 46-67, and "Religion and the Rise of
Modern Science," Past and Present 31 (1965), 111-26: and
P.M. Rattansi, "Science and Religion in the Seventeenth
Century," in The Emergence of Science in Western Europe,
ed. Maurice Crosland (London: Macmillan, 1976), pp. 79-88.
3. See Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern
Physical Science (2nd ed.: London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1932): and Koyre, From the Closed World to the Infinite
Universe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1957) and Newtonian
Studies (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1965).
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once put it, "The God of a philosopher and his world are
correlated."4

Most natural philosophers of the early

modern period believed without question that the world and
the human mind had been created by the omnipotent God of
the Judeo-Christian tradition.

For them, both the manner

in which and the degree to which the universe could be
understood depended on how God had acted in creating it and
how he continued to act in sustaining it, profound
theological questions indeed.

Over the centuries Christian

theologians, though reaching a consensus on the reality and
goodness of the creation, have differed widely on the
precise nature of the created order.

The spectrum of views

is bounded at one end by the Greek notion of
intelligibility via participation in pre-existing
archetypal forms and, at the other end, by the biblical
notion of the inscrutability of God's arbitrary acts.5
Thus the Christian doctrine of creation is a dialectic
between God's unconstrained will, which utterly transcends
the bounds of human comprehension, and God's orderly
intellect, which serves as the model for the human mind.
This is commonly referred to as the distinction between the

4. From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe, p. 100.
5. See the introduction to Creation: The Impact of an Idea,
ed. Daniel O'Connor and Francis Oakley (New York:
Scribner's, 1969), pp. 1-12: and Georges Florovsky, "The
Idea of Creation in Christian Philosophy," in Creation and
Redemption (Collected Works, Vol. 3: Belmont, Mass.:
Nordland, 1976), pp. 43-78.
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absolute and the ordinary power of God.6

Individual

thinkers typically acknowledge that God has both will and
reason, but usually emphasize one at the expense of the
other.

The question I wish to explore in this essay is

inspired by this dialectic: Within the thought of an
individual seventeenth century natural philosopher, is
there a link between his theology of creation and his
philosophy of nature?
Fifty years ago the late British philosopher Michael
B. Foster undertook a detailed investigation of the
implications of Christian theology for the enterprise of
natural science.7

Among his many claims, some more

plausible than others, Foster argued that "the method of
natural science depends upon the presuppositions which are
held about nature, and the presuppositions about nature
[depend] in turn upon the doctrine of God."

Foster

identified two basic attitudes toward God which,

he argued,

differ substantially in their implications for scientific
methodology.

Rationalist theology "is the doctrine that

the activity of God is an activity of reason."

Since "God

6. William J. Courtenay's forthcoming essay on "The
Dialectic of Divine Omnipotence" traces the origin of this
distinction to a treatise written in 1067 by Peter Damian.
I am grateful to Professor Courtenay for kindly allowing me
to see this paper before publication.
7. "The Christian Doctrine of Creation and the Rise of
Modern Natural Science," Mind 43 (1934), 446-68, and
"Christian Theology and Modern Science of Nature," Mind 44
(1935), 439-66, and 45 (1936), 1-27.
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is nothing but reason, there is nothing mysterious or
inscrutable in his nature."

Such a theology, Foster said,

"involves both a rationalist philosophy of nature and a
rationalist theory of knowledge of nature."

As a product

of divine reason, the world must embody the ideas of that
reason; and "our own reason, in disclosing to us God's
ideas, will at the same time reveal to us the essential
nature of the created world."

A voluntarist theology, on

the other hand, "attributes to God an activity of will not
wholly determined by reason."

The products of his creative

activity are thus not necessary, but contingent, and can be
known only empirically.8

This alleged connection between

voluntaristic theology and empirical science is what I
intend to consider in this essay.
Foster was not an historian of science, but a
Christian philosopher with an apologetic aim:

those many

contemporary thinkers who admire modern science also ought
to admire its source, Christian theology.

In this respect,

of course, Foster was not particularly original--Duhem had
said much the same thing forty years before.

I have no

intention of following their line: it is history,

not

apologetics, that I have in mind, and this brings me to the
most serious problem in Foster's work, his lack of

8. "Christian Doctrine," p. 465; "Christian Theology," pp.
1, 10, and Sn, respectively.
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historical documentation.9

Although he went a long way

toward showing what a consistently pursued theology of
creation ought to have entailed for natural philosophy, he
did very little to show that this had actually been the
case historically.

However, other scholars with a greater

sensitivity to history have laid the groundwork for an
historiography that incorporates Foster's essential
insights.

Foremost among these are Reijer Hooykaas, Eugene

Klaaren, J.E. McGuire, Francis Oakley, and Margaret J.
Osler.IO

Considered individually, their studies generally

lack the scope and detail required for an adequate test of
the Foster thesis.

Only Osler has looked closely at more

than one person, and her excellent work on the foundations
of the mechanical philosophy has by no means exhausted the

9. This is one of many objections raised by Rolf Gruner,
"Science, Nature, and Christianity," Journal of Theological
Studies 26 (1975), 55-81. This is not the place to refute
Gruner's arguments, many of which are valid but have no
bearing on the validity of this essay.
10. Hooykaas, Religion and the Rise of Modern Science
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1972), and "Science and Theology
in the Middle Ages," Free University Quarterly 3 (1954),
77-163: Klaaren, Religious Origins of Modern Science (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977): McGuire, "Boyle's Conception of
Nature," JHI 33 (1972), 523-42: Oakley, "Christian Theology
and the Newtonian Science: The Rise of the Concept of the
Laws of Nature," in Creation: The Impact of an Idea, ed.
O'Connor and Oakley, pp. 54-83: and Osler, "Descartes and
Charleton on Nature and God," JHI 40 (1979), 445-56,
"Providence and Divine Will: T~Theological Background to
Gassendi's Views on Scientific Knowledge," JHI 44 (1983),
549-60, and "Eternal Truths and the Laws of Nature: The
Theological Foundations of Descartes' Philosophy of
Nature," unpublished paper. I would like to thank
Professor Osler for allowing me to see this paper and for
her comments on portions of this essay.
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subject.

Oakley and Hooykaas have managed to cover a wide

range of figures, but only summarily~ Hooykaas, for
instance, devotes less than twenty pages to voluntaristic
elements in the works of Kepler, Galileo, Descartes,
Pascal, Boyle, Newton, and several others.

Klaaren, on the

other hand, focuses almost exclusively on two men, Van
Belmont and Boyle, one of whom (Van Belmont) was neither a
voluntarist nor a rationalist, and his account of Boyle is
marred by imprecise language and a convoluted argument.

I

am unable to say what it is that he intended to prove.ll
McGuire's paper on Boyle is quite clear, but it confines
itself almost entirely to just two of his many treatises,
the Free Inquiry into the Vulgarly Received Notion of
Nature and The Christian Virtuoso.
Taken together, however, these scholars have
demonstrated the explanatory power of the Foster thesis as
applied to early modern science.

Without their successes,

this dissertation probably would not have been contemplated
and certainly would not have been completed.

With their

11. Klaaren says (p. 1) that his "chief purpose"

is "to
show that religion was conducive to the advent of modern
science, specifically that belief in creation was a major
presupposition in the emergence of natural science in
seventeenth-century England." I do not know how to take
this.
One hardly needs to prove that belief in creation
was a major presupposition of 17th century English
scientists--it can be taken almost as axiomatic.
And I do
not see how studying Van Belmont can have anything to tell
us about English scientists. Klaaren seems to have more
than this on his mind, but I am at a loss to say what that
may be.
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help, I will now clarify further the issue I intend to
discuss in this essay.
It will be important always to keep in mind the
dialectic nature of Christian theology, according to which
God has both will and reason, not just will or reason.

To

assert the one to the exclusion of the other would be an
error.

As Foster put it, "It is Christian to ascribe to

God an activity of will, but it is not Christian to deny to
God a theoretical activity or to ascribe to him a blind
activity of will."

Thus the doctrine of creation implies

"that the created world must contain an element of
contingency, not that it must be nothing but contingent."12
Thinkers in the voluntarist tradition, McGuire has
observed, "do not usually deny that God is bound by the
laws of logier rather they are concerned to emphasize the
power of God--PANTOKRATOR--and the inscrutability of Divine
Will."13

Both voluntarists and rationalists agree that the

world is created and intelligibler they differ on the role
of the divine will in creation and on the manner in which
the world is intelligible.

For rationalists, God's will

bound to the dictates of his reason, and therefore the
world is open to human reason at every point,
reason

is the image of the divine.

for human

Voluntarists,

on the

other hand, begin by stressing God's absolute power to do
12. "Doctrine of Creation," p. 468.
13. "Boyle's Conception of Nature," p. 527 nlO.

is
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as he pleases, apart from any rational constraints, and
account for intelligibility by appealing to God's ordained
power.

This view, in the words of Oakley and Daniel

O'Connor, "rejects an~ priori deduction of rational and
necessary order."

It claims instead "only a de facto

intelligibility directly dependent on the Divine Will. 11 14
Hooykaas has argued similarly: "the biblical conception of
a world fabricated and created by a free act of [the] will
of God implies a science subject to data and facta, things
given and things made, whether they are rational or not."
Theology and science, he has also said, "have a common
enemy in philosophical rationalism, which refuses to accept
things it cannot explain. 11 15
I therefore propose to test the validity of these
ideas, which for simplicity I will refer to as the "Foster
thesis," by a careful examination of four great natural
philosophers of the seventeenth century: Galileo Galilei,

,

Rene Descartes, Robert Boyle, and Isaac Newton.

Both

pragmatic and methodological reasons led me to select this
particular group and not another.

First of all, because

each one played a leading role in what is often called the
scientific revolution, they constitute a stiff test for the
Foster thesis: if it has no validity for them, it probably
14. From the introduction to Creation: The Impact of an
Idea, p. 9.
15. Religion and the Rise of Modern Science, p. 29, and
"Science and Theology in the Middle Ages," p. 88.
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has no validity for others in the same period.
they were important figures,

Because

their works are readily

available, either separately (Newton) or in essentially
complete collected editions (the others).

Boyle wrote

entirely in English, and most of the treatises of the
others have been translated reliably into English.
Although I have consulted the original languages to check
key passages, I have done most of my reading in various
translations.

The secondary literature on each of these

figures is enormous--one could easily read for twenty years
and not digest the half of it.

Fortunately only a fraction

centers on science/religion issues, and only a fraction of
that on the question I have in mind.

Of course I have had

to become familiar with the salient features of the vast
scholarship devoted to each of these men and to the social
and intellectual contexts in which they worked.

Secondly,

the four men I have chosen represent a cross section,
albeit a limited one, of the seventeenth century scientific
community: one Italian, one Frenchman, and two Englishmen:
two Catholics and two Protestants: two physicists, one
chemist, and one philosopher with a strong interest in
biology: two who spent time as university professors and
two who did not: and, in terms of this study, two
rationalists and two voluntarists.

Together they span the

seventeenth century both chronologically and symbolically.
Certainly a larger group would make a better test of the
Foster thesis, but time has not allowed me that luxury--

12
'Tis better to do a little with certainty (I hope) and
leave the rest for others.

I would like to have included a

Cathoic voluntarist such as Pascal, Gassendi, or
Malebranche, and a Protestant rationalist such as Leibniz
(who does in fact put in an appearance in connection with
Newton), since the group I have selected suggests
misleadingly that voluntarists were English Protestants and
rationalists were Continental Catholics.

It is true that

voluntarism is an outstanding feature of the Augustinian
tradition, on which Protestants drew perhaps more freely
than Catholics.

It is also true that it was especially

attractive to the English--just as a voluntarist God had
the power to reorder his creation in whole or in part, so
the English strove to reorder their society into a new
creation.16

But neither the Protestants nor the English

had a monopoly on the will of God and the doctrine of
creation.

All of Christendom shared in the rich

inheritance of Greek philosophy and biblical theology which
flowed together in the deep river of Christian thought.
A full history of voluntarism, then, requires a full
history of the doctrine of creation.

Obviously that is

16. Klaaren has found the characteristic voluntarist
dialectic of God's absolute and ordinary power in the
writings of Puritans like John Preston, William Perkins,
and William Ames, and also in those of Anglicans like
Robert Sanderson, John Wilkins, Nathaniel Culverwell,
Walter Charleton, and John Locke. See Religious Origins of
Modern Science, pp. 39 and 48-52.
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impossible for me to attempt here.17

However I do need to

say something about the tension between rationalism and
voluntarism in the late Middle Ages following the
Condemnation of 1277, for only in light of its historical
background can we accurately weigh the influence of
voluntarism on the scientific revolution.

In the first

chapter therefore I summarize the Condemnation and its
effects on late medieval natural philosophy.

In the next

four chapters I consider in detail the role of divine will
in the natural philosophies of Galileo, Descartes, Boyle,
and Newton.

In the conclusion I offer my assessment of the

impact of voluntaristic theology on seventeenth century
natural philosophy.

17. For part of that history see Langdon Gilkey, Maker of
Heaven and Earth~ A Study of the Christian Doctrine of
Creation (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1959), and Arnold
Erhardt, The Beginning: A Study in the Greek Philosophical
Approach to the Concept of Creation from Anaximander to St.
John (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1968).

CHAPTER ONE:
THE CONDEMNATION OF 1277:
NOMINALISM AND VOLUNTARISM IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES

Of course, what really mattered to Tempier was only the
full recognition of the sovereignty and freedom of Goa, but
in rejecting any limits to these, he unintentionally took
away limitations to scientific theorizing as well.
Not
only the theology of necessity was at stake, but also the
natural science of necessity.
Among the theses he
condemned were those that suggested that God could not make
an empty space; that He could not create new species; that
He could not make more than one planetary system, and that
He could not give other than circular motions to the
heavenly bodies. All these prohibitions hampered the
freedom of scientific research; all of them in the long run
turned out to be false.
--R. Hooykaas, Religion and the Rise of Modern
Science, p. 32

The nominalists were not, therefore, abandoning the Greek
notion of "science"; they were setting more realistic
limits to its applicability.
But one can see here the
beginning of a new realization: if "science" is to be the
best attainable knowledge of some domain, then the
"science" of nature cannot be described in the traditional
Euclidean terms. This will ultimately involve a
modification in the notion of science itself.
But the
nominalists were not yet ready to make this modification.
"Science" in the sense of unchanging necessary truths still
seemed to them the goal of man's desire to know; the fact
that he could not know nature in this way was simply an
unhappy circumstance. So Buridan would say,
characteristically: there is no true "science" of nature;
not: there is a "science" of nature, but it has to be
differently defined~ "science."
--E. McMullin, "Empiricism and the Scientific
Revolution," p. 340

15

On 7 March 1277, exactly three years after the death
of Thomas Aquinas, the bishop of Paris, Stephen Tempier,
condemned on pain of excommunication "certain obvious and
loathsome errors" circulating at the university entrusted
to his care.I

The "outcome of doctrinal, philosophical,

and personal animosities that rocked Paris in the 1260s and
1270s," 2 this condemnation of 219 propositions has been
called "the central event" of thirteenth century thought
because of its far reaching effects on the philosophy,
theology, and natural science of the late middle ages.3
Because it represents the assertion of divine freedom
against the staunch rationalism of Aristotelian thought, it
is worth investigating why the Condemnation of 1277 took
place and how it influenced the subsequent development of
1. The text of the condemnation can be readily found in P.
Mandonnet, O.P., Siger of Brabant et l'averroisme latin au
XIIIme siecle, 2me partie, Textes inedits (2nd ed: Louvain,
1908), pp. 175-191. Mandonnet has arranged the prohibited
theses into categories: his edition is the basis for the
English translation by Ernest L. Fortin and Peter D.
O'Neill, found in Ralph Lerner and Mushin Mahdi, editors,
Medieval Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook (Toronto: The
Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 335-354.
All of my
citations are from this translation, but I have numbered
the propositions as they were ordered in the Latin
original. The fact that Aquinas died on 7 March 1274 is
noted by R. Hooykaas, "Science and Theology in the Middle
Ages," Free University Quarterly, 3 (1954), p. 89.
2. Edward Grant, "The Condemnation of 1277, God's Absolute
Power, and Physical Thought in the Late Middle Ages,"
Viator 10 (1979), p. 212.
3. Fernand Van Steenberghen, The Philosophical Movement in
the Thirteenth Century (New York: Thomas Nelson, 1955),
p. 95.
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natural philosophy.
Christianity has always been openly cautious, if not
deeply suspicious, of pagan philosophy.

Most Christian

theologians have agreed with Clement of Alexandria that
philosophy is best treated as a handmaiden to theology, not
as a noblewoman worthy of praise in her own right.

This

was particularly true of the first millenium of Christian
thought.

For seven hundred years after the fall of Rome,

theology's claim to the throne of knowledge was
unchallenged, her reign as queen of the sciences unbroken.
Philosophy, impoverished by the loss of her ancient
treasures in the Latin West, could do no more than give
passive obedience to her lord.

Even in the early

universities--Paris, Oxford, and Bologna all flourished
before 1200--the arts faculties were geared exclusively to
the preparation of students for higher studies in law,
medicine and, above all, theology.

In keeping with this

aim, the curriculum emphasized grammar and logic, not
philosophy, and the theologians, "themselves not greatly
interested in philosophy," were determined "to keep the
masters of arts within the fixed bounds of their province.
Their function was, in the phrase of Van Steenberghen, to
train the mind, not to feed it or fill it."4
The same years which saw the rise of the first
4. David Knowles, The Evolution of Medieval Thought
(Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1962), p. 226.
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universities also witnessed the recovery of a significant
part of Greek science and philosophy~ works which had been
unknown in the Latin West for nearly a thousand years began
to reach European scholars from their counterparts in the
Islamic empire.5

Of all the manuscripts which appeared at

this time, the most important were the scientific books of
Aristotle, the greatest natural philosopher before the
scientific revolution.

His systematic synthesis of

scientific thought and common sense observation possessed
remarkable explanatory power and depth of insight.

Its

impact on the arts masters was nothing short of
spectacular--here was a body of knowledge which cried out
for attention, which deserved to be studied for its own
sake.

Alas, Aristotle had been a pagan, a fact which had

affected his works and which Christians dared not forget.
His uncompromising assumption of naturalistic determinism
was unacceptable, and his opinions on certain matters, if
adopted by believers, would surely lead them to perdition.6
In the face of such a challenge to their authority,
theologians could only be expected to react with severe
5. See David c. Lindberg, "The Transmission of Greek and
Arabic Learning to the West," in Science in the Middle
Ages, ed. Lindberg (Chicago: UP, 1978), pp. 52-90.
6. For example, Aristotle had taught the eternity of the
world, the total regularity of nature and the impossiblity
of miracles, and that the soul does not survive the body.
And his rejection of the Platonic notions of form and
creation in time implied that God could not have known all
species of things that he would eventually create. See
Edward Grant, Physical Science in the Middle Ages (New
York: John Wiley & Sons, 1971), p. 24.
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disapproval.

A series of official decrees beginning in

1210 stirred the smoldering embers of disagreement, which
burst in 1267 into the open flame of confrontation.
Addressing a convocation of monks at Paris, St. Bonaventure
decried the dangers of a new paganism and denounced those
arts masters who taught the eternity of the world, the
unicity of ·the human intellect, and the mortality of the
soul.

The latter two points were also the target of St.

Thomas Aquinas' 1270 treatise On the Unicity of the
Intellect against the Averroists, in which he attacked
those philosophers who presumed to discuss theological
matters and showed his annoyance with those who held that
reason could affirm one truth while theology affirmed
another.

Then on 10 December of the same year, Tempier

officially "condemned and excommunicated with all who
taught or asserted • • • knowingly" thirteen articles as
follows:7
The first article is: That the intellect of all men
is one and the same in number.
2. That this is false or inappropriate: Man
understands.
3. That the will of man wills or chooses from
necessity.
4. That all things which are done here below depend
upon the necessity of the celestial bodies.
5. That the world is eternal.
6. That there never was a first man.
7. That the soul, which is the form of man as a human
being, is corrupted when the body is corrupted.
8. That the soul separated from death does not suffer
7. The original document is in Chartularium universitatis
Parisiensis I, 486f~ the translation here is that of Lynn
Thorndike, University Records, pp. 80f.
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from corporeal fire.
9. That free will is a passive power, not active~ and
that it is moved necessarily by appetite.
10. That God does not know things in particular.
11. That God does not know other things than Himself.
12. That human actions are not ruled by divine
Providence.
13. That God cannot give immortality or
incorruptibility to a corruptible or mortal thing.
Four of these propositions (numbers 1, 5, 6, and 8) are
found in treatises by Siger of Brabant, a radical
Aristotelian.8

The others are not directly attributable to

Siger or to anyone else, but we may assume their currency
in the arts faculty on other grounds.9
Yet the Condemnation of 1270 was apparently not enough
to silence the radical Aristotelians, or there would have
been no need for further action against them.

On 1 April

1272 the conservatives, under Alberic of Rheims, passed a

8. See John F. Wippel, "The Condemnations of 1270 and 1277
at Paris," The Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies
7 (1977), p. 179.
9. At around this time--perhaps in 1270, but not later than
1276--Giles of Lessines sent a letter to Albertus Magnus in
which he listed fifteen theses then being held by arts
masters at Paris~ all thirteen of the above are included.
See Wippel, pp. 182-183. The treatise Errores
philosophorum, by Giles of Rome, dates from the same
period. A member of the Order of the Hermits of St.
Augustine, Giles studied under Aquinas at Paris from 1269
to 1272. Errores philosophorum catalogues the various
"errors" of Aristotle, Avicenna, Averroes, Algazel,
Alkindi, and Maimonides, and castigates those Christians
who held the erroneous views. Josef Koch's edition of the
text is published with John O. Reidl's translation in

Errores philosophorum (Milwaukee: Marquette University
Press, 1944)~ a translation by Herman Shapiro appears on
pp. 386-413 of his Medieval Philosophy (New York: Random
House, 1964).
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regulation forbidding arts masters to treat theological
questions.IO

The following year Bonaventure saw fit to

repeat his attacks on the followers of Aristotle and the
Peripatetics in his Easter Collationes in Hexaemeron.

A

university decree of 2 September 1276 prohibited all
private teaching except for logic and grammar, a move which
prevented any rebellious masters from promulgating
heretical doctrines in secret.

Less than three months

later, on 23 November, Siger and two of his colleagues,
Bernier of Nivelles and Gosvin de La Chapelle, were called
before the French office of the Inquisition to answer
charges of heresy, of which they were subsequently
convicted.

Someone must have informed the new pope, John

XXI, of the dangerous ideas circulating at Paris, for on 18
January 1277 he ordered Stephen Tempier to investigate
certain errors and to make a report.
been executed with greater zeal.

Rarely has a command

Assembling a committee of

sixteen theologians, Tempier orchestrated the
identification and wholesale condemnation of 219
propositions on 7 March.

Ten days later in a related

event, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Robert Kilwardby,
condemned 30 propositions circulating at Oxford.

Although

there is no evidence that the Holy Father saw Tempier's
decree before it was issued--indeed on 28 April he wrote to
him, asking for the names of those perpetrating errors but
10. See Chartularium I, 499f, and Thornkike, University
Records, pp. 85f.
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making no mention of the condemnation itself--there can be
little doubt that it pleased him, for he never made any
attempt to revoke the decree or to limit its force.
the evidence points to a hasty job.

All

Allowing time for

Tempier to receive the papal letter and to gather around
him a sizeable group of men, not more than four weeks could
have been devoted to the preparation of the document.

The

prohibited articles were not listed in a logical order,
they contained both repetitions and contradictions, and
they included some perfectly orthodox opinions, among them
several upheld by Aquinas.11

The fact that 7 March was the

anniversary of Thomas' death has already been mentioned.
Surely this was no coincidence~ Thomas had not endeared
himself to Bonaventure and his followers, who were only too
anxious to heap coals on the memory of the Angelic Doctor.
As Peckham understood it, Thomas' system "despises the
doctrines of the Fathers and bases itself almost completely
on the doctrines of philosophers, so that the house of God
is filled with idols."12
But Aquinas was not the main target.

The Condemnation

of 1277 was "the brutal resolution of a crisis whose first
symptoms had been manifest since the first years of the

11. Some of these are identified by Armand A. Maurer,
Medieval Philosophy (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 206.
One such proposition was that the action of the will
naturally follows upon the judgment the of reason.
12. Quoted by Van Steenberghen, p. 104.
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century: the crisis of the Christian intelligence, shaken
by the wholesale invasion of pagan learning."13

It was

Aristotle and his Arabian commentators who had shaken the
Christian intelligence, and it was they who received the
full brunt of the blow.

Both the content and the spirit of

profane philosophy were directly impugned.

Each of the

thirteen articles condemned in 1270 was condemned again, in
one form or another, and many other opinions met the same
fate.

Some propositions were clearly counter to Christian

doctrinel4: others encouraged immorality or denied its
consequences.IS

Several propositions betray a bitter

professional rivalry between the theologians and the arts
mastersl6, a situation clearly evident in these statements
from Boethius of Dacia, one of those targeted by the
Condemnation: "It is easier for the philosopher to be
virtuous than anyone else":

"When a man is engaged in

[philosophical] activity he is in the best state possible
13. Van Steenberghen, p. 103.
14. Number 1: "That God is not triune • • • ": number 189:
"That creation is not possible, even though the contrary
must be held according to faith."
15. Number 183: "That simple fornication, namely, that of
an unmarried man with an unmarried woman, is not a sin":
number 178: "That death is the end of all terrors.--The
statement is erroneous if it excludes the terror of hell,
which is the last": number 19: "That the separated soul in
no way suffers from fire."
16. Number 40: "That there is no more excellent state than
to study philosophy": number 154: "That the only wise men
are philosophers": number 152: "That the teachings of the
theologian are based on fables": number 153: "That one does
not know anything more by the fact that he knows theology."
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to man."17

The preface of the decree explicitly banned the

licentious book De deo amoris by one Andre le Chapelain,18
a work on geomancy by an unnamed author, and other occult
writings.

Some sharp words were reserved for those who

held the doctrine of the double truth.

But above all, the

Condemnation of 1277 was a declaration of God's absolute
free will to do as he pleases, apart from rational and
physical necessity.

As Hooykaas has observed, the Parisian

theologians were defending the "core of religion, namely,
that creation depends on God and not God on creation.»19
"That God of necessity makes whatever comes immediately
from Him" (number 53): "That God cannot be the cause of a
newly-made thing and cannot produce anything new" (number
48): "That what is impossible absolutely speaking cannot be
brought about by God or by another agent" (number
147)--these and propositions like them were banned because
they placed limitations on God's power or subjected His
will to some external requirement.

Such a step was wholly

in keeping with the emphasis on voluntarism in Augustinian
theology.
Tempier's decree had several significant effects, but
the most important was that medieval philosophy reaped a
17. Quoted by Maurer, p. 204.
18. See A.J. Denomy, "The De Amore of Andreas Capellanus
and the Condemnation of 1277," Mediaeval Studies 8 (1946),
107-23.
19. "Science and Theology," p. 104.
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harvest of nominalism, which emphasized the inscrutability
of the divine will and the contingency of all created
things.20

William of Ockham (ca. 1285-1349), the chief

representative of this movement, taught that God was not
obligated to any action.21

Thus he opposed all attempts to

deduce the world~ priori.

The knowledge that one thing

exists, he said, does not allow us to infer the existence
of any other thing, for there is no guarantee that ideas
correspond to reality.

Relations between objects can only

be detected a posteriori, through the senses.

Even then,

we can have no certain knowledge of causal connections, for
God can produce an effect in any way he pleases.22
The impact of this "radical empiricism" on medieval
natural philosophy has been the subject of considerable
debate by historians of science.23

Pierre Duhem, the great

Catholic apologist for medieval science, saw the birth of

20. See Heiko Obermann, The Harvest of Medieval Theology
(Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1963).
21. In a commentary on the sentences, Ockham wrote: "Deus
autem ad nullum actum potest obligarir et ideo eo ipso quod
Deus vult, hoc est justum fieri." Quoted by Vernon J.
Bourke, Will in Western Thou ht: An Historico-Critical
Survey (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1964 , p. 174.
22. See Edward Grant, "Late Medieval Thought, Copernicus,
and the Scientific Revolution," JHI 23 (1962), 197-220, and
Ernest Moody, "Empiricism and Metaphysics in Medieval
Philosophy," The Philosophical Review 67 (1958), 145-63.
23. I am relying here on the excellent summary accounts in
Hooykaas, "Science and Theology," pp. 78-81, and Edward
Grant, "Late Medieval Thought, Copernicus, and the
Scientific Revolution."

25
modern science in nominalism and in certain propositions
condemned in 1277, notably articles 34 ("That the first
cause cannot make more than one world") and 49 ("That God
could not move the heaven in a straight line, the reason
being that He would then leave a vacuum").

In his opinion

the Condemnation freed medieval science from its
Aristotelian prejudices and stimulated the discussion of
novel hypotheses about the physical world.

Some of these

hypotheses, he argued, particularly those about the motion
of the world, fostered the development of a new mechanics
which foreshadowed the work of Galileo and his
contemporaries.24

On the other hand, Alexandre Koyr~ has

insisted that the only effect of the condemnation on
natural philosophy was to force the concession that God
could do things in any manner that he chose, yet natural
philosophers still seemed to assume that the world God had
chosen to make was Aristotelian. 2 5

Thus they pursued their

studies within the traditional world picture.

Reijer

Hooykaas prefers a more moderate line: "medieval theology
did not hamper the development of science," but "in some
respects it gave scope for [the] free development of
science by liberating it from philosophical constraint,"
although "it did not directly stimulate scientific
24. See volume 6 of Le systeme du monde (10 Vols.~ Paris,
Hermann, 1913-59).
25. See "Le Vide et l'Espace Infini au XVIe Siecle,"
Archives doctrinale et litteraire du Moyen Age 24 (1947),
45-91.
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research."26

Who is correct?

What were the actual effects

of the Condemnation of 1277 on late medieval science?

In

an attempt to answer these questions I will briefly
consider the problems of the plurality of worlds and the
motion of the earth as they were discussed in the
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.
According to orthodox Aristotelian thought, there
could only be one world.

The arguments for this position

are given in a commentary on the Sphere of Sacrobosco
attributed to Michael Scot and written well before 1277.27
If another world existed, the author said, it would have to
be in a place different from that of our world, but then
intermediate space would exist between the two worlds,
space which would not be body but which could not be void
because a void is impossible.

Furthermore, the elements in

another world would have to be the same as those in our
world~ they would possess similar properties and would have
the same natural motions.

But this would cause confusion,

for the element earth would tend to move both toward the
center of our world and toward the center of the other
world~ hence it would both fall and rise naturally, an
absurdity.

Michael therefore concluded that although God

could have made other worlds, he obviously had not really
done so, since nature lacked the capacity to recieve them.
26. "Science and Theology," p. 77.
27. See Grant, "The Condemnation of 1277," pp. 217-223.
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After Tempier had condemned the proposition that God could
not make more than one world, some continued to follow
Michael's line of reasoning, holding that such an act on
God's part, while possible in an absolute sense, would be
utterly unintelligible.

But others "took seriously the

possibility that God could create other worlds than our own
and, on the assumption that he did create them, sought to
counter those of Aristotle's arguments that had previously
been accepted more or less routinely. 11 28

In his French

commentary (1377) on Aristotle's De caelo, Nicole Oresme
admitted that "there never has been nor will there be more
than one corporeal world," yet he tried to make sense of
the claim that "God can and could in his omnipotence make
another world besides this one or several like or unlike
it."29

Oresme allowed that this created difficulties for

the idea of natural place, but instead of denying the
existence of other worlds, as Michael had done, Oresme
redefined "heavy" and "light" in relative terms which made
no reference to natural places.

A "heavy" body was said to

be "down" simply when it was surrounded by "light" bodies
which were said to be "up."

In intercosmic void space, a

body would not be surrounded by others and hence would be
neither "heavy" nor "light."

It would not seek to move in

any direction, but would come to rest.

28. Ibid., p. 220.
29. Quoted in ibid., p. 223.

Therefore if an
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earthy body from our world were to rise through the sphere
of the stars, it would not continue to move toward the
center of another world: being neither "heavy" nor "light,"
it would stay in the void between the worlds.

As for this

void--its very impossibility one of Michael Scot's
objections against the plurality of worlds--Oresme simply
assumed its possibility.
stance.

Robert Holkot took a stronger

In his Four Books of Questions on the Sentences he

assumed that God really could make another world, in which
case he could put it anywhere.

But what is now in the

place where God could put such a world?

Either a body or

nothing: if nothing, as Holkot preferred to assume, then we
must conclude that a vacuum presently exists beyond the
world, for God can really put something there, and any
place in which a body could be but is not constitutes a
vacuum.

It is significant that Holkot phrased this not in

the customary subjunctive mood, but in the indicative:
"extra mundum nihil est, et extra mundum potest esse
corpus: ergo extra mundum est vacuum, quia ubi potest esse
corpus, et nullum est, ibi vacuum est.
est."30

Ergo vacuum modo

For him, the real possibility that God could

create another world led to the actuality that a vacuum
presently exists beyond the world.

Although he did not

directly refer to any condemned articles, one can hardly
avoid hearing the footsteps of 1277 in Holkot's deliberate

30. Quoted in ibid., p. 224 n46.
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stride.
The impact of the Condemnation is equally apparent in
late medieval discussions of the possible motion of the
earth, something which was impossible in Aristotelian
natural philosophy for several reasons.

Since every

rectilinear motion was necessarily from place to place and
since the last heaven had no place, the world could not be
moved in a right line.

But suppose that it were to be

moved: how could we know it, with no stationary body for
our reference point?

Again, if the earth were to move, a

vacuum would be left behind, since a vacuum is a place
where a body could be but is not, and a vacuum is
impossible.31

Two of the many natural philosophers who

responded to these arguments in an attempt to make the
earth's possible motion intelligible were Jean Buridan and
Nicole Oresme.

Each undertook to redefine motion, and each

cited article 49 of the Condemnation as a reason for doing
so.

If God can move the world in a straight line, said

Buridan, then he can certainly move it circularly.

Now

such a motion would be undetectable if it were shared by
all parts of the world~ nevertheless it would in fact be
motion because God would be causing it and, presumably, he
would know this.

The same applies to the case of

rectilinear motion.

If all parts of the world were to be

moved together by God in a straight line, there would be no
31. These arguments are given in ibid., pp. 226-228.
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relative motion to observe, yet the world would still be
moving.

Thus for Buridan, God functioned as the absolute

reference for the motion of the world.

There was no need

to postulate places between which motion could occur.
Oresme's answer was much the same.

The motion of the world

could occur in an imaginary space beyond the world, an
absolute space not defined by reference to any body, a real
space over which God ruled at his pleasure and through
which he could transport the world if he so desired.32
I have cited only a few examples of the impact of the
Condemnation on late medieval science.
many more.

There are many,

As Grant has observed,

Frequent citation of, and implicit allusions to,
numerous articles of the Condemnation of 1277 should
convince us that it was taken seriously throughout
the fourteenth century and that it encouraged
innumerable invocations of God's absolute power in a
variety of hypothetical physical situations. The
supernatural alternatives which medieval scholastics
considered in the wake of the condemnation
conditioned them to consider possibilities outside
the ken of Aristotelian natural philosophy, and
usually in direct conflict with it. So widespread
was the contemplation of such hypothetical
possiblities in the late Middle Ages that it is no
exaggeration to view them as an integral feature of
late medieval thought.33
God's absolute power, Grant goes on to say, was "a

32. See ibid., pp. 229-32. As we shall see in a later
chapter, Newton used the same arguments against Descartes'
conception of relative motion, in defense of an absolute
space in which God was omnipresent.
33. Ibid., p. 239.
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convenient vehicle" for the consideration of original
physical hypotheses.

But if the Condemnation caused some

to challenge certain fundamental Aristotelian principles,
he points out, it did not result in a new science of
nature.

The possibilities entertained by the nominalists

were put forth secundum imaginationem, according to the
imagination, not according to the truth.

In spite of the

vigor with which a few scholastics pursued the possibility
of a moving earth, none of them, as far as is known, ever
actually believed that the earth moves.

The scientific

revolution did not begin until Copernicus proclaimed the
earth's motion as the true explanation of the phenomena.
If the nominalist "atmosphere of uncertainty" had
prevailed, Grant concludes, the scientific revolution
probably could not have happened.34
I find myself in agreement with Grant's main thesis,
that medieval nominalism did not produce the scientific
revolution.

It will be my chief purpose in this essay,

however, to demonstrate that the theology associated with
the Condemnation of 1277 did in fact play a major role
within the scientific revolution: to wit, it encouraged the
development of a new view of scientific knowledge as
deriving from phenomena rather than from propositions.

In

a provocative essay on "Empiricism and the Scientific
34. This interpretation is developed in "Late Medieval
Thought" and "Hypotheses in Late Medieval and Early Modern
Science," Daedalus 91 (1962), 599-616.
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Revolution,"35 Ernan McMullin has argued that "the history
of science, from its Greek beginnings right down to the
present, has been marked by a tension between two views
concerning the nature of science, which we can call the
conceptualist and the empiricist views."

Where the

conceptualist assumes "that a direct access to the essence
or structure of natural objects is available," the
empiricist believes "that evidence for a scientific
statement" can be found "only in the singular observations
on which the statement rests."

Conceptualist science "will

be certain and definitive": empiricist science "will be
tentative, approximate, progressive."

McMullin offers the

following historical analysis in terms of these categories:
Although challenged by the positivism of the later
nominalists, "the dominant medieval theory of science was
conceptualist."

The science of the early seventeenth

century "was still largely conceptualist," but it "became
more and more empiricist in tone" as the century
continued.36

This is precisely the pattern which emerges

from the four case studies in the following pages: the
conceptualism of Galileo and Descartes belonged to the
first half of the seventeenth century, the empiricism of
Boyle and Newton to the latter half.

What I intend to show

35. In Art, Science, and History in the Renaissance, ed.
Charles S. Singleton (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1967),
pp. 331-69. This article contains a brief rejoinder to
Grant's view of Copernicus and nominalism.
See pp. 341-44.
36. Pages 332-34.
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is that this change in philosophy of nature from
conceptualism to empiricism was accompanied by a change in
theology of creation from rationalism to voluntarism.
the medieval nominalists were unable to accomplish--the
construction of a science of contingent truths deriving
from phenomena--the seventeenth century voluntarists
successfully carried out.

What

CHAPTER TWO:
GALILEO AND THE GOD OF REASON

The possibility of an applied mathematics is an expression,
in terms of natural science, of the Christian belief that
nature is the creation of an omnipotent God.
This belief
is what replaced the Greek conception of nature as the
realm of imprecision with the Renaissance conception of
nature as the realm of precision. The Platonism of
Renaissance natural science is not fundamentally Platonic,
it is fundamentally Christian. Christian thought is
adapting Platonism to its own ends, or begetting upon
Platonism an idea which Platonism proper would never have
originated or even tolerated.
--R.G. Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics, p. 253

By his free use of the word "nature," he [Galileo] does not
mean to deny an ultimately religious interpretation of
things. God, by his immediate creative knowledge of
nature, thinks into the world that rigorous mathematical
necessity which we reach only laboriously through
resolutions and demonstrations--God is a geometrician in
his creative labours--he makes the world through and
through a mathematical system • • • • It was this religious
basis of his philosophy that made Galileo bold to declare
that doubtful passages of scripture should be interpreted
in the light of scientific discovery rather than the
reverse. God has made the world an immutable mathematical
system, permitting by the mathematical method an absolute
certainty of scientific knowledge. The disagreements of
theologians about the meaning of scripture are ample
testimony to the fact that here no such certainty is
possible.
--E.A. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern
Physical Science, pp. 82f
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Giorgio Spini's remark that "our sources of
information about Galileo's religiousness do not always
allow us to reach a certainty beyond all reasonable doubt"
greatly understates the case.I

Apart from his letter to

the Grand Duchess Christina, which was hardly a spontaneous
effusion of deep religious conviction, Galileo never wrote
at length on any religious topic, and some of the little
that he did say--for example, the pious platitudes
scattered sparingly throughout his works--can only be taken
with a grain of salt.

From all appearances, Galileo

reflected his civic heritage: religion, while necessary for
salvation, need not be an important part of one's private
lifer public worship, not personal piety, was the rule for
Florentine society.2
1. "The Rationale of Galileo's Religiousness," in Galileo
Reappraised, ed. Carlo L. Gelino (Berkeley: The University
of California Press, 1966), p. 44. The standard edition of
Galileo's works is the 20-volume Le Opere di Galileo
Galilei, ed. Antonio Favaro (Florence: G. Barbera,
1899-1909). Most of my references will be to English
translations.
2. See Gene A. Brucker, Renaissance Florence (New York:
John Wiley & Sons, 1969), pp. 172-212. An ambivalent
attitude toward the Church was a characteristic feature of
Renaissance Florence. A host of cults and confraternities
and periodic revivals gave Florentines ample opportunities
to display their public religion. Yet Florence suffered
heretics quite readily, and was more than once under the
threat of an interdict: anticlericalism was virtually a
sign of good citizenship.
In financial matters the
cittadini looked after their own interests first: if a
number of highborn women ended up in nunneries, it was
largely because their families could not afford to provide
them with dowries.
Galileo, who sent both of his daughters
into cloisters, himself studied at a Vallombrosan monastery
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It would be a serious mistake, however, to assume that
Galileo had no faith at all.

Too often he is depicted as a

martyr for the church scientific, or a saint who strode
forth like David to slay the Goliath of Catholic theology
with his smooth stones of critical reasoning.

Such

accounts only serve to obscure the complexities of the
historical reality: Galileo had his supporters in the
Church, and some of his staunchest intellectual foes were
Latin Averroists like Cesare Cremonini, Fortunio Liceti,
and Antonio Rocco, outspoken libertines who had no time for
Christianity. 3

The fact is that Galileo never repudiated

his Catholicism publicly or privately--indeed he saw
himself as saving the Church from error by championing the
truth of Copernicanism.4

Furthermore, in confronting the

virtual identification of mathematics with physics, and the
justification he provided was couched in the language and
concepts of theology.

Some scholars, clinging tenaciously

to their precious positivist picture of Galileo, refuse to
allow that he ever engaged in serious metaphysical
as a youth and even became a novice in that order before
Vincenzio put a stop to a monastic career for his son.
3. See Spini, pp. 57-58; Giorgio de Santillana, The Crime
of Galileo (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955);
Jerome J. Langford, Galileo, Science, and the Church (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966); and Stillman
Drake, Galileo at Work (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1978), especially p. 288.
4. See his Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina, ed. Drake
in Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo (Garden City, NY:
Doubleday, 1957), pp. 175-216.
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speculation.5

Maurice Clavelin, I think, comes much closer

to the truth:
To hold that mathematical reason is capable of
embracing reality, to assume that rational necessity
is akin to natural necessity, to turn simplicity into
a touchstone of scientific explanation is not to
introduce so many ostensive definitions based on the
evidence of our senses, but rather to choose a
metaphysical position.6
He did so consciously, above all in the Dialogue, where the
debate between Salviati and Simplicio hinged on the
relevance of mathematics to the physical world.7

In the

ensuing discussion we shall see that Galileo's ideal of a
5. For example, Stillman Drake, .£.E.• cit., and Edward w.
Strong, "The Relationship between Metaphysics and
Scientific Method in Galileo's Work," in Galileo: Man of
Science, ed. Ernan McMullin (New York: Basic Books, 1967),
pp. 352-364.
6. The Natural Philoso h of Galileo, trans. A.J. Pomerans
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1974 , p. 461.
Edwin Arthur
Burtt was an early proponent of The Metaphysical
Foundations of Modern Physical Science (2nd ed.~ Lonson:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1932)~ so was Alexandre Koyre,
Galileo Studies, trans. John Mepham (Atlantic Highlands,
N.J.: Humanities Press, 1978), and "Galileo and Plato," JHI
4(1943), 400-428.
7. Simplicio maintained, "with Aristotle, that in physical
[naturali] matters one need not always require a
mathematical demonstration." Dialogue Concerning the Two
Chief World Systems--Ptolemaic & Copernican, trans.
Stillman Drake (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1953), p. 14. Simplicio did not come over to Salviati's
position until the First Day of the Discourses, when he
admitted that "if I were to begin my studies over again, I
should try to follow the advice of Plato and commence from
mathematics, which proceeds so carefully, and does not
admit as certain anything except what it has conclusively
proved." On the Second Day he added, "Truly, I begin to
understand that although logic is a very excellent
instrument to govern our reasoning, it does not compare
with the sharpness of geometry in awakening the mind to
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mathematical, a priori science of nature was grounded
explicitly on a rationalistic understanding of God's
relation to created objects and to created minds.
The Perfect Creation of an Omnipotent God
Philosophy, wrote Galileo in The Assayer,
is·written in this grand book--! mean the
universe--which stands continually open to our gaze,
but it cannot be understood unless one first learns
to comprehend the language and interpret the
characters in which it is written.
It is written in
the language of mathematics, and its characters are
triangles, circles, and other geometrical figures,
without which it is humanly impossible to understand
a single word of it1 without these, one is wandering
about in a dark labyrinth.a
The strong Platonic flavor of this passage and others like
it has lent credence to the notion that Galileo can best be
understood as a Platonist.9

To be sure, he styled himself

as a champion of Plato's emphasis on mathematics and pure
discovery [invenzione]." Two New Sciences, trans. Stillman
Drake (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974), pp.
93 and 133. Hereafter these translations will be referred
to as the Dialogue and the Discourses, respectively.
8. From pp. 183f of Stillman Drake's translation, found on
pp. 151-336 of The Controversy on the Comets of 1618, ed.
Drake and C.D. O'Malley (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1960). All future references to The
Assayer will be to this translation.
9. See Burtt, .2£• cit.1 Koyre, .2£• cit., and "Newton,
Galileo, and Plato," in his Newtonian Studies (London:
Chapman and Hall), pp. 201-2201 Ernst Cassirer, "Galileo's
Platonism," Studies and Essa sin the Histor of Science,
ed. M. Ashley Montagu (New York: Schuman, 1946 , pp.
277-297, and "Mathematical Mysticism and Mathematical
Science," in Galileo: Man of Science, pp. 338-351. Compare
th~ correctives offered by Dudley Shapere, "Descartes and
Plato," JHI 24 (1963), 573-5761 A.C. Crombie, "Galileo's
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reason, as over and against Aristotle's reliance on
dialectic and direct sense experience: in the great
Renaissance debate immortalized in Raphael's "School of
Athens," Galileo followed Plato's upraised arm rather than
Aristotle's earthbound gesture.IO

But Plato's god differed

profoundly from Galileo's, and consequently so did his
conception of science.

Although the Demiurge had wanted to

make a perfect world, he had been limited by a recalcitrant
matter.

Necessity--not natural law but its very

antithesis, an indeterminate, unintelligible chaos
--had required to be persuaded to cooperate with Reason in
producing the world.

Alas, Reason had not been wholly

successful, so the product was only an imperfect copy of
the ideal reality.

Physical things, as flawed images in

the world of becoming, merely "participated" in number:
they did not perfectly embody the mathematical forms of the
world of being which alone were fully comprehensible.
Physics, the study of physical objects, could therefore be
only a "likely story," not a true science capable of giving
knowledge.11
Conception of Scientific Truth," in Literature and Science,
Proceedings of the Sixth Triennial Congress of the
International Federation for Modern Language and Literature
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1955), pp. 132-138: Ernan
McMullin, "Galileo, Man of Science," in Galieo: Man of
Science, pp. 3-51: and Thomas P. McTighe, "Galileo's
Platonism: A Reconsideration," ibid., pp. 365-387.
10. I.B. Cohen uses the same example in "A Sense of History
in Science," American Journal of Physics 18 (1950), 343-59.
11. Francis Macdonald Cornford, Plato's Cosmology (London:
Kegan Paul, 1937), pp. 23, 34, 171-172.
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For Galileo, however, the "great book of nature" was
"the creation of the omnipotent Craftsman," not of a mere
Demiurge.

The world was "most perfect, being the chief

work of God."

It was therefore "of necessity, most

orderly, having its parts disposed in the highest and most
perfect order among themselves."

This principle being

established, said Salviati, it follows that "straight
motion cannot be natural for any body," for "whatever moves
straight changes place," and "if that were the motion which
naturally suited it, then at the beginning it was not in
its proper place," which contradicts the assumption of
perfect order.

Only circular motion and rest were suitable

for a perfect world.12

God's perfect creative act was

likewise the formal cause of circular motion in the
heavens.

Twice in the First Day of the Dialogue and once

more in the Fourth Day of the Discourses, Galileo
speculated on the origin of the solar system.13

Each time

conception to himself (under the pseudonym of the "Lincean
Academician" or a similar conceit).

From this and from the

fact that he apparently believed that he had mathematically
verified it, we must conclude that Galileo took his
"Platonic" cosmogony quite seriously.

It is not really

Platonic--nothing resembling it can be found in

12. Dialogue, pp. 3, 14, 19, and 31-32.
13. Pages 20-21, 29-30~ and 232-234, respectively.
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Plato.14

Nevertheless Galileo believed that he was

"illustrating a Platonic concept" whose foundations, which
he had discovered by "removing their poetical mask or
semblance, show it in the guise of a true story [verace
istoria]."15

According to Sagredo, Plato had said that

God, after having created the moveable celestial
bodies, in order to assign to them those speeds with
which they must be moved perpetually in equable
circular motion, made them depart from rest and move
through determinate spaces, • • • successively
accelerating. And he added that these having been
made to gain that degree [of speed] which it pleased
God that they should maintain forever, He turned
their straight motion into circulation, the only kind
that is suitable to be conserved equably, turning
always without retreat from or approach toward any

14. Samuel Sambursky has speculated that Galileo was
inspired by sections 30A, 38C-39A, and 43B of the Timaeus.
See "Galileo's Attempt at a Cosmogony," Isis 53 (1962),
460-464.
Alexandre Koyre says flatly, "the theory in
question is not in Plato." See "Newton, Galileo, and
Plato," in his Newtonian Studies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1965), pp. 201-220. Galileo's presumably
unsuccessful effort to provide a mathematical foundation
for his scheme is explored in I.B. Cohen, "Galileo, Newton,
and the Divine Order of the Solar System," in Galileo: Man
of Science, pp. 207-231; and Shigeru Nakayama, "Galileo and
Newton's Problem of World-Formation," Japanese Studies in
the History of Science 1 (1962), 76-82.
15. Dialogue, p. 29; Discourses, p. 233.
I cannot resist
quoting Cornford's comment about the Timaeus: "Some have
regarded the mythical character of the dialogue as a 'veil
of allegory,' which can be 'stripped off,' and have
imagined that they could state in literal terms the meaning
which Plato has chosen to disguise • • • • But there
remains an irreducible element of poetry, which refuses to
be translated into the language of scientific prose. Plato
declares that his account, so far from being exact, cannot
even be consistent with itself. The inexactness and
inconsistency are inherent in the nature of the subject:
they cannot be removed by 'stripping off the veil of
allegory'." Plato's Cosmology, p. 32.
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pre-established goal desired by them.16
More importantly, perfection meant that God's
mathematical ideas had been completely realized in the
objects he had created.

Even the complexities of real

bodies were subject to the exacting scrutiny of geometry.17
Simplicio, the plodder who represented Aristotelian
philosophy in the Dialogue, argued that while
mathematicians may prove their propositions well enough in
theory, things happened otherwise in practice.

Ideal

spheres were not material spheresr the imperfection of
matter prevented "things taken concretely from
corresponding to those considered in the abstract."
Galileo's spokesman Salviati denied the charge:
SALV. Are you not saying that because of the
imperfection of matter, a body which ought to be
perfectly spherical and a plane which ought to be
perfectly flat do not achieve concretely what one
imagines of them in the abstract?
SIMP. That is what I say.
SALV. Then whenever you apply a material sphere to a
material plane in the concrete, you apply a sphere
which is not perfect to a plane which is not perfect,
and you say that these do not touch each other in one
point. But I tell you that even in the abstract, an
immaterial sphere which is not a perfect sphere can
16. Discourses, p. 233.
17. As Crombie has pointed out, Galileo differed with Plato
on the matter of essentialism: where Plato maintained that
the physical world was a poor copy of mathematical forms,
Galileo held that it "actually consisted of the
mathematical primary qualities and their 'Iaws, and that
these laws were discoverable in detail with absolute
certainty." Op. cit., p. 135, his italics. William R.
Shea, GalileoT's Intellectual Revolution (New York: Science
History Publications, 1977), agrees. See page xi.
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touch an immaterial plane which is not perfectly flat
in not one point, but over a part of its surface, so
that what happens in the concrete up to this point
happens the same way in the abstract • • • • Just as
the computer who wants his calculations to deal with
sugar, silk, and wool must discount the boxes, bales,
and other packings, so the mathematical scientist
[filosofo geometra], when he wants to recognize in
the concrete the effects which he has proved in the
abstract, must deduct the material hindrances, and if
he is able to do so, I assure you that things are in
no less agreement than arithmetical computations.
The errors, then, lie not in the abstractness or
concreteness, not in geometry or physics, but in a
calculator who does not know how to make a true
accounting.18
Although nature might not be simple, it was nevertheless
wholly explicable in mathematical terms.

As McTighe has

put it, for Galileo there was "no intractable surd in the
things of nature which defies rationalization."19

Failure

to plumb the depths of the created order was due not to the
intrinsic recalcitrance of an imperfect matter, but rather
to the mathematical incompetence of the human investigator.
Galileo's assumption that, because the Divine geometer
had fully carried out His intentions nature was at root
mathematical, amounted to the identification of
mathematical form as the intelligible essence of bodies.

I

have said, "of bodies," not "of substances," for Galileo
emphatically denied that we could know the true essences of

18. The discussion begins on p. 203 and closes with this
quotation from pp. 207f. Cf. Discourses, pp. 12f.
19. 2£• cit., p. 369.
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substances in this temporal world.20

But the essences of

mathematical forms could in fact be known--properties could
be deduced from definitions.

To learn about a circle, we

should begin with one of the simplest properties, and
"taking this for the definition of a circle, proceed by
reasoning" to other properties.

God, who simply apprehends

"the circle's essence, knows without time-consuming
reasoning all the infinity of its properties."

To the

degree that we, too, could know the essence of a form, to
that same degree we could share in the Divine knowledge.21
If one were unable to reduce a thing to intelligible
essences--to regular geometric figures--then one could not
know its properties.22

The regular geometric forms--the

sphere, the cube, the pyramid, etc.--were "equally eternal

20. Letters on Sunspots, trans. Stillman Drake, in his
Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo (Garden City, NY:
Doubleday, 1957), pp. 123f. Cf. Dialogue, p. 234.
21. Dialogue, pp. 103f~ cf. p. 204.
22. Regular lines, Galileo wrote in The Assayer (p. 197),
are "susceptible of definition and of having their
qualities and properties demonstrated. Thus the spiral is
regular, and its definition originates in two uniform
motions, one straight and the other circular~ so is the
ellipse, which originates from the cutting of a cone or a
cylinder~ and so on. But irregular lines are those which
have no determinacy whatever and are indefinite and casual,
and hence indefineable~ no property of such lines can be
demonstrated, nor in a word can anything be known about
them.
Hence to say, 'Such events take place by reason of
an irregular line' is the same as saying, 'I do not know
why they occur.' The introduction of such lines is in no
way superior to the sympathy, antipathy, occult properties,
influences, and other terms employed by some philosophers
as a cloak for the correct reply, which would be: 'I do not
know.' "

45
and prior to the creation of heaven and earth,"23 by which
Galileo probably meant that God was the Divine geometer in
a literal sense: as constant objects of his intellect,
geometrical forms had always existed in his mind, and were
thereby "co-eternal with God," to borrow a Nee-Platonic
phrase from Johannes Kepler.24

Galileo therefore equated

science, true and necessary knowledge of nature, with
mathematics, true and necessary demonstration.

Probable

arguments were not good enough: conclusions not "proved by
necessary demonstrations from their primary and
unquestionable foundations" did not belong in science.
Natural truths "must follow necessarily, in such a way that
it would be impossible for them to take place in any other
manner," for "just as there is no middle ground between
truth and falsity in physical things, so in rigorous proofs
one must either establish his point beyond any doubt or
else beg the question inexcusably."25

"The method that we

shall follow," Galileo proclaimed in De motu, "will be
always to make what is said depend on what was said before,
and, if possible, never to assume as true that which
23. Postil 113 to Orazio Grassi's Ratio ponderum librae et
simbellae, quoted by Shea, .£P.· cit., p. 90.
Elsewhere
Galileo described the circle as "more regular so to say,
than any other [form]." Quoted in ibid., p. 107 n32.
24. "Geometrical reasons are co-eternal with God," Epitome
of Copernican Astronomy, Book IV, trans. Charles Glenn
Wallis, Great Books of the Western World (Chicago: UP,
1952), Vol. 16, p. 863.
25. Discourses, pp. 15f: Dialogue, p. 424: The Assayer, p.
252. Cf. Dialogue, pp. 157ff.
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requires proof."26

The contradiction of geometry was "the

bald denial of truth."27
In Galileo's opinion, then, scientific conclusions
ought to have the force of "necessary and eternal"
conclusions.28

But this would only be possible if God

himself, as Author of the great book of the universe,
guaranteed that nature displayed the same characteristics
as the mathematical language in which it was written, and
further guaranteed that the human mind was capable of
reading that language.

Galileo claimed nothing less.

Since he took "matter to be inalterable--that is, always
the same," it was evident that for any "eternal and
necessary property, purely mathematical demonstrations can
26. Galileo Galilei On Motion and On Mechanics, trans. I.E.
Drabkin and Stillman Drake (Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1960), p. 50. Galileo and Descartes
clearly held a common view of knowledge.
Ironically they
differed on the role of mathematics in their respective
systems. Descartes shunned a truly mathematical science
for an essentially Aristotelian method of necessary
demonstration from qualitative~ priori principles, taking
geometry as a "paradigm of intelligibility" but not in
itself as a significant component of science. Galileo, on
the other hand, actually equated geometry with physical
science. See McTighe, .2£• cit., p. 376.
27. The Assayer, p. 164.
28. This is the substance of his critique of William
Gilbert in the Dialogue, p. 406.
The Italian here is
"conclusioni naturali, necessarie ed eterne." (Favaro VII,
356) Salusbury rendered this as "natural, necessary, and
lasting conclusions," which is not the literal meaning.
Mathematical Collections and Translations (London, 1661),
Tome I, p. 370. The Salusbury translation was reprinted in
a slightly modified form as the Dialogue on the Great World
Systems, revised and annotated by Giorgio de Santillana
(Chicago: UP, 1953). See page 415.
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be produced that are no less rigorous than any others."29
As "the obedient executrix of God's commands," nature was
"inexorable and immutable," never transgressing "the laws
imposed upon her."30

The human mind could comprehend those

laws specifically because God allowed it "to partake of
divinity" by understanding numbers.

Within the limited

range of mathematical demonstration, human "knowledge
equals the Divine in objective certainty, for here it
succeeds in understanding necessity, beyond which there can
be no greater sureness."31

Indeed this certainty was

inborn--by means of the thought experiment, one discovered
the truth which was already present in his own mind.
Presumably it had been implanted there by God, "who has
endowed us with sense, reason, and intellect • • • to give
us knowledge."

Holy Scripture itself could be interpreted

in more than one way.

But necessary demonstration yielded

unique, certain conclusions which could--and should--aid
29. Discourses, p. 13. Galileo's words here are the same
as before: "eterna e necessaria." (Favaro VIII, 51) The
translation of Henry Crew and Alfonsio de Salvio reads as
follows: "Since I assume matter to be unchangeable and
always the same, • • • we are no less able to treat this
constant and invariable property in a rigid manner than if
it belonged to simple and pure mathematics." Dialogues
Concerning Two New Sciences (New York: Macmillan, 1914), p.
3.
30. Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina, p. 182. Cf. the
Letters on Sunspots, p. 136. In a letter to Diodati of 16
July 1611 (Favaro XI, 149), Galileo referred to nature as
the "inexorable and immutable minister of God." Quoted by
McTighe, ~- cit., p. 375.
31. Dialogue, pp. 11 and 103. For Galileo's Platonic
theory of knowledge, see Shea, pp. 150-155.
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even "in the true exposition of the Bible and in the
investigation of those meanings which are necessarily
contained therein, for these must be concordant with
demonstrated truths."32

The Book of Nature and the Book of

Scripture had in fact the same Author, but the Divine
geometer had spoken a different language than the Holy
Spirit, and had written with greater clarity and force.
Divine Transcendence and the Limits of Human Reason
Rationalism in theology, according to M.B. Foster, "is
the doctrine that the actvity of God is an activity of
reason.

It implies the corollary that the activity of

reason in man, in so far as it is pure, is itself
divine."33

This, the dominant theme of Galileo's theology,

served as the foundation for his ideal of a deductive
science of necessary truths.

Yet Galileo never lost sight

of his only limited capacity to participate in God's
unlimited understanding of the creation.

He believed that

"the human understanding can be taken in two modes, the
32. Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina, p. 183.
Galileo's position in this letter and in the controversy
which provoked it was always to maintain, with Bellarmine,
that only an absolutely certain physical demonstration
could be the basis for interpreting scripture contrary to
the consensus opinion of the Church Fathers.
A merely
probable demonstration was not enough. Of course Galileo
thought he had a certain demonstration of the earth's
motion in his explanation of the tides. See pp. 163f, 166,
169, 177, 183f, 194f, and 199. Also see Langford, .£.E.•
cit., pp. 50-78.
33. "Christian Theology and Modern Science of Nature," Mind
45 (1936), p. 1.

49

intensive or the extensive."

Intensively, with regard to

"understanding some proposition perfectly, I say that the
human intellect does understand some of them perfectly,"
and here it "equals the Divine in objective certainty, for
here it succeeds in understanding necessity, beyond which
there can be no greater certainty."

But extensively, with

regard to the infinite number of intelligibles, "the human
understanding is as nothing even if it understands a
thousand propositions~ for a thousand in relation to
infinity is zero."

And God knows all the infinite

propositions in a way "exceedingly more excellent than
ours.

Our method proceeds with reasoning by steps from one

conclusion to another, while His is one of simple
intuition."

While our intellect moves laboriously from one

step to the next, the Divine mind moves
like light in an instant~ which is the same as saying
that everything is always present to it.
I conclude from this that our understanding, as
well in the manner as in the number of things
understood, is infinitely surpassed by the Divine~
but I do not thereby abase it so much as to consider
it absolutely null. No, • • • I recognize and
understand only too clearly that the human mind is a
work of God's, and one of the most excellent.34
Thus for Galileo, our minds differ from God's both in kind
and in degree~ his knowledge of things is immediate and
complete, ours only discursive and partiaI.35
34. Dialogue, pp. 103f.
35. Burtt, ..2£· cit., p. 82.
In the notes (p. 115) to his
edition of the Dialogue, Santillana attributes to Augustine
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The discussion about extensive and intensive
understanding rounded out the First Day of the Dialogue.
Just before this, the three interlocutors were actively
debating what the surface of the moon might be like, and
whether life could be found there.

After some guarded

remarks about the severity of lunar conditions, Salviati
noted that any creatures living there would have to be
unimaginably different from terrestrial species, "for this
seems to me to fit with the richness of nature and the
omnipotence of the Creator and Ruler."

Sagredo nodded

assent; those who would "make human abilities the measure
of what nature can do" are extremely rash, for not a single
effect in nature is fully understood by anyone.36

Indeed

Galileo confessed in The Assayer that he was "almost
totally blind when it comes to penetrating the secrets of
Nature."

The more his science partook of perfection, the

fewer were the conclusions it could demonstrate.37

Instead

of trying to subsume every effect of nature under an
all-embracing world system, Galileo contented himself with
trying to grasp just a small portion of the cornucopia of
created phenomena.38

His cautious, intellectually modest

the view "that God can conceive the infinity of numbers as
a whole and see it in action in His own mind, sine
cogitationis alternatione." See De Civitate Deixii, 17.
36. Page 101.
37. Pages 260 and 189.
38. See Samuel Sambursky, "The Influence of Galileo on
Boyle's Philosophy of Science," in Actes au Symposium
International des Sciences Physiques et Mathematiques dans
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rationalism--which constrasts so sharply with Cartesian
presumptiveness--revealed his constant consciousness of and
deep appreciation for the richness of nature.

Nowhere is

this clearer than in his parable of the cicada, about a
bird lover who studied the causes of musical sounds.39

He

learned that sweet songs could arise from an amazing
variety of sources--hollow sticks, taut strings, squeaky
hinges, glass goblets, and beating insect wings.

Then,

when he had come to believe that he had exhausted all the
possibilities, he heard a new sound which he could not
explain, the song of the cicada.

After many false starts

he finally succeeded in locating a possible mechanism, the
shaking of certain thin, hard ligaments in the chest.

But

his efforts to determine whether this really was the source
were too coarse, and he managed only to kill the little
creature.

Now he would never know for sure just what the

source of the sound had been.

From then on, when asked how

sounds are generated, he would "reply tolerantly that
although he knew some of the ways, he was certain that many
more existed which were unknown and unimaginable."

Nature

was so bounteous that even our senses and experience were
not always sufficient to teach us the means by which an
effect was produced.
Because God's thoughts were often above ours, nature
la Premiere Moitie au XVIIe Siecle (Pisa and Venice, 1958),
pp. 142-146, and Shea, pp. 90-92.
39. The Assayer, pp. 235-237.
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was not open to human reason at every point.

God was not a

Pythagorean: one could not derive the universe from pure
number.40

Indeed one could not even discover~ posteriori

the precise pattern of the heavens.

In a letter to

Gallenzone Gallenzoni, Galileo distinguished three classes
of proportions: the perfect, between proximate numbers: the
less perfect, between "more remote prime numbers": and the
imperfect, between incommensurables, these being
inexplicable.

If it were up to us to arrange the motions

of the celestial bodies, said Galileo,
we should have to rely on proportions of the first
type, which are the most rational: God, on the other
hand, not bothering about symmetries that man can
understand, has ordered these motions with the help
of proportions that are not only incommensurable and
irrational but totally inaccessible to our
intelligence.41
-Again, if a famous architect were to distribute the fixed
stars throughout the vault of heaven, he would employ
regular geometric figures and familiar ratios that provide
the best proportions.

But God, "by apparently scattering

them at random, impresses us as having arranged them

40. Dialogue, pp. 10-12.
41. Letter of 16 July 1611 (Favaro XI, 149-150), quoted by
Clavelin, pp. 447f, emphasis mine.
Here Galileo was almost
certainly following Nicole Oresme, who had argued that the
ratios of the celestial motions were likely to be
incommensurable, so that no astrological Great Year of the
planets could occur. See Edward Grant, ed. and trans.,
Nicole Oresme, De ro ortionibus ro ortionum and Ad auca
respicientes Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
1966), pp. 111-122.
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without heeding any rules or any demands of symmetry and
elegance."42

The problem of the finiteness or infinity of

the world was also beyond human determination.

It is one

of those questions, Galileo told Liceti, which is "happily
inexplicable to human reason, and similar perchance to
predestination, free will, and such others in which only
Holy Writ and divine revelation can give an answer to our
reverent remarks."43

God's reasons were his own, not

man's, and we must not presume to know them.

When

Simplicio objected that Copernican cosmology put a vast,
useless space between the orbit of Saturn and the fixed
stars, Salviati replied that "it is brash for our
feebleness to attempt to judge the reason for God's
actions," and to label this space superfluous.

How inept,

added Sagredo, are those who would have God make the
universe "more in proportion to the small capacity of their
reason than to His immense, His infinite power."44

*

*

*

*

*

Precisely because God's reasons are often inscrutable,
Galileo believed it fruitless to speculate on what might
happen if God, by his absolute power, were to perform an
42. Loe. cit.
43. Letter of 10 February 1640 (Favaro XVIII, 293ff),
quoted by Alexandre Koyre, From the Closed World to the
Infinite Universe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1957),
p. 98.
44. Dialogue, pp. 367-370.
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act outside the normal course of nature.

Unlike his

medieval predecessors, Galileo rejected arguments based on
supernatural possibilities, neither taking them seriously
when introduced by his opponents nor employing them in his
own natural philosophy, not even in thought experiments,
the traditional vehicle for the consideration of
supernatural possibilities.

An ideal place to have invoked

divine intervention would have been in his treatment of a
body dropped into a tunnel through the earth.

Twice

Galileo suggested this problem, and twice he declined to
attribute the construction of the tunnel to the power of
God.

The first time he wrote, "if the earth were tunneled

through the center": the second time, "if the terrestrial
globe were pierced by a hole." Neither time did he suggest
an agent.45

Had he accepted the medieval mode of arguing

secundum imaginationem, surely he would have employed it
here.
Equally he refused to accept supernatural
possibilities proposed by others.

Several times in the

Diaglogue, Simplicio quoted from an anti-Copernican work,
Disguisitiones mathematicae de controversiis ac novitatibus
astronomicis, by Christopher Scheiner's pupil Locher.
of Lecher's objections was cast in the form of a
supernatural possibility.

If, "by Divine power, or by

means of some angel, a very large cannon ball were
45. Ibid., pp. 22 and 236.

One
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miraculously transported" to the orbit of the moon and then
dropped, it is incredible that the ball should remain
always over the same spot on the earth's surface, if the
earth is really rotating.

At first Salviati took the

opportunity to calculate how long such a fall would take,
in order to refute Locher's absurd figure of six days.
Then the conversation turned to the question of whether an
internal or an external principle would be sufficient to
keep the ball moving along with the earth.
that it could be neither.

If an external prfnciple, does

God cause it by a continuous miracle?
air?

Locher claimed

It could be none of these.

Or an angel?

The

Before Simplicio could

read the arguments, Salviati abruptly cut him off:
Do not bother to read the objection, for I am not one
of those who assign such a principle to the
surrounding air. As to the miracle or the angel, I
rather lean that way, because whatever begins with a
Divine miracle or an angelic operation, such as the
transportation of a cannon ball to the moon's orbit,
is not unlikely to do everything else by means of the
same principle.46
They proceeded to a second argument.

If the earth were to

stop by God's will, would objects on its surface stop, too?
Would the seagull be unable to hover over the fish?
Salviati's tongue found his cheek at once: if the earth
should stop whirling by the will of God, "the birds would

46. Pages 219 and 237. Galileo's sarcasm betrays his
disgust with scholastic arguments generally, not just with
theological ones. Simplicio rightly accused Salviati of
taking Locher's arguments in jest (p. 240).
Cf. p. 258.

56

do whatever that same will of God desired."47

Simplicio

tried again at the close of the Fourth Day, taking his
argument this time not from Locher but from "a most eminent
and learned person," none other than Maffeo Barberini, Pope
Urban VIII.

Referring to Galileo's "proof" of the earth's

motion from the tides, Simplicio asked whether "God in His
infinite power and wisdom could have conferred upon the
watery element its observed reciprocating motion" by some
means other than that proposed by Salviati.

Anticipating

that his friends would concede that God could have done
this in many ways beyond our comprehension, Simplicio
concluded that "it would be excessive boldness for anyone
to limit and restrict the Divine power and wisdom to some
particular boldness of his own," echoing the argument that
Salviati had earlier used against him.

Salviati's reply is

worth quoting in full.
An admirable and angelic doctrine, and well in accord
with another one, also Divine, which, while it grants
to us the right to argue about the constitution of
the universe (perhaps in order that the working of
the human mind shall not be curtailed or made lazy)
adds that we cannot discover the work of His hands.
Let us, then, exercise these activities permitted to
us and ordained by God, that we may recognize and
thereby so much the more admire His greatness,
however much less fit we may find ourselves to
penetrate the profound depths of His infinite
wisdom.48
47. Page 240.
48. Page 464.
The Pope was understandably very offended by
the fact that Galileo gave his argument to the foolish
Simplicio, thus undermining its force and holding him up to
ridicule.
A similar passage appears in the preface (p. 6),
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I am unable to believe that Galileo meant this sincerely.
In the Letters on Sunspots, he had rejected just this kind
of reasoning.

The technical apparatus of Ptolemaic

astronomy, he noted, was "merely assumed by mathematical
astronomers in order to facilitate their calculations."

It

was
not retained by philosophical astronomers who, going
beyond the demand that they somehow save the
appearances, seek to investigate the true
constitution of the universe--the most important and
most admirable problem that there is. For such a
constitution exists~ it is unique, true, real, and
could not possibly be otherwise • • • 49
Galileo's inclusion of the Pope's argument can be explained
only as a conciliatory gesture, so that he could claim
(falsely) that he had obeyed the Church's instruction not
to teach Copernicanism as the true system of the world.
Earlier in the Fourth Day, as the interlocutors were just
beginning to discuss the tides, Simplicio had stated that
unless someone could show him a more reasonable cause for
where Galileo stated, "It is not from failing to take count
of what others have thought that we have yielded to
asserting that the earth is motionless, and holding the
contrary to be a mere mathematical caprice, but (if for
nothing else) for those reasons that are supplied by piety,
religion, the knowledge of Divine Omnipotence, and a
consciousness of the limitations of the human mind."
49. Page 97.
"Galileo had pointed out that there is no
sense in looking for many probable reasons if we can find
the mathematical one, for that single reason becomes
necessity itself. And this is what the pope could in no
wise accept." Giorgio de Santillana, "Necessity,
Contingency, and Natural Law," in M~langes Alexandre KoyrG,
ed. I.B. Cohen and Rene Taton (2 Vols.~ Paris: Hermann,
1964) II, 458-470, at p. 463.
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the ebb and flow of the sea than Salviati's explanation
(based on the double motion of the earth), he would
conclude that it is a supernatural effect.

Then Salviati

asked, "do you not believe that the terrestrial globe could
be made moveable supernaturally, by God's absolute power?"
Of course, answered Simplicio.

All right, said Salviati,

since we must introduce a miracle, then "let us make the
earth miraculously move with that motion by which the
oceans are naturally moved," for this would be far simpler
and involve fewer miracles than making an immense bulk of
water perform all the intricate movements associated with
the tides.

Lest we take this seriously, lest we think that

Salviati had adorned himself with his opponent's mantle,
Galileo added a warning through the mouth of Sagredo: let
us not have recourse to miracles unless natural
explanations fail.

Though indeed, he added piously, "to my

mind all works of nature and of God appear miraculous."

I

feel the same way, said Salviati, with doubtful sincerityr
"saying that the natural cause of the tides is the motion
of the earth does not exclude this operation from being
miraculous."50
The Ideal of a Deductive Science
The major emphasis of Galileo's theology of creation
was on the ability of the human mind to participate in

50. Pages 42lf.
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divinity, to read the mathematical language of the
perfectly written Book of Nature.

Therefore his concept of

science was heavily weighted toward~ priori demonstration.
This is not to deny that Galileo gave ample room to
empirical factors--one must not forget that it was his
telescope which first opened the heavens to modern
astronomical observation.

It is only to assert that his

ideal science, the kind of science he advocated from the
beginning of his career and brought to full fruition in the
Discourses, to wit, the science of mechanics, was given at
heart much more to deductive demonstration than to
inductive investigation.

I am not claiming that Galileo's

physics divorced reason from reality, mathematics from
experience.

There can be no doubt that he experimented~ he

was not the pure abstractionist of Koyre's Galileo Studies.
Clearly experiment was an essential element in the process
of discovery.

Yet the role he assigned it in his published

writings was a very different one.

In the context of

justification, it took a back seat to necessary
mathematical reason.
The well-known inclined plane experiment from the
Third Day of the Discourses is a good example of the true
function of experimentation in Galileo's ideal science.51
It is Simplicio--the naive sense empiricist--not Salviati,
who calls for an experimental check on the demonstrated
51. Pages l69f.
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conclusions~ this experiment is therefore introduced for
polemical, not strictly methodological, reasons.52

True

enough, Salviati says that experiments are "usual and
necessary" when applying mathematics to the physical world
and that the Author [Galileo] himself has "not failed to
make them."

Closer attention shows, however, that Galileo

could not have performed some of the experiments he claimed
to have performed.

This should not be surprising.

If, as

Galileo repeatedly said, a true science consists only of
necessary mathematical demonstrations, it ought to follow
that true scientific conclusions require no direct
confirmation from experience and might even contradict that
experience.

In the Dialogue, when the discussion turns to

a stone falling from the mast of a ship, Salviati makes the
claim that "experiment shows • • • that the stone always
falls" at the foot of the mast, whether or not the ship is
moving.

Now Galileo had in fact done this experiment--at

least he said as much in his Reply to Ingoli,53 and there
is no reason to doubt it--but Salviati does not argue on
that basis.

Simplicio rhetorically asks whether Salviati,

who freely declares the result to be certain, has made the
test even once.

"Without experiment," comes the reply, "I

52. For this and the following point, see McTighe.
53. "I have made the experiment--before which, physical
reasoning had persuaded me that the effect must turn out as
it indeed does." Quoted in Drake, Galileo at Work, p. 294.
Note that Galileo's emphasis, even here, is on the
demonstration, not the verification.
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am sure that the effect will happen as I tell you, because
it must happen that way"; and what is more, Simplicio, you
know it, too.

What follows is not a real experiment, the

dropping of a ball from the mast of a moving ship, but a
series of thought experiments intended to convince
Simplicio that he really does "know" the truth of the
matter already.

Similarly Galileo needed no experimental

confirmation for his conclusions about artillery; "having
gained by demonstrative reasoning the certainty that the
maximum of all ranges of shots is that of elevation at half
a right angle, the Author demonstrates to us something that
has perhaps not even been demonstrated through experiment,"
the fact that two shots fired at complementary angles will
travel equally far.

Causal knowledge of one effect

(maximum range occurs at 45 degrees) leads to "the
understanding and certainty of other effects without need
of recourse to experiment. 11 5 4

As he told Pietro Carcavy,

even if it is not the case that experience supports the
conclusions, "my demonstrations founded on my supposition
lose nothing of their force and conclusiveness. 11 55

Or, as

he wrote to Baliani, "it would matter little" [poco

~ ~

importerebbe] whether demonstrated conclusions correspond
well to the "accidents" of nature.56
54. Discourses, pp. 245f.
55. Letter of 5 June 1637 (Favaro XVII, 90-91), quoted by
McTighe, p. 374.
56. Letter of 17 January 1639 (Favaro XVIII, 12-13);
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Little wonder, then, that Galileo plainly contradicted
experience on more than one occasion.

It is not true, for

example, that two pendulums, one with a narrow arc and the
other with a wide arc, will swing together for hundreds of
oscillations, as Galileo claimed in the Discourses.57

Nor

is it true that if a wooden ball and a lead ball are
dropped together, the former at first moves more swiftly
than the latter, and then the latter overtakes and passes
the former.

Yet Galileo explicitly said, in the essay

~ersion of De motu, that he had "often tested" this.58

In

fairness to Galileo, let me add that he later stated the
correct law~ nevertheless he did claim experimental
verification for this "fact."

Perhaps the most glaring

contradiction of experience was his "proof" of the earth's
motion from the tides.

According to his theory, high and

low tides ought to be twelve hours apart.

Unfortunately,

as every sailor in Italy knew all too well, they are only
six hours apart.

In his first treatise on the subject, an

unpublished but widely circulated work from 1616, Galileo
flatly rejected this fact, calling it a "fallacy which has
led writers to imagine many useless fantasies."5 9

In the

Dialogue he admitted the six hour interval for the
McTighe, loc. cit.
57. An "experiment gives firm assurance of this."
226f.

Pages

58. On Motion and On Mechanics, p. 107.
59. Favaro v, 388f~ quoted by Shea, p. 177. Shea's
excellent treatment (pp. 172-186) of this topic accents the
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Mediterranean, but attributed it to secondary causes~ the
primary cause (the earth's double motion) was still
credited with producing just one full cycle per day.
This is not to deny that observation and experiment
had an essential function in Galilean science.

Reason can

err~ a true conclusion can be obtained from false premises.
Shea has convinced me that Galileo discovered this for
himself in his early work on floating bodies, and that he
subsequently paid more attention to what Shea has called
"the regulative use of experiment," whereby Galileo would
try experimentally to confirm at least one conclusion of a
theory.60

Galileo was concerned that the world he was

deducing would not be just a world on paper, but the world
of our sense experiences.

There was nothing wrong with

inventing motions and deriving properties, but he wanted to
discover the motion which freely falling bodies actually
have in nature.

He was confident that he had done so,

"chiefly for the very powerful reason that the essentials
successively demonstrated by us correspond to, and are seen
to be in agreement with, that which physical experiments
show forth to the senses."61

The world could only be

mathematical, but which mathematical laws it incorporated
was a matter for empirical determination.
~

priori nature of Galileo's science.

60. See pp. 14-44.
61. Discourses, p. 153.
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Galileo's God of Pure Reason
I introduced this study of Galileo's thought with the
observation that the theology expressed in his scientific
works met an apologetic need: the new science of nature
required a new metaphysics for its justification.

Although

it has not been my primary purpose to prove this assertion,
I believe it is a correct assessment of the facts.

A

significant commitment to a mathematical science of ideal
bodies is evident very early in Galileo's career, surely in
De motu if not before.

I can find no evidence of a similar

commitment to a theology of creation prior to the sixth
decade of his life, when he was openly confronting the
Aristotelianism that had so thoroughly entrenched itself in
the European intellectual establishment.

I am aware of

nothing which would support the claim that Galileo's
philosophy of nature derived in any way from his theology
of creation.

It appears rather that Galileo's theology was

designed specifically to undergird an approach to nature
which he had already embraced for other reasons.
My primary purpose has been to examine the elements of
that theology, in order ultimately to determine the impact
of voluntarism on early modern science.

Galileo believed

that an omnipotent God had fully thought into the world the
very patterns and figures of mathematical forms.

Mortals

could share in the objective certainty of the divine mind
whenever they could think God's thoughts after him through
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the deductive rigor of geometry.

Some things, such as the

precise order established in the heavens, were forever
beyond the reach of human reason.

Other things, aspects of

the richness of creation, limited the scope of our inquiry.
Nevertheless it was possible to attain enough certain
truths to constitute a demonstrative science of nature.
Platonic "likely story" simply would not suffice.

A

Thus

Galileo's was a cautious rationalism~ but rationalism, not
voluntarism, it primarily remained.
place in Galilean natural philosophy.

God's will had no
And if God's power

was the acknowledged source of nature's bounty, the notion
that that power might inhibit our search for causes was
laughed out of court.

The principal function of divine

omnipotence was to insure that God's geometrical thoughts
would be embodied perfectly in the objects of his making,
so that the ideal world of circular motions and regular
geometric forms would indeed be directly applicable to the
world of experience.

And since the world was mathematical

to the core, our failure completely to know God's works was
due more to the defect of a finite understanding than to
the exercise of divine freedom.

Thus it was largely "from

within," as Maurice Clavelin has concluded, "that Galileo's
rationalism was forced to take stock of its own
limitations, that it came to appreciate its true scope and
thus armed itself against an oversimplified interpretation
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of reality. 11 62

62. Page 447.

CHAPTER THREE:
GOD, MAN, AND NATURE: THE PROBLEM OF CREATION
;

IN THE NATURAL PHILOSOPHY OF RENE DESCARTES

The physics of Descartes, therefore, depends in a
particular way upon his metaphysics~ it provides merely the
lower stages in an hierarchical system that definitely
reaches back to God. Descartes is prepared to work out a
whole system of the universe, starting with matter (or with
what the philosophers call extension) on the one hand, and
movement, purely local motion, on the other.
Everything
was to be accounted for mathematically, either by
configuration or by number.
His universe, granting
extension and movement in the first place, was so based on
law that no matter how many different universes God had
created--no matter how different from one another these
might be at the start--they were bound, he said, to become
like the universe we live in, through the sheer operation
of law upon the primary material.
Even if God had created
a different universe at the beginning, it would have worked
itself round to the system that now exists •
• • • He tells us in the Discourse on Method that from
one or two primary truths that he had established he was
able to reason his way by the deductive method to the
existence of the heavens, the stars and the earth, as well
as water, air, fire, minerals, etc. When it came farther
than that--to the more detailed operations of nature--he
needed experiment to show him in which of the alternative
ways that were possible under his system God actually did
produce certain effects~ or to discover which of the
effects--amongst a host of possible alternatives that his
philosophy would have allowed or explained--God had
actually chosen to produce.
--H. Butterfield, The Origins of Modern Science,
pp. 125f
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Descartes' relationship with the Church provides a
sharp contrast to that of the feisty Galileo.I

In an

effort to avoid controversy over his Copernican views,
Descartes repressed his early treatise Le Mende and
cautiously guarded his statements about cosmology in his
later Principia philosophiae.

The quiet Frenchman, whose

motto was "bene qui latuit, bene vixit," lived abroad for
most of his adult life in order to steer clear of clerical
interference.

His writings, both public and private, are

filled with avowed refusals to touch on questions of
revealed theology, which Descartes believed "must not be
subjected to human reasoning."

Theology, he thought,

should be kept as simple as possible~ subjecting its truths
to critical examination had led to "sects and heresies" and
was unnecessary, for even "simple country folk" had as much

1. The standard edition of Descartes' letters and writings
is the Oeuvres de Descartes, edited by Charles Adam and
Paul Tannery, 12 Vols. (Paris: Leopold Cerf, 1897-1913).
I
will usually quote from one of the many reliable English
translations, which will be cited as they appear~ when
quoting from Descartes' correspondence, I will give the
location of the letter in Adam and Tannery, which will be
abbreviated simply as AT, followed by the volume number and
the page(s).
If no other source is given, then the
translation is my own. Adrien Baillet's two volume La Vie
de Des-Cartes (Paris: Daniel Horthemels, 1691), which has
recently been reprinted in one binding (Geneva: Slatkine
Reprints, 1970), was also printed in an abridged form
(Paris: LaVeuve Marbre Cromoysi, 1693) which was translated
into English by someone identified only as "S.R." (London:
R. Simpson, 1693). A good modern biography in English is
Jack R. Vrooman, Rene Descartes, a Biography (New York:
Putnam, 1970).

69
chance of attaining heaven as the most learned scholar.2
Whatever God had revealed concerning his own person or his
actions, Descartes was content to believe, whether or not
he could comprehend it.3

Like his Jesuit teachers at

LaFleche, Descartes left his skepticism at the church door,
thereby remaining orthodox in his faith if not always in
his philosophy.
Nevertheless Descartes made every endeavor to develop
a rational theology, if not a revealed theology.

His

entire system of knowledge, notably including his natural
philosophy, was grounded upon the bedrock of God's
existence and attributes.

God had established certain laws

in nature, and had imprinted notions of them in our souls.
The natural world was nothing other than "the order and

2. Descartes' Conversation with Burman, trans. and ed. by
John Cottingham (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1976), pp.
46f. See the similar passage in the first part of the
Discourse on Method, as found in Paul J. Olscamp, trans.,
Discourse on Method, O tics, Geometr, and Meteorolo
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965 , p. 8.
In the future,
Cottingham's translation will be cited as Burman.
References to Olscamp's translation will indicate the
relevant treatise and section (for example: Meteorology
II), followed by the page number(s) in Olscamp.
3. Passages to this effect are not difficult to find.
Two
of the clearest are found in the Principles of Philosophy,
trans. by Valentine Rodger Miller and Reese P. Miller
(Boston: Reidel, 1983), propositions I.25 and IV.207 (pp.
13 and 288, respectively). Hereafter this translation will
be called Principles. Another good example appears in the
Objections and Replies II, trans. by Elizabeth S. Haldane
and G.R.T. Ross in the second volume of their two-volume
set, The Philosophical Works of Descartes (New York: Dover,
1955), p. 47.
Hereafter this set will be abbreviated as
HR, with the number of the appropriate volume.
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disposition" of things laid down by God in the creation,
and human nature was nothing other than a "complexus" of
things given by God.4

Thus his philosophy of nature

embraced the three elements of the classical Christian
doctrine of creation--God, man, and nature--and the
relations among them (see Figure 1).

With his radical

emphasis on the unity of God's will and intellect,
Descartes denied the traditional distinction between these
two aspects of God's being, yet his thought exhibits all
too clearly a tension between them which manifested itself
in his methodology as a tension between empirical and~
priori elements.5

Descartes believed that, "because God

alone is the true cause of all things which are or can be,
it is obvious that we shall be following the best method of
philosophizing if we strive to deduce the explanation of
the things created by him from the knowledge of God Himself
{and the notions innate in us}"; so that "from a

4. Method V (Olscamp, p. 34); Meditations VI (HR I, 192).
The natural light of reason, for which Descartes is so well
known, was "natural" only in the scholastic sense of being
a creation of God, completely dependent on him.
For
Descartes, God was the source of all truth, both
metaphysically and epistemologically. See Michael A.
Grill, "Descartes: A Re-interpretation of His Metaphysics
and Science," doctoral dissertation at the University of
Kansas (1975), pp. ii-iv.
5. Like much seventeenth century thought, that of Descartes
is characterized by a "genuine sense of contingency and
[human] limitation being in conflict with a tendency to
regard the power of the rational mind as virtually
limitless." Bernard Williams, "Descartes," in The
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards (New York:
Macmillan, 1967), Vol. 2, p. 349.

Figure 1:
God, Man, and Nature
God

Nature~<'----..~ Man
(Created order)

(Created mind)
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consiaeration of his attributes we can investigate the
truth of • • • things, since he is their cause."6

Taking

this as my chief clue, I will try to show how Descartes'
conception of God's attributes informed both the content
ana the methoa of his natural philosophy.

Those attributes

which were most important for his natural philosophy were
Goa's infinite perfection, his immense power, and his
veracity and immutability as manifested in his infallible
aecrees.7

As we shall see, it was God's perfection which

determined the outcome of the aialogue between his power
ana his immutability.
The Relation between Goa ana His Creation
Descartes was content to allow God to be God in all of
his transcendence.

In contrast to all other possible

entities, God was the only necessary being~ existence was
linked inextricably with his nature.8

Fixed between man

and God, creature and Creator, was an awesome gulf,
unbridgeable by finite minas.

Undoubtedly this emphasis on

6. Principles I.24 and 75 (Miller, 12f ana 35)~ the phrase
in brackets appears only in the French edition.
7. Among those things most to our advantage, Descartes told
the Princess Elisabeth, "the first ana principal is that
there exists a God upon whom all things depend, whose
perfections are infinite, power immense, decrees
infallible • • • " Letter of 15 September 1645 (AT IV,
288)~ trans. by John J. Blom in his Descartes, His Moral
Philosophy and Psychology (New York: UP, 1978), p. 150. In
the future this translation will be called "Blom."
8. See Meditations V (HR I, 18lf) and Objections and
Replies I (HR II, 20).
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what Boyce Gibson has called God's "amplitude" derived from
Descartes' strong orientation to the Augustinian theology
of the Oratorians.

From 1626 to 1628, while he was in

Paris, Descartes was in close touch with Gibieuf, whose De
libertate dei et creaturae (1632) denied that human
standards were applicable to God and asserted God's
indivisible unity and unrestricted freedom.9

In the same

manner Descartes denied to Aquinas and the scholastics the
right to reason analogically from man to God, undermining
any attempt to make God in man's own image.

As an

inseparable unity of will and reason, God was radically
free, his will not subject to constraint by his
intellect.IO

Descartes' theology of an infinite,

transcendent God interacted with his nascent physical
theory in three main places, which I will discuss in turn
as follows:

the boundless size of the universer the

9. See A. Boyce Gibson, The Philosophy of Descartes
(London: Methuen, 1932), pp. 23f. There are "marked
resemblances between the original elements of the two men's
[Descartes and Gibieuf] theories of the relation of God to
the world." (p. 45)
10. See Norman Kemp Smith, New Studies in the Philosophy of
Descartes: Descartes as Pioneer (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1953), pp. 163-168, and Etienne Gilson, Laliberte
chez Descartes et la theologie (Paris: F. Alcan, 1913),
passim. Cf. passages, quoted below, on the eternal truths.
Professor Richard Greaves has kindly called to my attention
the interesting fact that the English Puritan (and
voluntarist) William Ames was teaching at Franeker while
Descartes was enrolled there in 1629-30. Whether this is
significant or not I am unable to say. See Keith L.
Sprunger, The Learned Doctor William Ames7 Dutch
Back rounds of En lish and American Puritanism (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1972 , p. 80.
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impropriety of teleological explanations~ and the nature of
the eternal truths.11
It is "the nature of the infinite," Descartes wrote in
the third Meditation, "that my nature, which is finite and
limited, should not comprehend it • • • "12

When confronted

with infinite quantities, conventional mathematics was
powerless to avoid falling into paradoxes.
we could comprehend could not be infinite.13

Any number that
Because God

alone could be said positively to have no limits in any
respect, Descartes reserved for him the term "infinite."
All other things--numbers, stars, parts of a body, the
extension of the world--were said negatively to be
"indefinite" because they had no discernible limits~
because this apparent lack of limits resulted from "the
11. These correspond to Kemp Smith's "three stages in
Descartes' conversion to this new theology." Note,
however, his admission that "How far they came in actual
succession, or how far they may have overlapped, remains a
matter of conjecture." (p. 170) My concern is the
substance, not the order, of the stages.
12. HR I, 166.
13. See the well known letter to Mersenne, 15 April 1630
(AT I, 146f), quoted by Kemp Smith,.££· cit., p. 171.
Mersenne had stated that the number of feet [pieds] in an
infinite line would be three times greater than the number
of yards [toises], so that the latter number could not be
infinite. Descartes replied that we have no basis for
comparing infinite quantities. What ground, he asked
Mersenne, "have you for judging whether one infinite can or
can not be greater than another? It would no longer be
infinite, were we able to comprehend it." Actual, or
completed, infinities have disturbed philosophers and
mathematicians from Aristotle to Cantor. The apparent
intractability of infinity has often been associated with
the inscrutable but omniscient mind of God.
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weakness of our own understanding rather than from the
nature of these things," they could not be construed as
limitless in a positive sense.14

This position, which

reflected real theological and philosophical concerns, was
not without practical benefits for Cartesian natural
philosophy.

If Descartes denied the motion of the earth

"more carefully than Copernicus and more truthfully than
Tycho," he also denied the infinity of the world more
subtly than anyone else:
We shall find no difficulty in the indefinite
extension of the World, if only we would consider
that, in saying it is indefinite, we are not denying
that perhaps in the very truth of the matter it may
be finite, but we are only denying that there are any
bounds or extremities which can be comprehended by
our intellect. The which estimate seems to me much
saner and safer than that of those who, in affirming
the world to be finite, dare to prescribe limits to
the works of God.15
As Descartes well knew, this argument for an apparently
boundless universe as an expression of God's infinite power
had been used by Nicolas of Cusa and others.16

It was

14. Principles I.26-27 (Miller, p. 13f); see also
Objections and Replies I (HR II, 17) and Burman, p. 33.
Alexandre Koyr~ has covered this in From the Closed World
to the Infinite Universe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP,
1957), pp. 100-124.
15. Excerpta ex Cartesio: MS de Leibniz (AT XI, 656),
quoted by Albert G.A. Balz, Descartes and the Modern Mind
(New Haven: Yale UP, 1952), p. 360. Cf. the letter to
Chanut of 6 June 1647 (AT v, 50ff) and Principles III.19-20
(Miller, 91), where the remark about Copernicus and Tycho

can be found.
16. See the letter to Chanut mentioned in the previous note
(Blom, 219f). On Cusa, see Alexandre Koyre, From the
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intended partially to answer the serious objection that, in
an infinite (or at least indefinitely large) universe, the
place of humanity would be too insignificant and might even
render God incapable of special providences.

Descartes'

two prominent female correspondents voiced this argument,
which he did not accept.

A finite power, he replied, might

be exhausted by such a world, but "the more we esteem the
works of God to be great, the more we note the infinity of
his powerr and the more this infinity is better known to
us, the more we are more greatly assured it extends to all
the particular actions of men."17

The real problem, as

Descartes saw it, was not so much with our inadequate
conception of God's power as with our exalted conception of
our own place in the creation.

Men commonly suppose, he

told Burman, that
they themselves are the dearest of God's creatures,
and that all things are therefore made for their
benefit. They think their own dwelling place, the
earth, is of supreme importance, that it contains
everything that exists, and that for its sake
everything was created. But what do we know of what
God may have created outside the earth, on the stars
and so on?l8
Closed World to the Infinite Universe, pp. 5-24.
17. From Descartes' letter to Elisabeth of 6 October 1645
(AT IV, 304ffr Blom, 163). Elisabeth expressed her
reservations in a letter of 30 September 1645 (AT IV,30lffr
Blom, 154ff)r Queen Christina of Sweden conveyed her
opinions through Chanut, the French ambassador to her
court, in his letter of 11 May 1647 (AT X, 617ffr Blom,
213-218). Descartes answered Chanut on 6 June 1647 (ATV,
50ffr Blom, 218-224).
18. Page 36. Also see Principles III.2 and the letter to
Hyperaspistes from August 1641 (AT III, 422), in Anthony
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Apart from the revelation of Scripture, we are not privy to
God's eternal counsel: "we ought not to presume so much of
ourselves as to think that we are the confidants of his
intentions."

Therefore "we shall not undertake any

reasonings from the end which God or nature set himself in
creating these things, {and we shall entirely reject from
our Philosophy the search for final causes}."19

Even if we

could know the purpose of a thing, arguing from ends--which
was "Aristotle's greatest fault"--could never lead to a
knowledge of the thing itself.20
Nowhere is Descartes' confession of God's absolute
power more apparent than in his doctrine of the eternal
truths, mathematical or logical propositions and statements
pertaining to the essences of entities:21 for example, "the
Kenny, Descartes: Philosophical Letters (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1981), p. 117.
Hereafter
this translation will be abbreviated as K.
19. Principles I.28 (Miller, 14): the bracketed phrase is
found only in the French edition. That Scripture can tell
us certain of God's purposes is clear from Burman (p. 19)
and elsewhere.
20. Burman, loc. cit.: also see Meditations IV (HR I, 173).
Gassendi's objectons to Descartes' amputation of final
causes from physics is found in Objections and Replies V
(HR II, 174-176): Descartes' reply is on p. 222: "We cannot
pretend that certain of God's purposes rather than others
are openly displayed: all seems to be equally hidden in the
abyss of his inscrutable wisdom."
21. Several studies have focused on this aspect of
Cartesian thought.
In addition to Gilson, .2£• cit., and
portions of the general literature, see Emile Brehier, "The
Creation of Eternal Truths in Descartes' System," in
Descartes: A Collection of Critical Essa s, ed. by Willis
Doney (New York: Macmillan, 1967 , pp. 192-208: T.J.
Cronin, "Eternal Truths in the Thought of Descartes and His
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whole is greater than its part," "two plus two equals
four," "it is impossible for the same thing to be and not
to be at the same time," and "he who thinks cannot not
exist while he is thinking."22

The orthodox position was

the scholastic doctrine of created essences as found in
Aquinas' Contra gentiles: God can know particulars because
his essence contains in itself the essences of all possible
particulars.

Eternally related to God's understanding,

these uncreated possible essences could take on actual
existence by an-act of divine will with the creation of the
bodies to which they applied.

Hence Aquinas put into the

mind of God archetypes which depended upon his essence or
Adversary," JHI 21 (1960), 553-559, and Objective Being in
Descartes and in Suarez (Rome: Gregorian UP, 1966): Harry
Frankfurt, "Descartes on the Creation of the Eternal
Truths," The Philosophical Review 86 (1977), 36-57: Amos
Funkenstein, "Descartes, Eternal Truths, and the Divine
Omnipotence," SHPS 6 (1975), 185-199: A. Boyce Gibson, "The
Eternal Veritiesand the Will of God in the Philosophy of
Descartes," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society n.s. 30
(1929-30), 31-54: Michael Heyd, Between Orthodoxy and the
Enlightenment: Jean-Robert Chouet and the Introduction of
Cartesianism in the Academy of Geneva (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1982), and "From a Rationalist Theology to
Cartesian Voluntarism: David Derodon and Jean-Robert
Chouet," JHI 40 (1979), 527-542: Anthony Kenny, "The
Cartesian Circle and the Eternal Truths," Journal of
Philosophy 67 (1970), 685-700: Margaret J. Osler, "Eternal
Truths and the Laws of Nature: The Theological Foundations
of Descartes' Philosophy of Nature," unpub. paper; and
Norman J. Wells, "Descartes' Uncreated Eternal Truths," The
New Scholasticism 56 (1982), 185-199. Only Funkenstein and
Osler have tried to relate the eternal truths to Cartesian
natural philosophy. Only Osler has tried to make a
specific connection to Descartes' methodology.
Although my
argument was formed independently of hers, I have
benefitted greatly from her paper.
22. See Principles I.49 (Miller, 22); Burman, 34; the
letter to Mersenne of 17 May 1638 (AT II, 134ff; K, 55);
among other places.
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nature but not upon his will.23

Though owing allegiance to

nothing outside God's nature, the divine will nevertheless
could not endorse things which were inherently impossible
and was bound to accept the truths presented to it by the
divine intellect.

Thus God could not "make a genus not

predicable of its species, or bring it about that the radii
of a circle are not equal, or that a rectilinear triangle
should not have its three angles equal to two right
angles."24

Suarez taught, beyond this, that God knows the

eternal truths necessarily, because they are true in
themselves; "man is a rational animal" was true because the
idea of man itself contains the idea of rationality.

In

his Disputationes metaphysicae, a work which Descartes
cited in his reply to Arnauld's objections, Suarez wrote:
"Habent perpetuam veritatem, non solum ut sunt in divine
intellectu, sed etiam secundem se ac praescindendo ab
illo." 2 5
Descartes' own views on the eternal truths are found
in several letters from the 1630s and 1640s, in his replies

23. Summa contra gentiles I, 54.
and Frankfurt, p. 38.

See Brehier, pp. 194f,

24. Aquinas, Contra gentiles I, 84 and 25, quoted by
Gibson, The Philosophy of Descartes, p. 272, and Kenny,
"The Cartesian Circle and the Eternal Truths," p. 695,
respectively.
25. Disp. XXXI, sec. 12, no. 40, quoted by Brehier, p. 195.
Also see Cronin, "Eternal Truths," pp. 557-559.
Descartes'
citation of Suarez can be found at AT VII, 235 (HR II,
107).
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to the fifth and sixth sets of objections, and in the
Conversation with Burman.26

Perhaps for prudence' sake,

Descartes did not specify the theologian(s) against whose
position he was reacting.

Gilson denies that it was Thomas

or any schoolman; Garin argues that it was Suarez.27

In

any case his general position was diametrically opposed to
the prevailing Renaissance conception in which both God and
man were bound by inexorable laws.28

Descartes stated his

views most clearly in his letter to Mersenne of 15 April
1630, from which I quote at length:
{A} The mathematical truths which you call eternal
have been laid down by God and depend on him entirely
no less than the rest of his creatures.
Indeed to
say that these truths are independent of God is to
talk of him as if he were Jupiter or Saturn and to
subject him to the Styx and the Fates. {B} Please do
not hesitate to assert and proclaim everywhere that
it is God who has laid down these laws in nature just
as a king lays down laws in his kingdom.
There is no
single one that we cannot understand if our mind
turns to consider it. They are all inborn in our
minds just as a king would imprint his lawsonthe
26. The letters to Mersenne of 15 April, 6 May, and 27 May
1630 (AT I, 145-6, 149-50, 151-3), and 17 May 1638 (AT II,
138); to Mesland on 2 May 1644 (AT IV, 118f); to Arnauld on
29 July 1648 (AT v, 223f); and to More on 5 February 1649
(ATV, 272f); all of these have been translated by Kenny.
The other locations are HR II, 226 and 248f, and Burman, 22.
27. Gilson,~· cit., pp. 34-75; P. Garin, Theses Cartesiennes et Theses Thomistes (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer,
no date), pp. 130-138. For useful summaries of the
considerable literature on this subject, see the appendix
to Cronin, Objective Being in Descartes and Suarez, and
Wells, "Descartes and the Scholastics Briefly Revisited,"
The New Scholasticism 35 (1961), 172-190.
28. See James D. Collins, Descartes' Philosophy of Nature
(American Philosophical Society Quarterly Monograph Series,
5; Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1971), p. 10.
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hearts of all his subjects if he had enough power to
do so.
• • •
{C} It will be said that if God had established
these truths he could change them as a king changes
his laws. To this the answer is: 'Yes he can, if his
will can change.' 'But I understand them to be
eternal and unchangeable.'--'I make the same
judgement about God.' 'But his will is free.' -- 'Yes,
but his power is incomprehensible.' {D} In general we
can assert that God can do anything that we can
comprehend but not that he cannot do what we cannot
comprehend.
It would be rash to think that our
imagination reaches as far as his power.29
To aid in discussing this passage, I have divided it into
four sections (A through D).
{A} and {D}: God's Absolute Power Over the Eternal Truths
Descartes refused to allow that anything could be
independent of God.

He could not accept any view which

subordinated God's will to his reason or failed adequately
to distinguish between our finite minds and God's infinite
mind.

The eternal verities did not exist in any sense

apart from God and were true only because God had willed
them to be so, for "the existence of God is the first and
most eternal of all possible truths and the one from which
alone all others derive."30

As the efficient and total

cause of all things, as author of both the essence and the
existence of every creature, God had created the eternal
truths freely.

Just as

29. K, llf. The italicized words represent Latin words in
a French letter.
30. Letter to Mersenne, 6 May 1630 (K, 14).
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he was free not to create the world, so he was no
less free to make it untrue that all the lines drawn
from the centre of a circle to its circumference are
equal.
And it is certain that these truths are no
more necessarily attached to his essence than other
creatures are.31
God's creative acts had been radically free, undetermined
by any considerations whatsoever.
God did not will to create the world in time because
he saw that it would be better thus than if he
created it from all eternity7 nor did he will the
three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right
angles because he knew that they could not be
otherwise. On the contrary, because he worked to
create the world in time it is for that reason better
than if he had created it from all eternity7 and it
is because he willed the three angles of a triangle
to be necessarily equal to two right angles that this
is true and cannot be otherwise7 and so in other
cases • • • •
For if any reason for what is good had preceded his
preordination, it would have determined him toward
that which it was best to bring about7 but on the
contrary because he determined himself towards those
things which ought to be accomplished, for that
reason, as it stands in Genesis, they are very good7
that is to say, the reason for their goodness is the
fact that he wished to create them so • • • • Hence
neither should we think that eternal truths depend
upon the human understanding or on other existing
things7 they must depend on God alone, who, as the
supreme legislator, ordained them from all
eternity.32
Here, as in {B} from the letter to Mersenne quoted above,
Descartes employed the voluntarist metaphor of God as the
ruler of creation who sovereignly imposed on his kingdom
laws of his own choosing, the products of his free will and

31. Letter to Mersenne, 27 May 1630 (K, 15).
32. Objections and Replies VI (HR II, 248-251).
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not of a rational necessity external to himself.

Nothing

could be farther from the Greek conception of creation as
found, for example, in Galen,33 or in the (postCartesian) Protestant rationalist David Derodon, who held
that God's wisdom and goodness necessitated the creation of
the world and that his creative act was limited to the
actualization of possible entities whose essences were
intrinsic to themselves.34

Thomas Aquinas and John Calvin

had argued that divine goodness was the reason for
creation, although they had denied that there had been any
necessity in this--while God of necessity willed his own
being, he did not of necessity will other beings--rather he
had had freedom of indifference.35
33. With regard to omnipotence, said Galen, "the doctrine
of Moses differed from that of Plato and of all the Greeks
who have correctly approached the study of Nature. For
Moses, God has only to will to bring matter into order, and
matter is ordered immediately. We do not think in that
way; we say that certain things are impossible by nature
and these God does not even attempt; he only chooses the
best among the things that come about." On the Uses of the
Parts IX, 14, quoted by Francis Macdonald Cornford, Plato's
Cosmology (London: Kegan Paul, 1937), p. 36.
34. Disputatio de libertate (Geneva, 1662); see Michael
Heyd, Between Orthodoxy and the Enlightenment, p. 60. For
Derodon, possible essences were co-eternal with God: "Non
est autem absurdum ut sint actu duo entia aeterna, quorum
unum sit actu aeternum ens simpliciter, absolute et
perfecte, scilicet Deus. Alterum vero sit actu aeternum
ens secundum quid, conditionale et imperfecte, scilicet res
possibilis." Quoted by Heyd, "From a Rationalist
Theology," p. 534.
35. Summa theologica I, 19, 11-111; Summa contra gentiles
I, 74-82; Institues of the Christian Religion I.V.6. See
Heyd, "From Rationalist Theology," p. 531.
Descartes'
insistence on the unity of God's will and God's intellect
led him into deep water in several places, among them the
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For Descartes, God's omnipotence required him to be
able to perform even what we understand to be logically
impossible.

The limits of human reason were only that--the

limits of human reason, not of possible truths.

The

eternal verities were "inherently as contingent as any
other propositions" which God could have freely willed to
create.36

God could have made it untrue that twice four is

eight or that one and two make three, though if he had done
so, the minds he in fact gave us would be incapable of
comprehending it, for God has so created our minds "as to
be able to conceive as possible things which God has wished
to be in fact possible," but not those things "which God
could have made possible, but which he has in fact wished
to make impossible."

So we perceive as necessary those

truths which God has willed to be necessary, but this did
question of necessity and indifference as applied to God.
Thus he told Burman (pp. 32f) that, "although God is
completely indifferent with respect to all things, he
necessarily made the decrees he did, since he necessarily
willed what was best, even though it was of his own will .
that he did what was best. We should not make a separation
here between the necessity and the indifference that apply
to God's decrees: although his actions were completely
indifferent, they were also completely necessary • • • • In
reality the decrees could not have been separated from God:
he is not prior to them or distinct from them, nor could he
have existed without them.
It is clear enough[!?] how God
accomplishes all things in a single act." This amazing
passage might be explained away by attributing to Burman an
incorrect transcription or to Descartes a change of
opinion, but I prefer to interpret it as simple confusion,
the outcome of Descartes' position that an act of free
divine will ("his actions were completely indifferent") was
simultaneously an act of rational intellection ("they were
also completely necessary").
36. Quoting Frankfurt, "Descartes on the Creation of the
Eternal Truths," p. 42.
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not mean "that he willed them necessarily: for it is one
thing to will that they be necessary, and quite another to
will them necessarily, or to be necessitated to will
them."37

It would be rash indeed to think that our

imagination reaches as far as his power.
But there was still one thing which even God could not
do.

He could not act against his own perfect nature, for

then he would not be God.

Although he could, by his

absolute power, have made it untrue that two plus two is
four, he could not make it untrue that "God exists"--he
could not deprive himself of existence, for that would be
an imperfection.38

Hence there were two kinds of eternal

truths in Cartesian philosophy.

Uncreated eternal truths,

which could not be otherwise, flowed necessarily from God's
essence.

Created eternal truths, free products of the

divine will, appeared to the human mind to be necessary but
could have been otherwise if God had so willed.39

Clearly,

37. Letter to Mesland, 2 May 1644 (K, 151): Objections and
Replies VI (HR II, 251). Cf. the letters to Beeckman on 17
October 1630 (AT I, 156ff) and to Arnauld on 29 July 1648
(AT v, 223f), in which Descartes refused to maintain that
God could not perform certain things, such as logical
contradictions (K, 17 and 236f). Descartes' position here
appears to be identicle to that of those medievals who
taught that there was a theological logic superior to
ordinary logic.
Professor Edward Grant kindly pointed this
out to me.
38. Letter to***, March 1642 (AT v, 544).
39. See Wells, "Descartes' Uncreated Eternal Truths." J.D.
Collins further divides the uncreated eternal truths into a
single "most eternal" truth--that God exists--and several
"more eternal" truths of the divine being and nature.
See
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the uncreated eternal truths were not subject to
change--they were in fact "eternal."
created truths?

But what of the

If they were wholly dependent on God's

unfettered will and not upon any external standard of
reason, how could they be eternally valid, and how could
they possibly be discovered by the human mind?

These are

separate questions, and the answer to each lies buried in
Descartes' understanding of God's attributes, especially
his perfection.
{C}: Divine Unity and Perfection
The eternal validity of the created truths obviously
hinged upon the immutability of God's will, for if he were
able to change his will, he would be able to change the
eternal truths.

In a definite break with scholastic

tradition but fully in keeping with his emphasis on divine
transcendence, Descartes refused to accept any distinction
between God's will and his reason--a distinction, he
thought, which told nothing of God but reflected a purely
human limitation.

In reality, he said, God's nature was an

indivisible unity of will and reason.40

Therefore a change

in God's will would entail a change in his understanding,
but a change in his understanding would be an imperfection,
since at some time his understanding would have been
Descartes' Philosophy of Nature, pp. 13-15.
40. Principles I.23 (Miller, 12); letter to Mesland of 2
May 1644 (K, 151); Burman, 3lf.
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mistaken or incomplete7 therefore God's will could not
change.41

"Concerning the decrees of God which have

already been enacted," Descartes told Burman, "it is clear
that God is unalterable with regard to these, and, from the
metaphysical point of view, it is impossible to conceive
the matter otherwise."42

Thus, although Descartes did not

think that "the essence of things, and those mathematical
truths which may be known about them," were independent of
God, he nevertheless affirmed "that because God so wished
it and brought it to pass, t h e y ~ immutable and
eternal."43
In the opinion of Boyce Gibson, Descartes established
a division, irreconcilable with his doctrine of God's
unity, at the moment of God's decision to create a specific
eternal verity. Prior to that moment, his will was supreme
over his intellect, in that no proposition necessarily
required his assent~ but once he had determined which
propositions would be true eternally, his intellect gained

41. This is M.J. Osler's interpretation, which I find very
convincing.
See "Eternal Truths and the Laws of Nature."
42. Page 32.
In the same place Descartes discussed the
efficacy of prayer in light of God's immutable decrees,
concluding that "God is indeed quite unalterable, and that
he has decreed from eternity either to grant me a
particular request or not to grant it." Cf. the similar
passage in Descartes' letter to Elisabeth of 6 October 1645
(AT IV, 304ff~ Blom, 163f) and the resignation of his
letter to Huygens upon the death of Huygens' wife (20 May
1637, AT I, 371).
43. Objections and Replies V (HR II, 226), emphasis his.
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the upper hand, for he could not change his mind.44

It is

not clear to me that Descartes believed what Boyce Gibson
assumes he did--to wit, that God created the eternal truths
in time and not from eternity--although he did believe that
the world had been created in time.45

It remains true that

Descartes' God could have done things differently, even
outlandishly so, but what he had done could not be undone.
When Burman asked if God could have commanded a creature
even to hate him, Descartes could see no reason to deny it.
"We simply do not know what he could have done," he said,
but "God could not now do this."46
Descartes heavily stressed God's immutable nature as
one of his perfections.

It was another divine perfection

to be
immutable and completely constant in the way he acts.
Thus, with the exception of those changes which
either manifest experience or divine revelation
renders certain, and which we perceive or believe to
occur without any change on the part of the Creator~
we must not suppose that there are any others in his
works, for fear of accusing him of inconstancy.
From
this it follows that it is completely consistent with
reason for us to think that, solely because God moved
44. The Philosophy of Descartes, p. 277.
45. The key passage would appear to be Objections and
Replies VI (HR II, 248), part of which was quoted above at
note 32.
46. Page 22, emphasis mine. A related proposition, "that
God might have made creatures independent of him," is
considered in Descartes' letter to Mesland of 2 May 1644
(AT IV, 110). Descartes called this an "evident
contradiction," yet refused to say that God was bound by it
(K, 151).
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the parts of matter in diverse ways when he first
created them, and still maintains all this matter
exactly as it was at its creation, and subject to the
same law as at that time; he also always maintains in
it an equal quantity of motion.47
This understanding of divine immutability was a curious one
indeed: "that God is immutable and that, acting always in
the same way, he always produces the same effect."48

To

hold that God's nature and will did not change was entirely
orthodox, but to hold in addition that God always acts in
the same way was not the usual interpretation.

Even John

Calvin, who staunchly defended the constancy of God's will,
readily admitted that God's actions could change.49

For

Descartes, however, divine immutability meant the constancy

47. Principles II.36 (Miller, 58).
48. Le Monde: ou Traite de la lumiere, trans. by Michael
Sean Mahoney (New York: Abaris Books, 1979), p. 69.
Hereafter this translation will be called Mahoney.
49. Speaking of divine repentance, Calvin said that "we
ought not to understand anything else under the word
'repentance' than change of action, because men are wont by
changing their action to testify that they are displeased
with themselves.
Therefore, since every change among men
is a correction of what displeases them, but that
correction arises out of repentance, then by the word
'repentance' is meant the fact that God changes with
respect to his actions. Meanwhile neither God's plan nor
his will is reversed, nor his volition altered; but what he
had from eternity foreseen, approved, and decreed, he
pursues in uninterrupted tenor, however sudden the
variation may appear in men's eyes." Institutes of the
Christian Religion I.17.13, trans. by Ford Lewis Battles
and ed. by John T. McNeill (2 Vols.; London: SCM Press,
1960) I, 227.
Descartes' view of prayer (see note 42
above) was not very different from this, but Calvin seems
to have been unperturbed by the notion of God acting in
different ways at different times--always, of course, in
harmony with his immutable decrees.
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of his action in the world as manifested in the
conservation of quantity of motion, whereby God maintained
every motion precisely as it was at that moment, and not as
it had been an instant before.

Apart from external

causes--collisions with other bodies were the only possible
agents--bodies at rest would remain at rest and those in
motion would continue in motion.

Rectilinear motion could

be apprehended in a single instant, and so was the most
fundamental of all.50

God was therefore the active

efficient cause of motion, just as he was "the cause of
created things, not only in respect of their coming into
existence, but also in respect of their continuing to
exist," for "in order to be conserved in each moment in
which it endures, a substance has need of the same power
and action as would be necessary to produce and create it
anew, supposing it did not yet exist"~ the distinction
between creation and conservation was "solely a distinction
of the reason."51

For Descartes, then, the laws of nature

were not simply decrees, they were enactments whereby God
immutably and universally sustained what he had fully
50. Principles II.36-39 (Miller, 58-61)~ Le Monde, chap. 7
(Mahoney, 71-73). As Peter Machamer has pointed out,
Descartes was following the traditional Neoplatonic and
Christian-Aristotelian practice of connecting a phenomenon
directly to one of God's attributes. See "Causality and
Explanation in Descartes' Natural Philosophy," in P.K.
Machamer and R.G. Turnbull, eds., Motion and Time, Space
and Matter: Interrelations in the Histor and Philoso h of
Science Columbus: Ohio State UP, 1976 , pp. 168-199.
51. Objections and Replies V (HR II, 219)~ Meditations III
(HR I, 168)~ also see Method V (Olscamp, 37).
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determined.52
Yet decrees they no less remained, immutable and
universal in their efficacy.

In spite of his voluntaristic

conception of freely ordained, direct divine action in
nature, Descartes placed over nature not the providential
miracle worker of the Bible, but the constant preserver of
the coming Enlightenment.

A God who performed miracles

could stand in the way of the universal demonstrative
science that Descartes so earnestly desired to create.53
Apart from those actions which "divine revelation renders
certain"54--and these did not include the Eucharist55
--Descartes displayed a skeptical attitude towards
miracles.56

He also mitigated God's sovereignty with his

belief that, while the regular laws of nature were the
direct result of divine superintendence of motion, the
actual, highly irregular paths of particles were produced

52. J.D. Collins, .£E.• cit., pp. 48f.
"Laws of nature are
quite pregnantly laws for nature, in the sense of being
dependent and instrumental expressions of the manner in
which the divine power conveys movement to the whole field
of material particles." (p. 27)
53. Le Monde, chap. 7 (Mahoney, 77).
54. Principles II.36 (Miller, 58); I take this to refer
implicitly to miracles.
55. See his natural explanation in Objections and Replies
IV (HR II, 116ff) and in his letter to Mesland of 9
February 1645 (AT IV, 16lff; K, 154-159).
56. See the letters to Mersenne of 19 June 1639 (AT II,
557-568) and 28 October 1640 (AT III, 205-221), and Method
V (Olscarnp, 37).
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by "the diverse disposition of matter," for which God was
apparently not responsible.57

Indeed at one point

Descartes was willing to entertain the thought that God
might have created the world in a state of chaos from which
he brought order by his laws,58 but he later abandoned this
as unbecoming to the character of God.59
{B} God and Human Knowledge: Certainty and Innate Ideas
If it is one thing to assert that God made certain
propositions true for all eternity, it is quite another to
assert that the human mind is capable of discovering them
and of recognizing them as truths.

Descartes raised this

question in the Third Meditation:
But when I took anything very simple and easy in the
sphere of arithmetic or geometry into consideration,
e.g. that two and three together made five, and other
things of the sort, were not these present to my mind
so clearly as to enable me to affirm that they were
true? Certainly if I judged that since such matters
could be doubted, this would not have been so for any
other reason than that it came into my mind that
perhaps a God might have endowed me with such a
nature that I may have been deceived even concerning
things which seemed to me most manifest. But every
time that this preconceived opinion of the sovereign
power of a God presents itself to my thought, I am
constrained to confess that it is easy to him, if he
wishes it, to cause me to err, even in matters in

57. Le Mende, chap. 7 (Mahoney, 75).
58. LeMonde, chap. 6 (Mahoney, 55); Cf. Method V (Olscamp,
35). This reminds one of Genesis 1:1-3.
59. Principles III.47 (Miller, 107f), especially the French
version.
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which I believe myself to have the best evidence.60
The God who created us could do all things, and "we do not
know whether he chose to make us in such a way that we are
always mistaken, even about those things which appear to us
to be the best known of all."61

But the God who created us

was yet perfect, and Descartes recognized "it to be
impossible that he should ever deceive me7 for in all fraud
and deception some imperfection is to be found, and • •
the desire to deceive without doubt testifies to malice or
feebleness, and accordingly cannot be found in God."62
This proposition, "that God cannot lie," was "the
foundation of faith and all our belief"7 those theologians
who denied it, in opposition to Augustine and Aquinas,
would "have to abandon all certainty."

Precisely because

God "is veracious in the highest degree," Descartes
believed that it followed "that all things which we clearly
perceive are true," beyond any possibility of doubt, or
else God would be a deceiver.

Thus our conceptions of the

eternal truths of mathematics and other propositions
perceived clearly and distinctly were in fact true.63

As

60. HR I, 158.
61. Principles I.5 (Miller, 4).
62. Meditations IV (HR I, 172)7 cf. Principles I.29 (Mi
ller, 15).
63. See the letter to Mersenne of 21 April 1641 (AT III,
358ff7 K, 99) and Principles I.29-30 (Miller, 15)7 cf.
Method IV (Olscamp, 32).
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the ruler of creation, God had implanted in the human mind
certain "innate" ideas, "such as the idea of God, mind [or
soul], body, triangle, and in general all those which
represent true immutable and eternal essences," that is,
the eternal truths.64
The process whereby Descartes established the eternal
truths as eternal truths closely paralleled the methodic
doubt for which he is well known.

Having denied that God

was subject to any rational constraint whatsoever,
Descartes was nevertheless faced with the hard fact that a
perfect God could not act against his own nature by
changing his mind, and therefore whatever he had freely
chosen to make true would remain true for all eternity.
The human investigator might doubt the truth of any
proposition except the proposition that the ability to
doubt implied the existence of the doubter; the clarity and
distinctness of this indubitable .truth became the
cornerstone for the edifice of certain knowledge.

The evil

genius who haunted the sleep of reason was God shorn of His
veracity, the creator of arbitrary and continually changing

64. Letter to Mersenne of 16 June 1641 (AT III, 383; K,
104); cf. Method IV (Olscamp, 33). The idea of God was
"the mark of the workman imprinted on his work," the very
imago dei. (Meditations III~ HR I, 170) In the early
Regulae, Descartes had spoken of "certain primary germs of
truth implanted by nature" rather than implanted directly
by God. (HR I, 12) His mature works are more explicitly
theistic.
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essences.65

Doubt was transformed into the means for

arriving at eternal truths, "an acid for etching away what
does not belong to a thing's essence."66

In the absence of

prejudices--to wit, by sticking to the Cartesian method of
doubt--all men would clearly perceive the same set of
eternal truths, the very essences ordained by God.67

What

is more, if we were unable to conceive of something, if we
"found a contradiction in attempting to conceive it
clearly," we could then conclude that it did not exist at
all,68 which is just what Descartes did with regard to
atoms and the void.

He could not conceive of matter apart

from extension, nor extension apart from matter~ the idea
of body was contained in the idea of space no less than the
idea of a mountain was contained in the idea of a valley.
To imagine "that God removes all the air in a room without
putting any other body in its place," he wrote to Mersenne,
"you will have to suppose~ ipso that the walls of the
room will touch each other; otherwise you will be thinking
65. See Brehier, "The Creation of the Eternal Truths," pp.
200-201.
66. Jonathan Ree, Descartes (London: Allen Lane, 1974), p.
71. Ree stresses the "reductive ideal" of Cartesian
thought rather than the "deductive ideal" found by many
other scholars and upon which I will build the rest of my
argument.
67. Principles I.SO (Miller, 22).
68. Meditations VI (HR I, 185): "For there is no doubt that
God possesses the power to produce everything that I am
capable of perceiving with distinctness, and I have never
deemed that anything was impossible for him, unless I found
a contradiction in attempting to conceive it clearly."
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a self-contradictory thought."
impossible.69

Hence a vacuum was

Again, because matter and extension were

inseparable, an atom was necessarily an extended body which
was clearly and distinctly divisible, and anything clearly
and distinctly conceived to be divisible had in fact to be
divisible, at least by God if not by human agents.
atoms could not exist either.70

So

The same issue came up

again in Descartes' letter to Arnauld of 29 July 1648 and
in his letter to More of 5 February 1649.71

In both places

Descartes tempered his earlier position (in the
Principles), conceding that he could not place limits on
God's absolute power to perform a contradicton.

But the

thrust of each passage was to affirm anew that Descartes
could not comprehend such an act, so that as far as he was
concerned, it could not be considered a live possiblilty.
As he said in his reply to the authors of the Sixth
Objections, "it is useless to inquire how God could from
all eternity bring it about that it should be untrue that
twice four is eight": "it would be irrational to doubt
concerning that which we correctly understand, because of
that which we do not understand and perceive no need to

69. Letter of 9 January 1639 (AT II, 479: K, 62). See the
forceful treatment of matter and extension in the Regulae
(HR I, 58f): cf. Principles II.4-18 (Miller, 40-48).
70. Principles II.20 (Miller, 48f).
71. ATV, 219-224 and 267-279 (K, 233-245).

96

understand."72
certainty.

Metaphysical doubt gave way to practical

In the last resort, as Reijer Hooykaas has

noted, "human reason became the measuring-rod for the truth
of existence!"73
The Relation between Created Minds and Created Objects
Descartes recognized that the possibility of certain
knowledge depended solely on the knowledge of God.

Once

God was known in all of his veracity and constancy,
Descartes had "the means of acquiring a perfect knowledge
of an infinitude of things, not only of those which relate
to God himself and other intellectual matters, but also of
those which pertain to corporeal nature in so far as it is
the object of pure mathematics."74

First of all, he "tried

to discover the general principles, or first causes, of all
that is or can be in the world, without for this purpose
considering anything but God alone, its Creator, and
without deriving these principles from anything but certain
seeds of truth which are naturally in our souls."75

In

72. HR II, 251.
73. Religion and the Rise of Modern Science (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1972), p. 42. His analysis rings true: "There
cannot be a void, not because God could not have made it,
but because He does not will it to be, and I know this
because my reason cannot conceive how a void could possibly
exist."
74. Meditations V (HR I, 185)~ cf. Principles III.43
(Miller, 104f).
75. Method VI (Olscamp, 52). One's view of the Cartesian
method in natural philosophy is in large part determined by
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spite of appearances, Descartes did not see himself as an
ivory tower philosopher who built a world on paper
according to his personal whims.

The actually existing

world is what he wanted to explain, and this could not be
done with imaginary principles "established through the
caprice of several armchair thinkers."76

It was

nevertheless true that, as G.A.J. Rogers has said, "a large
part of [Cartesian] physics could be done in an
armchair."77

With the infinite perfections of God as his

sole starting point, Descartes "tried to demonstrate all
those laws about which we might have any doubt, and to show
that they are such that even if God had created many
worlds, there would have been none of them where these laws
failed to be observed."78

The knowledge of those laws--the

three laws of motion and the eternal truths of
mathematics--was

which passages one chooses to take as normative.
Some
scholars rely heavily on the second part of the Discourse
on Method, but I agree with the bulk of Cartesian
scholarship in taking the sixth part of the Discourse as
the most definitive statement.
The rest of this passage
will be quoted below.
76. From a lost letter to Villebressieu, indirectly
recorded by Baillet and quoted by Collins,.££• cit., p. 29.
Even the most~ priori thinker of all, Plato, fully
acknowledged the role of the senses at the most fundamental
level~ the very sight of the heavens, said Timaeus (47A),
"has caused the invention of number" and motivated science.
Cornford, Plato's Cosmology, p. 157.
77. See "Descartes and the Method of English Science,"
Annals of Science 29 (1972), 237-255, at p. 240.
78. Method V (Olscamp, 35f).
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so natural to our souls that we cannot but judge them
infallible when we conceive them distinctly, nor
doubt that, if God had created many worlds, the laws
would be as true in all of them as in this one.
Thus, those who can examine sufficiently the
consequences of these truths and of our rules will be
able to know effects by their causes and (to explain
myself in the language of the schools) will be able
to have demonstrations~ priori of everything that
can be produced in that new world.79
For Descartes, then, it was not enough merely to know a set
of laws that described or explained selected phenomena.
The laws of physics had to be necessary truths, valid in
all possible worlds and capable of yielding certain
knowledge through~ priori demonstration.

If God did

indeed create many worlds, each with its own sun, there was
only one kind of world, one which the human mind could
penetrate completely because God had established certain
truths both in the world and in the minds of men.

Only the

certainty of mathematics, which he deeply wished his
physics should resemble, was acceptable to him.

Unless it

could be deduced from indubitable common notions with the
force of a mathematical demonstration, a proposition could
not be accepted as true.

Even this was not enough.

If he

could only say how things could be, without showing that
they could not be otherwise, Descartes would think he knew
nothing.BO

79. Le Monde, chap. 7 (Mahoney, 75-77).
80. Objections and Replies II (HR II, 131)~ Principles
II.64 (Miller, 76f)~ letter to Mersenne of December 1640
(AT III, 258).
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This is not to say that Cartesian physics was
mathematical--its sparse use of mathematics was perhaps its
greatest flaw--but rather that mathematics was, for
Descartes, the paradigm of science, the model of certain
knowledge.

He admired mathematics not so much for its

content as for its method of moving from one proposition to
another, by which the certainty of the antecedent flowed
undiminished down to the consequent.

Perceived clearly and

distinctly by the light of reason alone, the innate ideas
functioned as seeds of truth from which, by deduction, the
tree of knowledge grew.

Now for Descartes, deduction was

not limited to syllogistic reasoning, but included any
sequence of propositions in which could be perceived a
clear and distinct relation between the premises and the
conclusion.

At least in part, deduction was an ampliative

process whereby intuition moved to extend itself to embrace
previously uncertain notions.

It was the natural light of

reason, not the form of the argument, which established the
validity of a proposition.Bl
Having "thus discovered certain principles as regards
81. See Desmond Clerke, "Physics and Metaphysics in
Descartes' Principles," SHPS 10 (1979), 89-112, esp. p.
lOOf, and "Descartes' Use of 'Demonstration' and
'Deduction'," The Modern Schoolman 54 (1977), 333-344;
Charles Larmore, "Descartes' Empirical Epistemology," in
Stephen Gaukroger, ed., Descartes: Philosophy, Mathematics
and Physics (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1980), pp. 6-22; N.
Kemp Smith, New Studies, pp. 67-71; and A. Boyce Gibson,
The Philosophy of Descartes, p. 155. Descartes expounded
his view of deduction at length in parts two through seven
of the Regulae (HR I, 4-21).
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material objects, derived not from the prejudices of our
senses but from the light of reason, so that their truth is
indubitable," Descartes went on to consider "whether we are
able to explain all the phenomena of nature by these
principles alone: and we must begin with those phenomena
which are the most universal and on which the rest depend,
namely, the general structure of this whole visible
world."82

Proceeding to reconstruct the world, Descartes

examined what were the first and most ordinary
effects that we could infer from these causes. And
it seems to me that I thereby discovered the skies,
the stars, an earth, and even, on the earth, water,
air, fire, minerals, and certain other such things,
which are the commonest and simplest of all, and thus
the easiest to understand.83
The first and most ordinary effects mentioned here were the
basic parts of the heavens and the earth (the subject of Le
Mende), though later (in the Principles) Descartes seems to
have limited them to celestial phenomena alone.84

Whatever

they were, he claimed to have "discovered" them, by which
he could only have meant that he had successfully derived
them from first principles, so that their causes had been
found.

That he believed he had found such causes for the

82. Principles III.I.
Here I have quoted from two
different translations, first from Elizabeth Anscombe and
Peter Geach, Descartes: Philosophical Writings (New York:
Scribner's, 1954), p. 222, and then from Miller, p. 84.
83. I have returned to the passage in Method VI (Olscamp,
52).
84. See the introductory letter and principle III.42
(Miller, xxiv-xxv and 104).
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general effects cannot be questioned.

Assuredly, he said,

if the principles I use are very obvious, if I deduce
nothing from them except by means of a Mathematical
sequence, and if what I thus deduce is in exact
agreement with all natural phenomena; it seems {to
me} that it would be an injustice to God to believe
that the causes of the effects which are in nature
and which we have thus discovered are false.
For we
would then be accusing him of having made us so
imperfect as to be liable to make mistakes, even when
correctly using our reason {which he has given us}.85
For Descartes, then, science was rooted in
metaphysics, the first part of true philosophy, and
achieved a sure and certain knowledge of nature by holding
to what I will call the deductive ideal: from indubitable
first principles derived from the divine perfection and
immutability, one could deduce the world and all that is
therein.86

But God was more than perfect and changeless;

85. Principles III.43 (Miller, 104f); bracketed portions
are found only in the French edition.
86. See the introduction to the French edition of the
Principles. Most commentators have agreed that the primary
thrust of Descartes' method was deduction from first
principles, however much he may have allowed for empirical
factors.
A few scholars, most notably Olscamp and Clerke,
have pushed the opposite view to the point where they would
make of Descartes a modern, hypothetico-deductivist. The
view I am defending here gives ample consideration to
empirical elements without losing sight of the overall
structure of Cartesian thought.
Errors result from giving
too much weight either to Descartes' pressing philosophical
goals or to his work in natural science, as if he were
either a philosopher or a scientist but not both.
See the
introduction to Olscamp's translation of the Discourse on
Method, Optics, Geometry, and Meteorology and the following
works by Desmond Clerke: "The Ambiguous Role of Experience
in Cartesian Science," PSA 1976 ed. Frederick Suppe and
Peter D. Asquith (East Lansing: Philosophy of Science
Association, 1976), Vol. 1, pp. 151-164; "Physics and
Metaphysics in Descartes' Principles," SHPS 10 (1979),
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he was also omnipotent, and his unlimited power could and
did produce an unlimited variety of effects.

To be sure,

there could be only one universe--only one general fabric
of the world--but within this framework were an infinity of
possible particulars.

Thus when Descartes wanted to

descend to those effects that were more particular,
so many diverse ones presented themselves to me that
I did not believe it possible for the human mind to
distinguish between the forms or species of objects
that are on the earth, and an infinity of other ones
which could have been, if it had been the will of God
to put them there.
Nor, as a result, did I believe
it possible to direct them to our use, unless it be
by arriving at their causes through their effects and
by using many particular experiments.87
If the particular effects could not be predicted from
metaphysical truths--rather, if far too many particulars
followed therefrom--then how was Descartes to know what the
effects actually were?

Simple observation would tell him.

Clearly he already knew what phenomena he wished to
explain; his problem was to "discover" them by showing that
they followed from first principles and the general
89-112; and Descartes' Philosophy of Science (University
Park: The Pennsylvania State UP, 1982). Also see Laurens
Laudan, "The Clock Metaphor and Probabilism: The Impact of
Descartes on English Methodological Thought, 1650-65,"
Annals of Science 22 (1966), 73-104.
87. Method, loc. cit. On 5 April 1632 Descartes wrote to
Mersenne tha~"inthe treatise which I now have in hand
[Le Monde], after the general description of the stars, the
heavens and the earth, I did not originally intend to give
an account of particular bodies on the earth but only to
treat of their various qualities.
In fact, I am now
discussing in addition some of their substantial forms, and
trying to show the way to discover them all in time by a
combination of experiment and reasoning." (AT I, 242;
K, 22)
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effects.

Once he had "reflected upon all the objects that

[had] ever presented themselves" to his senses, that is,
once he had determined what the actual effects were,
Descartes ventured to say
that I never noticed a single thing about them which
I could not explain quite conveniently through the
principles I had discovered. But I must also confess
that the power of nature is so ample and so vast, and
these principles so simple and so general, that I
almost never notice any particular effect such that I
do not see right away that it can be derived from
these principles many different ways; and my greatest
difficulty is usually to discover in which of these
ways the effect is derived.
And to do that I know no
other expedient than again to search for certain
experiments which are such that their result is not
the same when we explain the effect by one
hypothesis, as when we explain it by another.88
Descartes saw the impossibility of a purely~ priori
physics all the way down to the last detail.

If the

general effects could be deduced from first principles
alone, the particulars could not.

In a letter to Mersenne,

Descartes revealed his dream of an~ priori physics while
confessing his inability to create it:
For the last two or three months I have been rapt in
the heavens.
I have discovered their nature and the
nature of the stars we see there and many other
things which a few years ago I would not even have
dared to hope; and now [I have] become so rash as to
seek the cause of the position of each fixed star.
For although they seem very irregularly distributed
in various places in the heavens, I do not doubt that
there is a natural order among them which is regular
and determinate.
The discovery of this order is the
key and foundation of the highest and most perfect
science of material things which men can ever attain.
88. Ibid.
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For if we possessed it we could discover a priori all
the different forms and essences of terrestrial
bodies, whereas without it we have to content
ourselves with guessing them~ posteriori from their
effects • • • • I think that the science I describe
is beyond the reach of the human mind: and yet I am
so foolish that I cannot help dreaming of it though I
know that this will only make me waste my time as it
has aleady done for the last two months.89
Why did such a physics come to naught?

Early on, in

the Regulae, Descartes conceded that some things were
beyond the reach of human knowledge, but not because of a
defect in intelligence.

Rather because "the nature of the

problem itself," or the fact that the investigator is
human, could prevent one from learning what he wanted to
know: success might depend "upon a certain experiment which
he is unable to perform" or it might be "that the knowledge
desired wholly exceeds the limits of the human
intelligence. 11 90

In his later works, starting with the

sixth part of the Discourse on Method (quoted above),
Descartes developed this theme at greater length, stressing
interchangeably now the fecundity of his principles, now
the complexity of nature, and now the creative power of
God.

The principles we have discovered, he said, "are so

vast and so fertile that their consequences are far more
numerous than the observable contents of the visible
universe": they were "so simple and so general" and the
power of nature was "so ample and so vast" that a given
89. Letter of 10 May 1632 (AT I, 250-252: K, 23f).
90. Rules VII and VIII (HR I, 20-28).
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phenomenon could be explained in any number of ways.91

Of

course this was only to say that his principles were so
vague and so imprecise that they appeared to possess great
fecundity--from virtually any initial arrangement of
particles and motions, he thought, he could deduce the
present form of the world.92

The objects of physics were

"composite," that is, they were characterized by a
multiplicity of detail, which contrasted with the
simplicity of mathematics.93

The indeterminate nature of

the particulars was attributed also to the inscrutability
of God's willr reason alone was insufficient to determine
which of the possible objects God had chosen to create.
Similarly, although we could be certain that the universe
consisted of one and the same matter, that this matter was
divisible into parts with essentially cyclical motions, and
that the quantity of motion in the world was always
conservedr nevertheless the unaided human reason was unable
to determine the exact sizes, shapes, speeds, and
trajectories of these particles, for God could have

91. Principles III.4, quoting from Anscombe and Geach, .2£·
cit., p. 223r Method, loc. cit.
92. Principles III.47 (Miller, 107f). Cf. passages in note
58 above. That the initial state of the world should be
almost irrelevant to its present state was a curious claim
for a deterrninist--indeed it shows how undeterministic (in
a mathematical sense, at least) Cartesian physics really
was. See Bernard Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure
Enquiry (Hassocks, Sussex: Harvester, 1978), pp. 270-275.
93. Meditations I (HR I, 147). See Boyce Gibson, The
Philosophy of Descartes, pp. 192-194.
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arranged them "in an infinity of ways; experience alone
should teach us which of all these ways he chose. 94
11

As

Descartes cautioned his readers in the opening paragraphs
of the third part of the Principles, "we must pay attention
to two things": God's infinite power and our limited
reason.95

*

*

*

*

*

Experiment was thus an essential part of Cartesian
science, since many questions could not be answered without
it.96

Although the law of refraction could not be

determined from experience, the index of refraction of a
substance could be found only by an appeal to the
phenomenon.97

In order to deduce the motion of the blood,

the disposition of the organs of the heart and of the parts
of the body had to be known.98

Since he lacked "the

94. Method, loc. cit.; Principles III.46 (Milier, 106).
95. III.1-2 (Miller, 84). The chief purpose of these two
principles, of course, was to lay the foundation for a
universe of indefinite dimensions.
96. On Descartes as experimentalist, see Baillet, La Vie I,
195-197; the works by Desmond Clerke cited above; L.J.
Beck, The Method of Descartes: A Study of the "Regulae"
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1952), pp. 239ff; and Spyres
Sakellariadis, "The Role of Evidence in Descartes'
Scientific Method," doctoral dissertation at the University
of Pittsburgh (1980), esp. chapter 2, "The Problem of
Descartes' Experimental Practice"; and "Descartes's Use of
Empirical Data to Test Hypotheses," Isis 73 (1982), 68-76.
97. Regulae VIII (HR I, 23f) and Dioptrics II (Olscamp,
81), respectively.
98. Method V (Olscamp, 41); letter to Elisabeth of May 1646
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required experimental evidence," he would not dare to
undertake an explanation of human embryology.99

So many

experiments were needed for the progress of human knowledge
that Descartes despaired of ever having the time and the
resources to complete them.

In order to do all the

experiments of use to him, he told Mersenne, he would have
to be wealthier than the King of China.100
The need for experiment in Cartesian physics was
critical, yet its place was subordinate to the dictates of
reason.

Experience was unambiguous "only when dealing with

the wholly simple and absolute."

Ingenious experiments

were called for only at the latter stages of investigation~
if performed too early, they were likely to mislead us.

In

the beginning, it was better to rely on ordinary sense
experience.101

Indeed, when Mersenne asked Descartes to

tell him how to make useful experiments, the latter replied
that, without devoting excessive attention to minor
details, one ought to make general surveys of the most
common things, for these were certain and could be known
(AT IV, 406~ Blom, 180).
99. Letter to the Princess Elisabeth of 31 January 1648 (AT
V, 112). Descartes nevertheless did undertake this
explanation.
100. Letter of 20 October 1642 (AT III, 590). On the need
for experiments, see Method VI (Olscamp, 52f), the preface
and article IV.188 of the Principles (Miller, xxvi and
275f), and the letter to Huygens of 4 December 1637 (AT I,
506f).
101. Regulae VIII (HR I, 23f)~ Method VI (Olscamp, 51).
See Desmond Clerke, "The Ambiguous Role of Experience."
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without expense--has Descartes had Bacon for breakfast?
But with regard to the more particular experiments, it was
impossible not to make many that were superfluous, or even
false,

if one did not know the truth of things before

making them.102

Quite so--as Gilson has observed,

Descartes was concerned principally with explanations, not
with facts.103

Nowhere is this clearer than in his opinion

of Galileo:
It seems to me that he lacks a great deal in that he
is continually digressing and never stops to explain
one topic completely, which demonstrates that he has
not examined them in an orderly fashion and that,
without having considered nature's first causes, he
has sought only the reasons for a few particular
effects, and thus he has built without a sure
foundation.104
If Descartes could not place an experiment into the context
of his own system of nature, he disregarded it.
Experiments performed by others, he wrote in the Discourse
on Method, were too clouded with extraneous ingredients to
yield a clear truth: beyond this, "because those who
performed these experiments have forced themselves to make
102. Letter of 23 December 1630 (AT I, 195f).
103. Etudes sur le role de la pensee medievale dans la
formation du systeme cartesien (Paris: J. Vrin, 1930),
p. 137.
104. From the letter to Mersenne of 11 October 1638 (AT II,
379), quoted by Vrooman, Descartes, p. 115.
Predictably
enough, Descartes rejected Galileo's conclusions about the
fall of bodies in vacuo as "without foundation"--if Galileo
had truly understood the nature of gravity, he would have
known that bodies could have no weight in a vacuum (if a
vacuum could even exist).
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them appear to conform to their principles," almost all of
them were "badly explained, or even false."105

Though

Harvey's hypothesis of the contraction of the heart
appeared to be confirmed by a convincing experiment [par
une experience fort apparente], for Descartes this proved
only that experiments could deceive us when we had
insufficient knowledge of all the causes which could be
involved.

The same effect might have a different cause

than the one Harvey had proposed--a good mechanistic cause,
of course, not an "occult" contraction--only further
experimentation could render a definitive verdict.106

When

Beeckman and Mersenne measured the acceleration of a
pendulum bob and their results differed from Descartes'
theoretical value, he ignored their work, for it could not
be explained by reason.107

Experiment had validity only in

the context of a priori argument: induction completed
deduction, which could not pass beyond a certain level of
particularization.

It served to close lines of inquiry,

not to originate them.

In order to learn the nature of the

105. Part Six (Olscamp, 58), emphasis mine. See
Sakellariadis, "Descartes's Use of Empirical Data," and
Beck, The Method of Descartes, pp. 26lff.
106. Description du Corps Humain, XVIII (AT XI, 24lf). See
J.A. Passmore, "William Harvey and the Philosophy of
Science," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 36 (1958),
85-94, and Alan Gewirth, "Experience and the
Non-Mathematical in the Cartesian Method," JHI 2 (1941),
183-210, esp. p. 199.
107. I am following Sakellariadis' analysis of Descartes'
correspondence with Mersenne from the latter part of 1629.
See "Descartes's Use of Empirical Data."
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magnet, the Cartesian physicist, who has reflected "that
there can be nothing to know in the magnet which does not
consist of certain simple natures evident in themselves"
--that is, who shares Descartes' confident knowledge of the
essences of things--"will have no doubt how to proceed."
After collecting all possible observational data, "he will
next try to deduce the character of that inter-mixture of
simple natures" which explains the data.

But in the event

that the magnet should contain "any sort of nature the like
of which our mind had never yet known"--such as action at a
distance, I am compelled to suggest--it would be "hopeless
to expect that reasoning will ever make us grasp it"~ it
would be enough to "discern with all possible distinctness
that mixture of entities or natures already known which
produces just those effects which we notice in the
magnet. 11 108

*

*

*

*

*

As we have seen, the first principles of Cartesian
physics were separated from the particulars of everyday
experience by God's omnipotence and freedom.

Just as there

might be two clocks made by the same craftsman, equally
good time-keepers and with exactly the same faces, yet
constructed internally with completely different
combinations of wheels~ so the supreme Craftsman

108. Regulae X and XII

(HR I, 47 and 55), emphasis mine.
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undoubtedly could have produced all that we see in many
diverse ways.109

The deductive ideal had broken down.

There was no necessary connection between first principles
and particular phenomena: one could not determine by reason
alone which of the possible explanations was the actual
explanation of a given effect.
bridged only by hypotheses.

This logical gap could be

Since God could have arranged

the shapes, sizes, and motions of particles in countless
ways, we were free to make any assumptions we pleased about
them, provided that the consequences agreed with
experience.110
Descartes spoke of hypotheses in two different senses.
Pragmatically, he presented as hypotheses propositions
which he believed he could deduce from first principles but
preferred not to do so, whether for fear of censorship or
for sheer convenience.

At the same time, he urged his

readers to accept hypotheses for true explanations in
themselves, as demonstrated by their heuristic value in
accounting for a wealth of phenomena.

With regard to

light, he wrote to Vatier,
if you look at the third page of the Dioptrics, you
will see that I said there expressly that I was going
to speak about it only hypothetically.
Indeed, since
the treatise which contains the whole body of my
physical theory is named On Light [this refers to Le
Monde], and since in it I explain light with greater
109. Principles IV.204 (Miller, 286).
110. Ibid., III.46 (Miller, 106).
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detail and at greater length than anything else, I
did not wish to write again what I had written there,
but only to convey some idea of it by comparisons and
hints, so far as seemed necessary for the subject
matter of the Dioptrics •
• • I cannot prove~ priori the hypotheses I
proposed at the beginning of the Meteors without
expounding my whole physical theory~ but the
phenomena which I have deduced necessarily from them,
and which cannot be deduced in the same way from
other principles, seem to me to prove them
sufficiently~ posteriori • • • • I chose this manner
of expounding my thoughts for two reasons.
First,
believing that I could deduce them in order from the
first principles of my Metaphysics, I wanted to pay
no attention to other kinds of proofs~ secondly, I
wanted to try whether the simple exposition of truth
would be sufficient to carry conviction without any
disputations or refutations of contrary opinions •
• • • And indeed it is not always necessary to have a
priori reasons to convince people of a truth.111
The assuptions he had made about light, although in reality
"conclusions" derived solely from "the axioms on which
geometers base their demonstrations," to wit, the eternal
truths, were nonetheless "proved by everything that comes
after."112

What he had written about refraction was thus a

demonstration, to the extent that one could be given
"without a previous demonstration of the principles of
physics by metaphysics," which was not forthcoming until
the Principia philosophiae of 1644.113

In the absence of

this demonstration, however, Descartes was content to deal

111. Letter of 22 February 1638 (AT I, 562f~ K, 47f)~ cf.
the very similar passage in Method VI (Olscamp, 60f).
112. Letter to Plempius, 20 December 1637 (AT I, 476~ K,
43f).
113. Letter to Mersenne, 17 May 1638 (AT II, 141~ K, 55).
The date in AT (27 May) is incorrect.
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in probabilities rather than certainties.

To ask for

geometrical demonstrations in physics was "to ask the
impossible."

Archimedes in mechanics, Witello in optics,

and Ptolemy in astronomy had demonstrated nothing
geometrically, but no one criticized them for this.

It was

enough in such matters that their hypotheses were not
manifestly contrary to experience and that their arguments
were logically sound, even though their hypotheses might
not have been strictly true.114

Having concluded willingly

that God was free to arrange things as he wished and not
necessarily as we might have, Descartes claimed that he had
done enough if those things which he had written
corresponded accurately with all natural phenomena, whether
or not he had found the true causes.
purposes, no more was required.115

For practical
Such things were "held

to be morally certain, that is, to a degree which suffices
for the needs of everyday life~ although if compared to the
absolute power of God, they are uncertain."

Suppose, for

example, that one were trying to read a ciphered message.
If by substituting B for A, C for B, and so on, one were

114. Ibid.
"I say that there are only two ways to refute
what I have written.
One is to prove by experience or
reason that the hypotheses I have made are false~ the other
is to show that what I have deduced from them cannot be
deduced from them • • • • But if people simply say that
they do not believe what I have written, because I deduce
it from certain hypotheses which I have not proved, then
they do not know what they are asking or what they ought to
ask." (K, 56).
115. Principles IV.204 (Miller, 286).
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able to obtain a sensible message, then he would conclude
that he had guessed the true pattern of the cipher, even
though it is possible that the writer had actually written
a different message in another cipher.
but probable?

Possible? perhaps~

It would "be so difficult for this to

happen, {especially if the message contains many words},
that it does not seem credible."116

Moreover there were

some things
which we judge to be absolutely, and more than
morally, certain, of which we judge that it is
impossible that the thing should be other than as we
think it. This certainty is founded on the
metaphysical ground that as God is supremely good and
cannot err, the faculty which he has given us of
distinguishing truth from falsehood, cannot be
fallacious so long as we use it aright, and
distinctly perceive anything by it. Of this nature
are mathematical demonstrations, the knowledge that
material things exist, and the evidence of all clear
reasoning that is carried on about them. Amongst
these truths it seems to me that there should be
counted those conclusions which have been arrived at
in this treatise, {at least the principal and more
general [au moins les principales & plus generales]},
if it be considered that they are derived in a
continual series from the first and most simple
principles of human knowledge • • • • for these facts
being admitted, all the others, at least the more
general [au moins les plus generales] doctrines which
I have advanced about the world and the earth, appear
116. Principles IV.205 (Miller, 287)~ the bracketed phrase
is only in the French edition. On moral certainty, see
John Morris, "Descartes and Probable Knowledge," Journal of
the History of Philosophy 8 (1970), 303-312. Descartes
believed in something akin to Whewell's "consilience of
inductions": if a single cause, however hypothetical, could
be assigned to several diverse effects, one could assume
that the true cause had been found.
See the letters to
Morin of 13 July 1638 (AT II, 197-200~ K, 57-59), to
Plempius (for Fromondus) of 30 October 1637 (AT I, 406~ K,
40), and to Huygens of June 1645 (AT IV, 224f)~ also see
Burman, p. 38.
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to be the only possible explanations of the phenomena
they present.117

*

*

*

*

*

The Cartesian universe consisted of two storeys (see
Figure 2).

The general effects, the world of Le Monde,

resided in the upper storey, the realm of absolute
certainty and~ priori demonstration.

Here the very

structure of the world lay exposed for all to see.

The

lower storey, the realm of practical certainty, yielded its
secrets more reluctantly.

The appeal to experience was

required to augment the power of reason~ the deductive
ideal had broken down.

The filter of experiment was called

upon to separate reality from possibility, actuality from
contingency.118

Yet even though experimentation was an

integral part of the pursuit of truth, it remained
subordinate to rational necessity, implemented only after
one had discovered the general causes of things by pure

117. Principles IV.206, quoting from HR I, 30lf instead of
from Miller (p. 287f). The French and Latin versions of
this article are substantially different.
For some reason,
the Miller translation has not considered these differences
to be important.
I have added the braketed phrase to the
text in HR. See AT IX, 324f. On 28 October 1640,
Descartes wrote to Mersenne that, although one could
explain a given particular effect in many different ways,
things in general had only one explanation, which was the
true one. (AT III, 212)
118. The role of experimentation was "to answer the
questions set by reason at the outset of the deduction
during the preliminary survey of the ground, and at each
stage of the deduction when a logical bifurcation is
possible." Beck, The Method of Descartes, p. 251.
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intuition.

To be sure, nature might not be completely

predictable--it might dictate which effects really exist
and which combinations of entities suffice to explain
them--but it could never surprise us with something wholly
new.

For those who followed the Cartesian method, the

universe was like a second-rate opera: the basic plot was
known even before the curtain was raised: only the
incidentals remained to be found.ll9
Voluntarism, Rationalism, and Demonstrative Science:
A Consideration of the Foster Thesis
It is now time to consider the validity of the Foster
thesis when applied to Rene Descartes: was there in fact a
connection between his theology of creation and his
119. For roughly similar analyses of Descartes' method in
natural philosophy, see Ralph M. Blake, "The Role of
Experience in Descartes' Theory of Method," in Theories of
Scientific Method: The Renaissance through the Nineteenth
Century, ed. by Edward H. Madden (Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 1960), pp. 75-103: Gerd Buchdahl,
Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science: The Classical
Origins: Descartes to Kant (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969):
A.C. Crombie, "Some Aspects of Descartes' Attitudes to
Hypothesis and Experiment," in Actes du Symposium
International des sciences physiques et Mathernatiques dans
la premiere moitie du XVIIe siecle (Paris and Venice,
1958), pp. 192-201: D. Garber, "Science and Certainty in
Descartes," in Descartes: Critical and Inter retive Essa s,
ed. by Michael Hooker Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 19 8 ,
pp. 114-151: Charles Larmore, "Descartes' Empirical
Epistemology," in Descartes: Philoso h, Mathematics and
Physics, ed. by Stephen Gaukroger New York: Barnes &
Noble, 1980), pp. 6-22: M.J. Osler, "Eternal Truths and the
Laws of Nature," unpub. paper, cited above: G.A.J. Rogers,
"Descartes and the Method of English Science," cited above:
A.I. Sabra, Theories of Light, From Descartes to Newton
(London: Oldbourne, 1967): N. Kemp Smith, New Studies in
the Philosophy of Descartes: and Bernard Williams,
Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry.
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understanding of scientific method?

I will begin by noting

that Foster's own view of Descartes betrays an inadequate
grasp of his scientific method and an unfamiliarity with
his conception of the eternal truths.

Cartesian natural

philosophy, he stated, can not demonstrate the existence of
the material world by pure reason: sense perception is
required here.

But once the world is known to exist,

argued Foster, "no further element of contingency is held
to belong to the nature of particular material things, and
consequently the science of them can rely upon the method
of demonstration alone."120

This is not correct.

As we

have seen, Descartes was unable to determine, without an
appeal to the phenomena, which particular effects God chose
to create and which mechanisms he used to produce them.

In

determining which of his ideas to embody, God exercised his
arbitrary will.

Apparently Foster did not see this, for he

described "this further element of voluntarism," which he
found in Leibniz's theology, as "over and above that which
Descartes had recognized."1 21

He likewise missed seeing

the voluntarism manifest in Descartes' belief that God was
utterly free to choose the eternal truths in any manner he
wished.

Hence his mistaken analysis of the Cartesian

position:

120. "Christian Theology and Modern Science of Nature,"
Mind 45 (1936), p. 19.
121. Ibid., p. 20.
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His Rationalist doctrine of nature corresponds with
his Rationalist doctrine of God: as he cannot
conceive of a voluntary activity in God, so he cannot
conceive the reality of a contingent element in
nature, and his identification of matter with
extension is the inevitable consequence of his
identification of the divine activity with
thought.122
Why was Foster so wide of the mark in his characterization
of Descartes as wholly rationalist in both theology and
science?

Two considerations are relevant here.

First of

all, Foster was writing at a time when Cartesian natural
philosophy was almost universally equated with intellection
alone, an opinion derived from an over attention to the
Regulae, the Meditations, the second part of the Discourse
on Method, and the first half of the Principles, to the
relative neglect of the sixth part of the Discourse, the
Dioptrics, and the latter half of the Principles.
Secondly, Foster probably read little, if any, of
Descartes' extensive correspondence, only a tiny fraction
of which was then available in English.

Unfortunately it

was primarily in letters that Descartes outlined his highly
voluntaristic views on the eternal truths.
Granted that Foster's conclusions about Descartes are
erroneous, is there still any merit to his basic thesis?
Is there in fact a clear relationship between Decartes'
theology and his natural philosophy, if both are properly

122. "The Christian Doctrine of Creation and the Rise of
Modern Natural Science," Mind 43 (1934), p. 466.
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understood?

I believe that there is, if we look closely

enough at the individual elements of Cartesian thought,
keeping in mind the dialectic nature of Christian theology.
The essence of the Christian doctrine of creation is that
God, of his own free will, gave existence to an ordered
world which continues to exist at his pleasure.

It would

therefore be heretical to hold either that the world is God
or that it is not God to the extent that it exists
independently of God.

The logical space between these two

assertions is the maneuvering room for Christian
theologians.

In a like manner, Descartes found himself

between the rock of asserting that God's creative acts are
entirely conformable to human reason and the hard place of
asserting that they are wholly beyond our comprehension.
On the ground between these propositions he erected his
system of thought: that this system contains elements of
both rationalism and voluntarism only reflects tensions
inherent to the Christian doctrine of creation.123
Starting from God's utter transcendence, Descartes
denied that any limits could be placed on God's power to
create a boundless universe or eternal truths

123. In an excellent (unpublished) article on "Eternal
Truths and the Laws of Nature," M.J. Osler correctly states
that "since both intellectualists and voluntarists ascribed
both will and intellect to God, the difference between them
is largely one of emphasis." Osler's argument is very
similar to mine, but less detailed and more limited in
scope. We differ somewhat in our evaluations of the
suitability of applying Foster's criteria to Descartes.
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incomprehensibly different from those actually perceived by
the human mind (see Figure 3).

However because God was

perfect and his will and intellect were one, he could not
change his mind once he had chosen which truths to create.
If we could gain knowledge of these truths, that knowledge
would be permanent and necessary, not contingent.

Without

question, here Descartes took a step away from the radical
voluntarism from which he began.

Yet in and of itself this

did not lead to scientific rationalism.

A stable set of

truths is surely a necessary condition for an~ priori
science of nature--if God can change his mind, then we can
never be sure of our knowledge--but a sufficient condition
it is not, for it provides no guarantee that we can know
those truths.

The key question for Descartes was not

whether God could have created a different set of eternal
truths or even whether He could now change those truths;
rather the key question was whether we could in fact know
the eternal truths for what they were: did the truths in
our minds correspond to those in the created order?

And at

this point his answer was a resounding, rationalistic
'Yes!'

A perfect God could not deceive us by implanting in

our souls seeds of error rather than seeds of truth.

It

was on this bedrock of certainty that Descartes erected a
demonstrative science.
But if God's freedom to employ his absolute power was
confined to the period prior to the creation, it was not
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altogether denied.

Initially to determine which

propositions to make true and which mechanisms to place in
nature remained the privilege of the divine will, not the
human mind.

Results of that determination were shared only

partially--the eternal truths were revealed to mankind by
the light of reason, but the actual mechanisms only by
experience.

In spite of this unmistakable element of

voluntarism, however, Descartes' ideal of science remained
essentially rationalistic~ the God who reigned sovereignly
over the eternal truths and the laws of nature, the God who
functioned as efficient cause of motion, was ultimately out
of step with the scientific enterprise as Descartes
conceived it.

For a demonstrative science to be possible,

God's absolute power had to be constrained by God's
ordained power.

The sovereign God of truth could not be

allowed to change his decrees~ the Lord of nature must not
disobey his own laws by performing miraculous acts~ the
Sustainer of the world had always to act in the same way.
It is therefore apparent that theological voluntarism,
in itself, need not lead to an empirical science of nature.
It depends on where that voluntarism asserts itself.

By

deliberately mitigating the strong voluntarism of his
initial position, above all by his strident announcement
that God gave us minds which could not but think aright
when properly employed, Descartes established the
theological basis for his~ priori science of nature.

CHAPTER FOUR:
DIVINE FREEDOM, HUMAN LIMITS, AND EMPIRICISM
IN ROBERT BOYLE'S NATURAL PHILOSOPHY

To find a well-balanced position, to evade the Scylla of an
arrogant and scientifically sterile rationalism, without
falling into the Charybdis of a pseudo-religious blind
faith, meant also to find a solid basis for empirical and
experimental science. This problem occupied the Christian
thinkers who tried to solve it in different ways since the
twelfth century.
--R. Hooykaas, "Science and Theology in the Middle
Ages," Free University Quarterly 3 (1954), p. 85

It is difficult to overestimate the significance of Boyle's
keen sense of God's "arbitrary" freedom vis-a-vis even the
laws of nature.
Like Newton, he felt no compulsion to
construct a completely detailed natural philosophy tied to
divine attributes. At the same time, both men expressed
man's responsibility to observe the regularities of
phenomena according to experience and experiment.
--Eugene Klaaren, Religious Origins of Modern
Science, p. 169
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"I am not a Christian, because it is the religion of
my country, and my friends," wrote Robert Boyle; "when I
chuse to travel in the beaten road, it is not, because I
find it is the road, but because I judge it is the way."l
His was an intelligent, informed decision not made in
ignorance of contemporary philosophical currents.

Aware of

the new science and difficulties in biblical
interpretation, Boyle was no naive literalist, though his
traditional stance on miracles and doctrine might suggest
otherwise.

Careful to distinguish between "what the

1. The Works of the Honourable Robert Boyle, ed. Thomas
Birch, is available in a five volume folio (London, 1744)
and a six volume quarto (London, 1772). All of my
references will be to the latter, which has recently been
reprinted with an introduction by Douglas McKie
(Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1965).
I have quoted here from
Some Considerations about the Reconcileableness of Reason
and Religion (Works IV, 155), a tract published in 1675 by
"T.E. a layman," usually assumed to have been Rober[T]
Boyl[E]. See Samuel Halkett and John Laing, ed.,
Dictionary of Anonymous and Pseudonymous English Literature
(9 Vols.; London: Oliver and Boyd, 1926-1962) v, 305; their
reference to the DNB is incorrect, however. The earliest
(and most reliable)identification of Boyle as the author
of Reason and Religion that I can find is in Edward Jones,
A Catalogue of the Philosophical Books and Tracts Written
by the Hon. Robert Boyle, esq.; together with the order of
time, wherein each of them hath been publish'd
res ectivel • To which is added a catalo ue of the
theological books, written by the same author London,
1689). The catalogue was apparently prepared by an unnamed
French physician, almost certainly Denis Papin, who
collaborated with Boyle for several years on many
experiments. The catalogue includes Reason and Religion as
a work considered to be Boyle's.
The title page of Boyle's
The Excellency of Theology, published (in 1674) just one
year before Reason and Religion, transparently disguised
the author as "T.H.R.B.E." (The Honourable Robert Boyle,
Esq.).
Perhaps Boyle simply used the first and last
letters of this pseudonym in his next theological book.
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scripture itself says, and what is only said in the
scripture," he recognized that biblical passages on nature
spoke "rather in a popular than accurate manner."

Holy

Writ, he claimed, was "designed to teach us rather divinity
than philosophy," echoing the Augustinian notion of
accommodation which had been adopted by Calvin and had
proved so convenient for Galileo and Kepler.2

If he

remained ever conscious of doing science willingly within
the bounds of Christian theism, he never attempted, as van
Belmont did, to derive the content of his science from the
Bible.
Boyle's views on ecclesiastical polity reveal the same
reasoned consideration.

Like many other Restoration

intellectuals, Boyle found himself attracted to the
moderate wing of the Anglican Church, the so-called
Latitudinarians who sought to steer a middle course between
Romanists, on the one hand, and radical Protestants, on the
other.

His compulsion for moral living, his focus on

essential doctrines rather than trivialities, his
toleration and compassion for dissenters, and his abiding
2. Some Considerations touching the Style of the Holy
Scriptures (II, 260 and 319) and Some Considerations
touching the Usefulness of Experimental Natural Philosophy
(II, 19). Also see Calvin's commentaries on Genesis 1:6
and 1:16, and Psalms 19:4-6, 24:2, 58:4-5, and 136:7~
Galileo's Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina, trans.
Stillman Drake in his Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1957), pp. 173-215~ and the
introduction to Kepler's Astronomia Nova, in Thomas
Salusbury, Mathematical Collections and Translations
(London, 1661), Tome I, part I, pp. 461-67.
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interest in the rational underpinnings of the Christian
faith all reflected Latitudinarian concerns, as several
scholars have noted.3

My interest in this chapter,

however, will be not the social relations of science and
religion--nor, as the Jacobs would have it, the social and
political roots of science--but their intellectual
relations as seen in the thought of one Latitudinarian,
Robert Boyle.

The question I propose to answer is this:

specifically how did Boyle's understanding of God's
relation to the world influence his conception of natural
philosophy?
Piety and Sovereignty: Boyle's Voluntarism
Boyle's piety is a matter of historical record.

While

still a very young man, he wrote an autobiography, "An

3. Best known are James R. Jacob and Margaret C. Jacob, who
have summarized the socio-political argument they have
propounded at greater length elsewhere in "The Anglican
Origins of Modern Science: The Metaphysical Foundations of
the Whig Constitution," Isis 71 (1980), 251-267.
James
Jacob's Robert Boyle a n d ~ English Revolution: A Study in
Social and Intellectual Change (New York: Franklin, 1977)
applies their thesis to Boyle.
For some limitations to
this approach, see Nicholas Steneck, "Greatrakes the
Stroker: The Interpretations of Historians," Isis 73
(1982), 161-177, and J.R. Jacob's acerbic reply on pp.
164-74 of his Henr Stubbe, Radical Protestantism and the
Early Enlightenment Cambridge: UP, 1983 • Louis Trenchard
More, The Life and Works of the Honourable Robert Boyle
(Oxford: UP, 1944), Mitchell Salem Fisher, Robert Boyle,
Devout Naturalist: A Study in Science and Religion in the
Seventeenth Century (Philadelphia: Oshiver Studio Press,
1945), and Richard McMaster Hunt, The Place of Religion in
the Science of Robert Boyle (Pittsburgh: UP, 1955), all
connect Boyle with the moderate Anglicans and show how this
influenced his natural philosophy.
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Account of Philaretus in his Minority," an essentially
religious work in which God, ever mindful of the care of
his own, brings Boyle safely into manhood and personally
into the fold of the righteous.

It is clear from his

deeds, if not also from his words, that Boyle never lost
the deep sense of gratitude to divine providence that so
permeates his own record of his early years.

He gave

ungrudgingly of his substance, in life for the propogation
of the gospel in Ireland, America, and elsewhere, in death
for the establishment of annual lectures to prove the truth
of the Christian religion "against notorious infidels."
Even if he did not write the Free Discourse against
Customary Swearing,4 he certainly could have (and probably
did), for his opposition to oaths and his veneration of God

4. In "Robert Boyle's Anonymous Writings," Isis 68 (1977),
284-87, Joseph Agassi opposes Boyle's authorship of the
Discourse on the grounds that "the vulgarity of some of its
anecdotes (especially the one about two friends
accidentally meeting in a whorehouse) makes it beyond
dispute that the author is not the gentle and pious Boyle."
Has Agassi forgotten that, in the "Account of Philaretus,"
Boyle tells of visiting a Continental brothel (from which
he nevertheless emerged innocent) and expresses his disgust
with two mendicants who tried to bugger him? J.F. Fulton
accepts the Discourse as authentic, but has reservations
about the aforementioned Reason and Religion, which most
scholars accept. See A Bibliography of the Honourable
Robert Boyle, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961).
"An
Account of Philaretus" can be found (abridged) in Birch's
The Life of the Honourable Robert Boyle, which is bound
with the first volume of the Works and is still the basic
biography, and (complete) in R.E.W. Maddison, The Life of
the Honourable Robert Boyle, F.R.S. (London: Taylor &
Francis, 1969), a disappointing book.
Flora Masson, Robert
Boyle, A Biography (London: Constable, 1914), and Roger
Pilkington, Robert Boyle, Father of Chemistry (London: John
Murray, 1959), are less scholarly but better written.
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were well known in his day.

He is said to have paused

routinely before uttering the name of God;5 if so, then he
wrote as he spoke.

Before discoursing Of the High

Veneration Man's Intellect Owes to God, Boyle paused to
consider his subject:
Upon this occasion I shall take leave to declare,
that it is not without some indignation, as well as
wonder, that I see some men, and some of them divines
too, who little considering what God is, and what
themselves are, presume to talk of him and his
attributes as freely and as unpremeditatedly, as if
they were talking of a geometrical figure, or a
mechanical engine: so that even the less presumptuous
discourse, as if the nature and perfections of that
unparalleled Being were objects, that their
intellects can grasp: and scruple not to dogmatize
about those abstruse subjects, as freely as about
other things, that are confessedly within the reach
of human reason, or perhaps are to be found among the
more familiar objects of sense.
It is probable, he continued, "that God may have diverse
attributes, and consquently perfections, that are, as yet,
unknown to us • •

"

Neither "the contemplation of his

works" nor "the study of his word • • • will suffice to
acquaint us with all his perfections."

Not even "the idea

of a Being supremely or infinitely perfect" sufficed to
show us all of his attributes.

God had probably made other

worlds and "displayed in some of the creatures, that

5. Birch tells us that Boyle "had so profound a veneration
for the Deity that the very name of God was never mentioned
by him without a pause and a visible stop in his discourse;
in which Sir Peter Pett, who knew him for almost forty
years, affirms that he was so exact, that he did not
remember to have observed him once to fail in it." Works
I, cxxxviii.

128
compose them, diverse attributes, that we have not
discovered by the help of those works of his, that we are
acquainted with."

And scripture, which discloses to us the

whole counsel of God insofar as it is necessary for
salvation, yet affirms our inability to know perfectly the
nature, attributes, and providence of God.6
What Boyle did know is that God is wise, powerful,
and, above all, free.

The outstanding feature of Boyle's

theology is in fact not his Latitudinarianism, but his
voluntarism.

Perhaps Boyle's piety produced in him a

voluntaristic conception of God~ perhaps it was the other
way around.

Deep personal piety often indicates a profound

sense of divine transcendence.

In any case, all of Boyle's

theological works and, to a lesser extent, many of his
scientific works display a strong voluntaristic
orientation.7

The central theme of voluntarist theology is

God's unrestricted freedom to do as he pleases.

For Boyle

this meant that God "needs not the services of men," and
was not obliged to create us.

From "the same lump of

earthy matter, of which he formed the body of the first
6. Works V, 130-32. Boyle's lack of confidence in the
ontological argument, vis-a-vis Descartes, displays his
fundamentally different theological orientation.
7. The only studies of Boyle's voluntarism of which I am
aware are Eugene Klaaren, Religious Origins of Modern
Science (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977)~ Mary E.C. Bowen,
"'This great automaton, the world': The Mechanical
Philosophy of Robert Boyle, F.R.S.," doctoral dissertation
at Columbia University (1976)~ and J.E. McGuire, "Boyle's
Conception of Nature," JHI 33 (1972), 523-42.
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man, he might, if he had pleased, as easily have formed a
dog, or an ape."
unmerited.8

His love for us was just as free and

It did not even follow from God's power and

wisdom that he was bound to make the best possible world.
When
he made the world, and established the laws of
motion, [he] gave them to matter, not to himself: and
so being obliged to none, as his superior or
benefactor, he was not bound to make, or administer,
corporeal things after the best manner, that he
could, for the good of the things themselves • • •
Boyle therefore based his theodicy on the voluntaristic
premise that God is entitled to dispose of his works "as he
thinks best for his own glory~ • • • he may have designs
• • • which we men are too short sighted to discern.

.

. n9

Indeed the Christian religion embraced diverse truths "that
reason, left to itself, would never have been able to find
out, nor perhaps to have so much as dreamed of," because
they "depend upon the free will and ordination of God," and
"consequently are not to be explicitly known but by his
revelation~ which he has not, that appears, vouchsafed to
us in any other book than the scripture."

The creation of

the world in six days, the incarnation, the virgin birth,
the resurrection of the dead, the last judgment--all these
were free decrees of God, beyond the determination of
8. The Christian Virtuoso (VI, 767) and Seraphick Love
(I, 266).
9. A Free Inquiry into the Vulgarly Received Notion of
Nature (V, 195-97).
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reason.10

The point here is not that Boyle admitted that

certain doctrines depended on the will of God--any
Christian would have admitted this--the point is that, as a
voluntarist, he repeatedly emphasized it.

Once these

truths had been revealed to us, however, reason could
readily embrace them.

While above reason in that they were

unknowable apart from revelation, they were not contrary or
repugnant to reason.

For examples of this distinction,

Boyle turned to Galileo's telescopic observations of the
Jovian moons and the phases of Venus, neither of which
could have been anticipated by unaided reason~ yet both
made sense once discovered.11

Thus for Boyle both the word

and the works of God reflected the voluntarist dialectic
between God's will and intellect.

Neither could be

determined by the human mind alone, yet neither, once made
known, mocked the human mind with truths against its
nature.

*

*

*

*

*

If God revealed some of his decrees in scripture, he
revealed his matchless power and unequaled wisdom in the

10. Christian Virtuoso (V, 542f) and Style of the
Scriptures (II, 284). Also see A Discourse of Thins Above
Reason (IV, 406f and 450).
In Seraphick Love (I, 267 and
The Excellency of Theology (IV, 15f), Boyle declined to
delve into such mysteries as whether or not God could have
redeemed mankind without the passion of Christ.
11. Christian Virtuoso (V, 546)~ cf. Excellency of Theology
(IV,9 •
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creation.

The "immense quantity of corporeal substance,

that the divine power provided for the framing of the
universe~ and the great force of the local motion, that was
imparted to it, and is regulated in it," spoke volumes of
God's omnipotence.

Within such a vast and beautiful world,

our proper response was awe and wonder at the richness of
the creation, a richness which only mirrored the fecundity
of the Creator.
Thus heaven goes under one name, but contains so many
fixed stars and planets, and they, by their diversity
of motions, exhibit so many phaenomena, that though
they have employed the curiosity of astronomers for
many ages, yet our times have, in the celestial part
of the world, made discoveries as considerable, if
not as numerous, as all those of the antients~ and as
our optick glasses have detected many fixed stars,
and divers planets, that were unknown to former
times, so our navigators, by their voyages beyond the
line, have discovered divers whole constellations in
the southern hemisphere: so that though heaven be an
object, that has been perpetually and conspicuously
exposed to men's view and curiosity for some
thousands of years, yet it still affords new subjects
for their wonder~ and I scarce doubt, but by the
farther improvements of telescopes posterity will
have its curiosity gratified by the discovery both of
new constellations, and of new stars in those that
are known to us already. We need not therefore fear
our admiration of God should expire, for want of
objects to keep it up.
That boundless ocean contains
a variety of excellent objects, that is as little to
be exhausted, as the creatures, that live in our
sublunary ocean, or lie on the shores, that limit it,
can be numbered.12
The telescope, the microscope, the anatomical knife, and
the chemical furnace were but instruments of God's glory.
12. High Veneration (IV, 132 and 153). One is immediately
reminded of Newton's famous remark about pebbles on the
shore.
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When Boyle studied the book of nature and consulted "the
glosses of Aristotle, Epicurus, Paracelsus, Harvey,
Helmont, and other learned expositors of that instructive
volume," he found himself "reduced to exclaim with the
Psalmist, How manifold are thy works, O Lord? in wisdom
hast thou made them all!"13

All of nature's engines,

animate and inanimate, great and small, pointed to the most
excellent craftsmanr but the exquisite construction,
symmetry, variety, and economy of the organic world did so
with the greatest force.

Though it be true, said Boyle,

"that the greater works of God do as well declare his great
wisdom as his power," yet no less did his wisdom appear in
lesser creatures.

God, "in these little creatures,

oftentimes draws traces of omniscience, too delicate to be
liable to be ascribed to any other cause."

The mole was no

less wonderful than the elephantr nature's clocks were no
more wonderful than her watches.14
Almost all natural philosophers of the scientific
revolution expressed awe and amazement when confronted with
the majestic and intricate works of nature.

Even Robert

Hooke, not a particularly pious man, described the effects
of nature as "wonderful because every natural production
may be truly said to be a wonder or miracle if duly
13. Seraphick Love (I, 262).
14. High Veneration (IV, 136f) and Usefulness (II, 22)r cf.
A Disquisition about the Final Causes of Natural Things
(V, 403).
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considered."15

For Boyle, however, the religious dimension

of scientific investigation was almost overwhelming.

He

considered himself a priest in the temple of God's works,
an interpreter of the book of creation.16

Far from

divorcing design from science, Boyle insisted that it was
"injurious to God, as well as unwarrantable in itself, to
banish from natural philosophy the consideration of final
causes.

"

In abandoning the argument from design, he

thought, the Cartesians had thrown away an argument "which
the experien-ce of all ages shews to have been the most
successful (and in some cases the only prevalent one) to
establish, among philosophers, the belief and veneration of
God."

The innate idea of God might suffice to show his

15. From "A Discourse of Earthquakes," in The Posthumous
Works of Robert Hooke, ed. Richard Waller (London, 1705),
pp. 423f. John Calvin, who never denied the reality of
secondary causes, once said that "there are as many
miracles of divine power, as many tokens of goodness, and
as many proofs of wisdom, as there are kinds of things in
the universe, indeed, as there are things either great or
small." Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T.
McNeill and trans. Ford Lewis Battles (2 Vols.: London: SCM
Press, 1960), I.14.21 (Vol. I, p. 181).
16. Final Causes (V,401) and Usefulness (II, 3lf). See
Harold Fisch, "The Scientist as Priest: A Note on Robert
Boyle's Natural Theology," Isis 44 (1953), 252-65.
Boyle
attributed the metaphor of the world as a temple to
classical antiquity. Calvin used a similar expression,
calling the world "this most beautiful theater": see
Institutes I.5.8., I.6.2, I.14.20, and II.6.1.
I do not
find in Boyle the lack of spirituality for which R.S.
Westfall generally condemns the virtuosi in Science and
Religion in Seventeenth-Century England (New Haven: Yale
UP, 1958). What I find is a lack of emphasis on redemption
within a creation orientation. The same could be said of
Calvin, for whom redemption was not as much salvation from
damnation as it was a restoration of the created state.
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power, but not his wisdom and goodness.17

Thus Boyle

turned Cartesianism on its head, arguing for God
teleologically rather than ontologically.

Boyle also

inverted Descartes' inference from an omnipotent God to a
universe of seemingly boundless size~ instead of arguing
that an infinite God demanded an immense universe, Boyle
took the fact of an immense universe as evidence of God's
infinite power.18
This is not to say that Boyle equated the practice of
science with the pursuit of final causes.

No good

voluntarist--no good Christian--could presume to know all
of God's purposes.

But there were two very different ways

wherein a man may pretend to know the ends of God in
his visible works: for, he may either pretend to know
only some of God's ends, in some of his works~ or he
may pretend to know all his ends. He, that arrogates
to himself to discover God's ends in this latter
sense, will scarce be excused from a high
presumption, and no less a folly, from the reason
lately intimated in the Cartesian objection.
But to
pretend to know God's ends in the former sense, is
not a presumption, but rather to take notice of them
is a duty.
For there are some things in nature so
curiously contrived, and so exquisitely fitted for
certain operations and uses, that it seems little
less than blindness in him, that acknowledges, with
the Cartesians, a most wise Author of things, not to
conclude, that, though they may have been designed
for other (and perhaps higher) uses, yet they were
designed for this use.19
17. Final Causes (V, 40lf).
Cf. Boyle's unenthusiastic
comments about the ontological argument in High Veneration
(V, 132).
18. Usefulness (II, 20).
19. Final Causes (V, 397).
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A modest search for final causes was entirely appropriate,
indeed a duty.

If it was erroneous to say "that everything

in the visible world was made for the use of man," it was
"more erroneous to deny, that any thing was made for ends
investigable by man."20

Some purposes were very clear: the

manifestation of God's glory, the general welfare of the
creation, the welfare of individual creatures, and the
suitability of certain things for human needs.21

Final

causes and efficient causes were complementary and
harmonious.

Both were required for a complete

understanding.

A man might "give a mechanical reason of

the structure of every wheel and other part of a watch,"
all the while supposing "that the artificer designed it to
shew the hours of the day."22

*

*

*

*

*

Design for Boyle was more than just a manifest feature
of the world which pointed unambiguously to a Designer.
was a necesssary principle of natural philosophy~ without
it, the origin of the world was inexplicable.

Mechanical

principles alone were insufficient to account for the
20. Ibid., p. 396.
21. Final Causes (V, 395f)~ cf. Usefulness (II, 15) and
Free Inquiry (V, 198). For a detailed discussion of
teleology in Boyle's biology, see James Lennox, "Robert
Boyle's Defense of Teleological Inference in Experimental
Science," Isis 74 (1983), 38-52.
22. Ibid., p. 399~ also seep. 443 and Free Inquiry
(V, 245).

It
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formation of the universe.

We needed in addition

an architectonick principle or power~ by which I mean
those various determinations, and that skilfull
guidance of the motions of the small parts of the
universal matter by the most wise Author of things,
which were necessary at the beginning to turn that
confused chaos into this orderly and beautiful world~
and especially, to contrive the bodies of animals and
plants, and the seeds of those things whose kinds
were to be propagated.
For I confess I cannot well
conceive, how from matter, barely put into motion,
and then left to itself, there could emerge such
curious fabricks as the bodies of men and perfect
animals, and such yet more admirably contrived
parcels of matter, as the seeds of living
creatures.23
Boyle rejected Descartes' cosmogony in which God set matter
into motion according to laws he established and then
ceased to interpose.

Although Boyle saw "some probability"

that, once God had properly set matter into motion,
vortices might be produced by "numberless occursions" of
the parts of the world without further divine action, he
deemed it "utterly impossible that brute and unguided,
though moving, matter should ever convene into such
admirable structures as the bodies of perfect animals."24
But once God had framed the world and established the
course of nature,
the naturalist (except in some few cases where God or
incorporeal agents interpose) has recourse to the
first cause but for its general and ordinary support
23. The Sceptical Chymist (I, 571).
24. Origin of Forms and Qualities (III, 30f), emphasis his~
cf. p. 15 and The Relation betwixt Flame and Air
(III, 597f).
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and influence, whereby it preserves matter and motion
from annihilation or desition~ and in explicating
particular phenomena considers only the size, shape,
motion (or want of it), texture, and the resulting
qualities and attributes, of the small particles of
matter. And thus in this great automaton, the world
(as in a watch or clock), the materials it consists
of being left to themselves could never at the first
convene into so curious an engine: and yet, when the
skilful artist has once made and set it a-going, the
phenomena it exhibits are to be accounted for by the
number, bigness, proportion, shape, motion (or
endeavor), rest, coaptation, and other mechanical
affections, of the spring, wheels, pillars, and other
parts it is made up of~ and those effects of such a
watch that cannot this way be explicated must, for
aught I know, be confessed not to be sufficiently
understood.25
By this Boyle meant only that scientific explanations of
the world as it now is (ever since God finished his
creative work) had to be mechanical in character.

He most

emphatically did not mean that divine superintendence had
ended with the creation of the world.

The transcendent

Clockmaker was also an immanent Mechanic.

The most potent

Author and Opficer of the world, wrote Boyle,
hath not abandoned a master piece so worthy of Hirn,
but does still maintain and preserve it, so
regulating the stupendiously swift motions of the
great globes, and other vast masses of the mundane
matter, that they do not, by any notable
irregularity, disorder the grand system of the
universe, and reduce it to a kind of chaos, or
confused state of shuffled and depraved things. 26
No single metaphor is sufficient to convey the full

25. Ibid., p. 31~ cf. Sceptical Chyrnist (I, 571), quoted
above.
26. Christian Virtuoso (V, 519).
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Judeo-Christian concept of God.

The Father Almighty is

also the Maker of heaven and earth: the God of Abraham,
Isaac, and Jacob is also the Ancient of Days.

In precisely

the same way, no single metaphor can fully capture the
nature of God's relationship to the world.

The clock

metaphor, one of the most widely used images of the world
throughout the scientific revolution, beautifully
harmonized the mechanical philosophy with the notion of
intelligent design, but simultaneously suggested the
dangerous, deistic thought that the craftsman might leave
his clock to run on its own after making it.
to Boyle, as it had others before him.27

This occured

Thus he stressed

27. The Puritan divine John Robinson (1576?-1625) had said
that "it addes to the honour of the skilfull Artificer, so
at the first to frame his Clocke or other worke of like
curious devise, as that the severall parts should
constantly move, and order each other in infinite varietie,
hee, as the Maker, and first Mover moving, and ordering
all. Where yet this difference must alwayes be minded,
that the Artisan leaves his worke being once framed to it
selfe: but God by continual! influx preserves, and orders
both the being, and motions of all Creatures.
Here also we
except both unnaturall accidents: and specially,
supernaturall, and miraculous events: which are, as it
were, so many particular creations, by the immediate hand
of God." See his Essays: or, Observations Divine and
Morall. Collected out of Holy Scriptures, ancient and
moderne writers, both divine and humane. As also, out of
the great volume of mens manners (2nd ed.: London, 1638),
pp. 3lf. This passage is mentioned by John Dillenberger,
Protestant Thought and Natural Science (Garden City, NY:
Doubleday, 1960), p. 116. On Robinson see the DNB, XVII,
18-22. Cf. Calvin's comment that "to make God amomentary
Creator, who once for all finished his work, would be cold
and barren, and we must differ from profane men especially
in that we see the presence of divine power shining as much
in the continuing state of the universe as in its
inception." Institutes I.16.1 (Vol. I, p. 197). S.L.
Macey, Clocks and the Cosmos: Time in Western Life and
Thought (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1980), traces
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repeatedly the necessity of what he often called God's
"general" or "ordinary concourse"--that is, his ordained
power--for the orderly running of the universe and even for
its moment by moment existence.

God was "the continual

preserver and upholder of [the universe]."28

Just "as the

world could not have had a beginning, without having been
provided by God, so for the continuance of the being it
enjoys, it depends altogether, and every moment, upon the
will and pleasure of its first author," to the extent that
"if God should at any time withdraw his preserving
influence, the world would presently relapse, or vanish
into its first nothing • • • "29

All of God's creatures

were likewise preserved in being "by that supporting
influence of God, which keeps them from relapsing into
their first nothing • • • "30
In no sense, then, can Boyle's world be said to have
run on its own, without the constant, direct supervision of
its maker.

God had not appointed a vice-gerent, "nature,"

to oversee his handiwork in his stead.

The "vulgar notion

of nature," by which Boyle signified the peripatetic
the clock metaphor back to the 14th century.
28. Free Inquiry (V, 163).
29. Occasional Reflections (II, 403), commenting on Acts
17:28 and Nehemiah 9:6.
Cf. Free Inquiry (V, 222).
30. Usefulness (II, 25), again commenting on Nehemiah 9:6~
cf. his comments on Psalm 104:29-30 in Occasional
Relfections, loc. cit. Commenting on Hebrews 1:3, Calvin
said that "allthings would instantly come to nothing, were
they not sustained by his power."
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conception, was "both injurious to the glory of God, and a
great impediment to the solid and useful discovery of his
works."31

By endowing the world with understanding or a

rational soul called "nature," philosophers had been led to
worship the creature rather than the Creator, an error
which even Christians had not escaped.

To say that "nature

does such and such a thing" explained nothing, for it did
not explicate how the thing was done, which could only be
by mechanical and not incorporeal causes, "according to the
laws of motion settled by the omniscient Author of things."
As a "clear and eminent example" of the damage done by
adhering to the received notion of nature, Boyle pointed to
the ascension of water in pumps, and in other
phenomena of that kind, whose true physical causes
had never been found out, if the moderns had
acquiesced, as their predecessors did, in that
imaginary one, that the world was governed by a
watchful being, called nature, and that she abhors a
vacuum, and consequently is still in a readiness to
do irresistably whatever is necessary to prevent itr
nor must we expect any great progress in the
discovery of the true causes of natural effects,
whilst we are content to sit down with other, than
the particular and immediate ones.32
It was unbecoming to the naturalist "to attribute to the

31. Free Inquiry (V, 162). Mary E.C. Bowen has properly
said, "Indeed, just as the new science was an intellectual
revolt against Aristotelian science, so also theologically
it was an assertion of theism against Aristotelian
paganism. " 2£. cit • , p. 3 5 •
32. Free Inquiry (V, 183f, 172, 176, and 165). Cudworth,
Glanvill, and More were three of the Christian philosophers
Boyle must have had in mind.
See Steneck, "Greatrakes the
Stroker," pp. 174f.
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senseless and inanimate body of water an aim at the good of
the universe, • • • as if it were a free agent" capable of
acting contrary to its nature by ascending to prevent a
vacuum, "like a noble patriot, that sacrifices his private
interests to the publick ones of his country."33

For

Boyle, matter was correctly understood, both scientifically
and theologically, as wholly inert and mindless, incapable
of acting according to any intelligent principle-incapable, therefore, even of obeying laws.

Properly

speaking, he said,
a law being but a notional rule of acting according
to the declared will of~ superior, it is plain, that
nothing but an intellectual Being can be properly
capable of receiving and acting by a law.
For if it
does not understand, it cannot know .what the will of
the legislator is~ nor can it have any intention to
accomplish it, nor can it act with regard to it, or
know when it does, in acting, either conform to it or
deviate from it: and it is intelligible to me, that
God should at the beginning impress determinate
motions upon the parts of matter, and guide them, as
he thought requisite, for the primordial constitution
of things~ and that ever since he should, by his
ordinary and general concourse, maintain those
powers, which he gave the parts of matter, to
transmit their motion thus and thus to one another.
But I cannot conceive, how a body devoid of
understanding and sense, truly so called, can
moderate and determinate its own motions, especially
so, as to make them conformable to laws, that it has
no knowledge or apprehension of • • • 34
The laws of motion "did not necessarily spring from the
nature of matter, but depended on the will of the divine
33. Experimental History of Cold (II, 500) and Usefulness
(II, 38).
34. Free Inquiry (V, 170), italics Boyle's.
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author of things • •

"

Boyle therefore looked upon a law

as a moral, not a physical cause, as being indeed but
a notional thing, according to which, an intelligent
and free agent is bound to regulate its actions. But
inanimate bodies are utterly incapable of
understanding what a law is, or what it enjoins, or
when they act conforrnably or unconforrnably to it~ and
therefore the actions of inanimate bodies, which
cannot incite or moderate their own actions, are
produced by real power, not by laws~ though the
agents, if intelligent, may regulate the exertions of
their power by settled rules.35
Manifestly, Boyle's conception of natural law was
voluntaristic.

God operated directly on matter, governing

his actions by rules which were products of his own will.
In commenting on these passages, J.E. McGuire has
attributed to Boyle a view of causality akin to that of
David Hurne, concluding that "Boyle implicitly expressed the
view that causation is something imposed upon observed
regularity by the conceptualizing power of the human
mind."36

I am unconvinced that Boyle would have put it

quite so strongly.

It is clear, however, that he denied

any immanency and necessity to natural laws.

Because they

were imposed by the will of a transcendent God, we could
presumably know them in a manner analagous to that in which
we could learn of his decrees in theology--to wit, by
revelation and not by unaided reason.

Just as the book of

35. Christian Virtuoso (V, 521).
36. "Boyle's Conception of Nature," p. 536.
For a
dissenting opinion, see Mary E.C. Bowen, £12.• cit., pp.
69-71.
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scripture revealed certain truths above reason, so the book
of nature revealed certain patterns by which its author
exercised his sovereign will.
If the world was therefore not intelligent in that it
possessed no mind of its own, it was yet intelligible
because the Lord of nature continually imposed his will on
his subjects.

Instead of finding mind in nature, Boyle

found it over and behind nature.

Though in themselves

mindless, inanimate bodies conformed to the intentions of
human and divine agents, thus giving the appearance of
innate intelligence where none was actually present.

An

arrow shot at a mark had no design to strike it, but moved
as if it did because a man had aimed it.

In declaring the

hour, the wheels of a timepiece had no thoughts of their
own, but only accomplished the intentions of the
designer.37

As God's own masterpiece perfectly embodying

his ends, the universe itself was "like a rare clock, such
as may be that at Strasburgh, where all things are so
skilfully contrived, that the engine being once set a
moving, all things proceed, according to the artificer's
first design • • • "38

The all-knowing Lord was more than

37. Final Causes (V, 413), Free Inquiry (V, 171), and
Usefulness (II, 40).
38. Free Inquiry (V, 163). Cf. this passage from
Usefulness (II, 39), which could easily be mistaken for a
selection from Query 31 of Newton's Opticks: God in the
beginning divided matter "into an innumerable multitude of
very variously figured corpuscles, and both connected those
particles into such textures or particular bodies, and
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merely a divine mathematician who established initial
conditions based on their calculated outcomes--indeed he
was not a mathematician at all.

His knowledge was not "a

progressive or discursive thing, like that assigned by our
ratiocinaton, but an intuitive knowledge" obtained, as i t
were, by looking into himself "as in a divine and universal
looking-glass."39

He was the unsearchably wise DEMIURGOS,

"whose piercing eyes were able to look, at once, quite
through the universe, and take into his prospect both the
beginning and end of time" with perfect knowledge not only
of the mechanical parts of the world, but also of the
secret thoughts and intentions of men and the contingent
actions of free agents.40

God was indeed more than a

watchmaker, and his creation more than a watch.

Instead of

dividing divine operations "into two sorts only, natural
and supernatural," Boyle added a third category, "supramechanical," for those operations which were "natural in a
larger sense."

Whereas

placed them in such situations, and put them into such
motions, that by the assistance of his ordinary preserving
concourse, the phaenomena, which he intended should appear
in the universe, must as orderly follow, and be exhibited
by the bodies necessarily acting according to those
impressions or laws, though they understand them not at
all, as if each of those creatures had a design of
self-preservation, and were furnished with knowledge and
industry to prosecute it • • • "
39. High Veneration (IV, 150).
view.

This recalls Galileo's

40. Free Inquiry (V, 190) and High Veneration, loc. cit.
This image is strikingly similar to Newton's PANTOCRATOR.

145
all the phaenomena of the world, as it is an
aggregate, or system of mere bodies, are performed by
matter, and local motion, according to mechanical
laws~ the operations of the human mind, and its
organical body upon one another, are not to be
accounted for by mere matter, and its mechanical
powers • • • So that these operations, that belong
to a man as he is so, though in some sense they are
not supernatural, because the order of things being
once established by the most wise and powerful author
of them, they are produced according to the course of
nature~ yet they may be stiled supra-mechanical,
because they cannot be mechanically explicated or
produced, nor can they be proved to flow from natural
causes, if these are considered, as but corporeal
ones.41
In its proper context, then, the clockwork metaphor
was intended to convey the lawlike, mechanical regularity
of the created universe under the absolute sovereignty of
an omnipotent, wise, and free creator.

Some measure of

Boyle's appreciation of divine sovereignty and freedom can
be obtained from an examination of his position on the
plurality of worlds, a topic of frequent discussion in the
scientific revolution.42

If God has made other worlds,

wrote Boyle, he "may have given peculiar and admirable
instances of his inexhausted wisdom in the contrivance and
government of systems, that, for aught we know, may be

41. Christian Virtuoso (VI, 754).
In an unpublished
manuscript listing remarks "About Atheism," Boyle said that
"no mechanical account can be given of Paine and Griefe
felt from the Body." Royal Society, Boyle Papers, vol. 6,
folio 61, quoted by Bowen, .£.E.• cit., p. 86.
42. See Steven J. Dick, Plurality of Worlds: The
Extraterrestrial Life Debate from Democritus to Kant
(Cambridge: UP, 1982). Dick's statement (p. 200 nl8) that
Boyle "did not specifically address himself to the question
of other worlds" is incorrect.
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framed and managed in a manner quite differing from what is
observed in that part of the universe, that is known to
us."

The kind of matter, the laws of motion, and the

living creatures might be highly unlike those in our own
world.43

In contrast to the Cartesian God, Boyle's God

apparently saw no necessity to create a given type of
matter or a given set of laws.
prescribed~ priori.

These things could not be

God could just as easily have made

other kinds of worlds as other worlds of the same kind.
Boyle thought that in the new heaven and new earth which
God would someday substitute for the present one, "the
primordial frame of things, and the laws of motion, and
consequently, the nature of things corporeal, may be very
differing from those that obtain in the present world."44
Boyle extended God's sovereignty yet further.

Just as

God could, at his pleasure, create other worlds or recreate
the present one, so he could alter the established course
of nature to suit his own purposes.

It is not so much that

Boyle admitted miracles, for any Christian would have, but
that he dwelt on them as an integral part of his natural
philosophy.

Where Galileo and Descartes had relegated

miracles forever to the realm of theology, Boyle considered
them worthy of inclusion within the pale of philosophical
discourse as something to be accounted for by the Christian
43. High Veneration (V, 138-147).
44. Christian Virtuoso (VI, 788f).
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virtuoso.

To be sure, this was not without its

difficulties for the committed mechanist that Boyle was,
but to say with R.S. Westfall that Boyle's reconciliation
of miracles and mechanisms was "artificial and arbitrary"
is to ignore the nuances and resources of the voluntarist
tradition.45
The paradigm miracle for Boyle was the creation of the
world, an act of pure omnipotence accomplished by fiat
without toil or pre-existent matter.
sovereign now as then.

But God was no less

The world was to God as a shadow to

a man: both could be changed at will, "in the twinkling of
an eye."

When God

had a mind to work those miracles, we most admire, as
when at Joshua'a prayer he stopped the course of the
sun, and at Hezekiah's, made him go back7 we men are
apt to imagine, that these prodigious effects must
needs cost their author much, and that he must strain
his power, and be necessitated to a troublesome
exertion of his omnipotence, to be able to produce
them: whereas to that divine agent, those things,
that would be to all others impossible, are so far
from being difficult, and the creatures have so
absolute and continual a dependance on him, that it
is as easy for him to effect the greatest alterations
in them, as to resolve to do so. And even those
miraculous changes of the course of nature, that do
the most astonish us, do so naturally and necessarily
flow from the motions of his own will, that to
decree, and to execute, (whether or no they require
powers otherwise than notionally differing) are alike
easy to him: and that irresistable agent finds as
45. Science and Religion, p. 89. Otherwise keenly aware of
seventeenth century theological currents, Westfall failed
to appreciate the signifigance of voluntarist orientations.
In this of course he was not alone--it is only recently
that historians have begun to see the importance of such
orientations.
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little more difficulty to produce the greatest
changes among the creatures, than to produce the
least, as I find it harder to move the whole arm of
my shadow, than to move the little finger.
By diverse ways, "some of them imaginable by us, and others
inconceivable to us," the grand Author of nature could
"bring such things to pass, as the ordinary course of
nature would never produce, and surpassing those which her
unassisted power could ever reach to."46

The laws of

nature were not necessary truths binding on God, but were
"arbitrarily instituted by God" and, in reference to him,
were "but arbitrary still."

It is a rule in natural

philosophy, said Boyle,
that causae necessariae semper agunt quantum possunt~
but it will not follow from thence, that the fire
must necessarily burn Daniel's three companions, or
their clothes, that were cast by the Babylonian
king's command into the midst of a burning fiery
furnace, when the author of nature was pleased to
withdraw his concourse to the operations of the
flames, or supernaturally to defend them against the
bodies, that were exposed to them.
That men once
truly dead cannot be brought to life again, hath been
in all ages the doctrine of mere philosophers~ but
though this be true, according to the course of
nature, yet it will not follow, but that the contrary
may be true, if God interpose either to recal the
departed soul, and re-conjoin it to the body, if the
organization of this be not too much vitiated, or by
so altering the fabrick of the matter, whereof the
carcass consists, as to restore it to a fitness for
the exercise of the functions of life. Agreeably to
this, let me observe to you, that, though it be
unreasonable to believe a miraculous effect, when
attributed only to a mere physical agent~ yet the
same thing may reasonably be believed, when ascribed
to God, or to agents assisted with his absolute or
46. Occasional Reflections (II, 402f) and Christian
Virtuoso (VI, 678-80)~ cf. Final Causes (V, 414).
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supernatural power.
Physical laws were just "collected or emergent" truths
inductively obtained by comparing many particulars
regarding "the settled phaenomena of nature," not "axioms
metaphysical, or universal, that hold in all cases without
reservation."

Thus Boyle rejected as "a great error" the

idea of the double truth--"that this or that thing is true
in philosophy, but false in divinity"--for it was "not
repugnant to reason" that God might interpose his power to
make iron float or a virgin conceive.47
God had indeed performed miracles, always for a
religious purpose, especially to authenticate the divine
origin of Christianity.

An argument grounded on miracles,

Boyle thought, was "little less than absolutely necessary,
to evince, that any religion, that men believe to be
supernatually revealed,
God."

does really proceed from

The miracles of Christ and his disciples certified

the truth of their message.

Although we ourselves have not

seen them, Boyle argued, we have experienced them
vicariously through the biblical histories, which were
penned by men who "cheerfully suffered to attest the truth"
of their witness.

Knowledge of the true limits of

mechanical powers would qualify the Christian virtuoso "to

47. Christian Virtuoso (V, 714), Reason and Religion (IV,
16lf), Things above Reason (IV, 463), and Reason and
Religion (IV, 163).
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distinguish between things, that are only strange and
surprising, and those that are only miraculousr so that he
will not mistake the effects of natural magic, for those of
a divine power."

The mechanical notion of nature was thus

superior to the vulgar because it enabled its proponents
more readily to recognize true miracles.48

Among the many

biblical miracles which Boyle mentioned, the two already
cited were perhaps his favorite examples of divine
sovereignty over nature.

One of these, the deliverance of

Daniel's friends from the fiery furnace, was a standard
theme of voluntarist theologians after Ockham.49

The

resurrection of the dead, the other example, drew from
Boyle an explanation of its possibility in light of the
mechanical philosophy.

By "recollecting a sufficient

quantity of the scattered matter of a dead human body" and
re-uniting it with a soul, God could "effect that wonder we
call the resurrection."SO

Putting aside considerations of

48. Christian Virtuoso (V, 53lf) and Free Inquiry (V, 164).
Cf. Seraphick Love (I, 269).
49. See Reason and Religion (IV, 162), Usefulness (II, 17),
The Martyrdom of Theodora, and of Didymus (V, 268), and The
Possibility of the Resurrection (IV, 20lf).
Francis
Oakley, "Christian Theology and the Newtonian Science of
Nature," in Creation: The Impact of an Idea, ed. Oakley and
Daniel O'Connor (New York: Scribners, 1969), pp. 54-83, has
found the fiery furnace as an example of divine freedom in
the works of Luther, Melanchthon, Suarez, Perkins, Preston,
Ames, Shepard, Norton, Increase Mather, and Willard.
Klaaren (££. cit., p. 221 n22) has called it a "stock
voluntarist example."
50. Reason and Religion (IV, 159)r cf. Usefulness
(II, 48f).
Boyle's short treatise on The Possibility of
the Resurrection was appended to Reason and Religion.
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how God might have accomplished it, Boyle clearly believed
that we too, like Christ, would be raised from the dead.
On the occasion of his only known visit to a nonconformist
religious service, Boyle disputed the meaning of Daniel
12:2 ("And many that sleep in the dust of the earth shall
awake, some to everlasting life, and some to everlasting
shame and contempt.") with Sir Henry Vane, who gave it an
allegorical interpretation in terms of the revival of long
dead religious doctrines.

According to Birch (who followed

Sir Peter Pett's account), Boyle "thought himself obliged
for the honour of God's truth to say, that this place in
Daniel being the clearest one in all the Old Testament for
the proof of the resurrection, we ought not to suffer the
meaning of it to evaporate into allegory • • • "51

A third

miracle, that at Pentecost, illustrates the apologetic
function of miracles in Boyle's thought.

In an unpublished

essay on the circumstances of and inferences deducible from
the Pentecost miracle, Boyle argued that the biblical
account satisfied the basic criteria of historical veracity
and then concluded that it confirmed such fundamental
articles of the faith as the existence of God, the
immortality of the soul, the reality of providence, the
triune nature of God, the messiahship of Christ, and the

51. Life of Boyle (I, cxl). Whether Boyle's objection was
motivated, at least in part, by political goals as J.R.
Jacob claims, I will not venture to consider.
My point
stands that Boyle believed in the importance of a literal
resurrection of the dead.
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resurrection of the dead.52
That Boyle accepted biblical miracles is one thing.
Did he also believe that God continued to perform miracles
in the present age or did he hold with many other
Protestants that they ceased with the apostolic era?

To

the best of my knowledge, Boyle addressed this question in
only two contexts, when discussing either the origin of the
soul or medical miracles.

From the immateriality of the

soul, Boyle inferred
that the divine providence extends to every
particular man; since whenever an embryo, or little
human body formed in the womb, is, by being duly
organized, fitted to receive a rational mind, God is
pleased to create one, and unite it with that body.
In which transaction, there seems to me a necessity
of a direct and particular intervention of the divine
power; since I understand not, by what physical charm
or spell an immaterial substance can be allured into
this or that particular embryo, of many that are at
the same time fitted to receive a human soul; nor by
what merely mechanical tie, or band, an immaterial
substance can be so durably (perhaps for 80 or 100
years) joined and united with a corporeal, in which
it finds no parts, that it has organs to take hold
of, and to which it can furnish no parts to be
fastened upon by them.53
In this sense at least Boyle believed that God had
52. I am following Mary E.C. Bowen's account of this
document on pp. 122-23 of her dissertation.
The manuscript
is in the Royal Society, Boyle Papers, vol. 7, folios 5 and
95.
53. Christian Virtuoso (V, 520). Boyle affirmed the
miraculous origin of each soul in A Defense of the Doctrine
touching the Spring and Weight of Air (I, 146) and in Free
Inquiry (V, 241); in the latter place, he assigned this
union of body and soul to the sixth or seventh week after
conception.
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performed miracles throughout human history.

But these

miracles involved no observable or unpredictable
disturbance of the ordinary course of nature--indeed they
happened normally, if not naturally, in the process of
embryological growth.

They were not miracles in the usual

sense, nor did Boyle call them "miracles."

In the affair

of Greatrakes the Stroker, however, the occurrence of true
miracles was certainly the issue.54

While visiting London

in 1665-66 (the height of the plague and the year of the
great fire), the Irish healer performed before reliable
witnesses (including Boyle) numerous apparent cures of the
king's evil and other ailments.

Henry Stubbe, a Stratford

physician who had seen some of the cures, published an
account of his observations, accompanied by an explanation,
in the form of a letter to Robert Boyle.55

Stubbe

interpreted Greatrakes' deeds as the effects of a sanative
temperament which was God's special gift to him.

They were

miracles equal to those of Christ and the apostles, yet the
result of a natural power and not the direct hand of God.
Boyle's reply, which was not published before Birch's 1744
edition of his works, took exception to Stubbe's careless
conflation of the natural and the supernatural.

In the

54. On Greatrakes see pp. 164-76 of J.R. Jacob, Robert
Boyle, and pp. 50-63, 164-174 of his Henry Stubbe~ Nicholas
Steneck, "Greatrakes the Stroker," cited above~ and Barbara
Kaplan, "Greatrakes the Stroker: The Interpretations of His
Contemporaries," Isis 73 (1982), 178-85. Other references
are given in these:55. The Miraculous Conformist (London, 1666).
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first part of his letter, said Boyle, Stubbe had argued for
the miraculous character of Greatrakes' cures, but in the
latter part he had offered a natural explanation.

With

regard to biblical miracles, in contrast, Boyle was "far
from believing, that any mechanical or physical hypothesis
will make out those supernatural phaenomena, without having
recourse to the miraculous interposition of God."

But if

Boyle readily dismissed Stubbe's explanation, he did not so
readily dismiss the possibility that Greatrakes might in
fact have been the doer of miracles.

For his part, he

said,
though I be very backward to believe any strange
thing in particular, though but purely natural,
unless the testimonies that recommend it be
proportionable to the extraordinariness of the thing
proposedr yet I remember not, that I have hitherto
met with (no more than you have done) any, at least
any cogent proof, that miracles were to cease with
the age of the apostlesr and not only the excellent
Grotius, but Tertullian, Justin Martyr, Cyprian, and
other ancients tell us, that the power of ejecting
devils out of possessed persons lasted long after
that, and was not infrequent in the Christian church.
And therefore if those relations of Mr. Greatraks's
cures, that I have not yet seen, shall convince me, I
shall not scruple, since his belief and life give me
no just suspicions to acknowledge my conviction, and
to rejoice in the appearing of a protestant, that is
enabled and forward to do good in such a way,
especially in an age where so many do take upon them
to deride all that is supernaturalr and, whilst they
loudly cry up reason, make no better use of it than
to employ it, first to depose faith, and then to
serve their passions and interests.
But by what
hitherto appears to me of Mr. Greatraks's cures, I
must take leave to think, that either they are not
real miraclesr or, if they have any thing in them of
a supernatural gift, it is so far short of the gifts
of our Saviour Christ and his apostles, that I
presume your friends will think, that if it were not
the effect of your haste, it was rather to shew your
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wit than declare your opinion, that you seem to make
a parity between them. And for my part I should in
that case, reflecting upon the passage you cite [l
Cor 12:5], that there are different administrations,
but the same Lord, think it more fit to look upon
this gift of Mr. Greatraks, as a distinct and
inferior kind, than degrade the unquestionable
miraculous gifts of the apostles, to depress them to
the same level with his.
Boyle's position here was an ambiguous one.

While

unwilling to affirm that miracles had ceased with the
apostolic age, he nevertheless remained "not fully
convinced" that Greatrakes' cures contained "any thing that
is purely supernatural."56

Though open to the possibility

of miracles in his own day, he did not see in the
Greatrakes controversy an opportunity convincingly to
settle the issue.
Boyle brought to his study of miracles the same
critical attitude that guided his study of Holy Writ.

His

Copernican leanings required adherence to the principle of
accommodation, and his endorsement of the mechanical
philosophy tempered his conviction that God could act as he
pleased in the natural world.

This is particularly clear

in his views on the origin of plagues.

The sacred writings

expressly teach, said Boyle with his customary prolixity,
that some plagues, and particularly that, which in
David's time swept away in three days 70,000 persons,
have been in an extraordinary manner inflicted by
God. And to me it appears either scarce possible, or
56. Birch, Life of Boyle (I, lxxix, lxxvi-lxxvii, and
lxxxi).

156
far more difficult, than those that have not
attentively enough considered the matter, are wont to
think it, to deduce the astruse origin, strange
symptoms, and other odd phaenomena of some plagues,
that are recorded in history, from merely corporeal
causes.
On the other side it seems unphilosophical • • • to
recur, without an absolute necessity, to supernatural
causes, for such effects as do not manifestly exceed
the power of natural ones: though the particular
manner of their being produced is perchance more than
we are yet able to explicate • • • •
Upon these and the like reasons I have sometimes
suspected, that in the controversy about the origin
of the plague: namely, whether it be natural or
supernatural, neither of the contending parties is
altogether in the right: since it is very possible,
that some pestilences may not break forth, without an
extraordinary, though perhaps not immediate,
interposition of almighty God, provoked by the sins
of men~ and yet other plagues may be produced by a
tragical concourse of merely natural causes.
But though the difficulties, that incumber each of
the opposite opinions, keep me both from dogmatically
asserting, that all plagues have a supernatural
origin, and from denying, that they have it: yet, to
say something on such an occasion, though I can speak
but very hesitantly, I shall venture to add, that,
whether or no the true plague be said to descend to
the earth from a higher sphere, than that of nature:
yet its propogation and effects are (at least for the
most part) carried on mainly by a malignant
disposition in the air • • • 57
Miracles did happen, but only rarely.

And some events we

were wont to call miracles were not really the effects of
supernatural causes, but rather of rational minds above the
level of the purely mechanical.

At diverse times--"perhaps

oftener than mere philosophers imagine"--God, by the
"intervention of rational minds," whether human or angelic,
gave to the parts of human bodies motions which they would

57. An Experimental Discourse of some Unheeded Causes of
the Insalubrity and Salubrity of the Air (V, 56).
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not have had "by laws merely mechanical" in order to
produce things "conducive to the welfare or detriment of
men."

It was becoming to the Christian philosopher to

admit "that God doth sometimes, in a peculiar though hidden
way, interpose in the ordinary phaenomena and events of
[medical] crisises"; but this happended so seldom "that we
are not hastily to have recourse to an extraordinary
providence, • • • if it may probably be accounted for by
mechanical laws, and the ordinary course of things."58

We

must be careful not to make too much of Boyle's insistence
on the rarity of miracles.

One scholar has said that

because Boyle was "unable to deny biblical miracles, he
forced himself to make miracles an exception to the general
rule."59

What else was anyone to make of miracles?

Without the ordinary course of nature, the extraordinary
acts of God could not be recognized for what they are;
there is no supernatural without the natural.

*

*

*

*

*

Boyle believed that miracles were events whose causes
wholly exceeded the bounds of natural processes.

Although

miracles could be understood theologically and were a
legitimate subject of rational discourse, supernatural
explanation had no place in natural philosophy.

58. Free Inquiry (V, 215f); cf. pp. 217 and 223.
59. R.S. Westfall, Science and Religion, p. 89.

It was
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God's ordained power, not his absolute power, which the
virtuoso ought to employ.

Appeals to angels and astral

influences were equally improper.
any other approach.60

Ockham's razor forbade

Those "schoolmen and philosophers

[who] have derived forms immediately from God," Boyle
protested in the Origin of Forms and Qualities, have "put
omnipotence upon working I know not how many thousand
miracles every hour, to perform that • • • in a
supernatural way which seems the most familiar effect of
nature in her ordinary course. 11 61

"'Tis the part of a

philosopher," wrote John Wilkins in 1640, "not to fly unto
the absolute power of God and tell us what He can do, but
what according to the usual way of providence is most
likely to be done, to find out such causes of things as may
seem most easy and probable to our reason. 11 62
himself never said it any better.

Boyle

In 1661 the Jesuit

Franciscus Linus proposed his funicular hypothesis to
explain Boyle's experiments with the vaccuum pump.

In

order to account for the existence of a space between the
top of a column of mercury and the top of a closed glass

60. An Hydrostatical Discourse (III, 608f) and Suspicions
about Some Hidden Qualities of the Air (IV, 95).
61. Works III, 40.
62. Discourse concerning a New World & Another Planet, Book
2, p. 193. This was said with reference to the exceedingly
great velocity of the celestial sphere which geocentric
cosmology required.
Although it was possible for God to
perform such a motion, Wilkins argued, it was repugnant to
the nature of things.
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tube, Linus suggested that Nature formed an invisible
elastic membrane of air or subtle matter between the
mercury and the tube.

As the mercury dropped, this

funiculus resisted distention, suspending the liquid in the
tube.

Reluctant to admit that the apparently empty space

left behind by the funiculus was a true vacuum, Linus
called it "virtual extension," adding that such a thing was
at least possible by divine fiat--to which Boyle replied,
"our controversy is not what God can do, but about what can
be done by natural agents, not elevated above the sphere of
nature."

In my hypothesis, Boyle said, "things are

explicated by the ordinary course of nature, whereas in the
other [Linus'] recourse must be had to miracles."63

Boyle

reacted in a similar way when Hobbes introduced God's power
into a discussion of infinite divisibility: "when Mr.
Hobbes has recourse to what God can do (whose omnipotence
we have both great reason to acknowledge) it imports not to
the controversy about fluidity to determine what the
almighty Creator can do, but what he actually has done."64
Boyle's determination to limit scientific explanation
to the sphere of God's ordinary activity--to what God

63. A Defense of the Doctrine touching the Spring and
Weight of the Air (I, 149). Linus' Tractatus de Corporum
Inseparabilitate is discussed in Robert A. Greene, "Henry
More and Robert Boyle on the Spirit of Nature," JHI 23
(1962), 451-74.
-64. An Examen of Mr. T. Hobbes's "Dialogus Physicus de
Natura Aeris" (I, 236).
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actually did, not to what he had the power to do--betrays
both a fundamental distrust of human speculation and a
healthy respect for the facts as God saw fit to establish
them.

It is to the theological roots of that attitude that

we will now turn our attention.
God's Creative Power, the Limits of Human Knowledge,
the Eternal Truths, and Empirical Science
Some of the greatest minds of the seventeenth century
yielded to the temptation to impose the bounds of their own
reason on God's absolute power, enclosing his creative acts
in a box of their own making.

For Boyle, however, the

rationalist enterprise amounted to sheer, unwarranted
presumption.

As "purblind mortals, that are not of the

highest order of God's creatures," we could not but be
"incompetent judges" of God's power, which could "justly be
supposed to reach farther than our limited intellects can
comprehend~ or, •
to bound."65

without a saucy rashness, can presume

We men, he wrote in the Christian Virtuoso,

have too good a conceit of ourselves, when we think
that no such thing can have an existence or at least
have a nature or being, as we are not able to
comprehend.
For if we believe God to be the author
of things, it is rational to conceive that he may
have made them commensurate, rather to his own
designs in them, than to the notions we men may best
be able to frame of them.
The world was made before man, who was not consulted in its

65. Christian Virtuoso (VI, 676f).
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construction.

The author of nature "made things in such

manner as he was pleased to think fit, and afterwards left
human understandings to speculate as well as they could
upon those corporeal, as well as other things."

Therefore

Boyle saw "no necessity, that intelligibility to a human
understanding should be necessary to the truth or existence
of a thing • • • "66

God was under no obligation to conform

to human notions in anything he did.

Boyle rejected as

"not very cogent, and somewhat irreverant," Van Helmont's
argument that divine providence was compelled to provide a
cure for every disease; God was "not obliged any more to
continue life or health to sinful man, than to beasts, that
never offended him • • • "

Neither the stars nor the

passages of scripture had been "nicely or methodically
placed," for "it became not the majesty of God to suffer
himself to be fettered to human laws of method," which were
far below his own conception of things.67

Fully to

comprehend God's infinite nature required no less than an
infinite understanding.

Even for the corporeal works of

God our knowledge was

66. Works VI, 694.
Things above Reason (IV, 450) contains
a passage parallel to the last quotation.
In an
unpublished paper on the causes and remedies of atheism,
Boyle denied that "the intellect of man is the genuine
standard of truth, so that whatever surpasses his
comprehension must not be admitted to be." Royal Society,
Boyle Papers, vol. 6, folio 330, quoted by R.S. Westfall,
Science and Religion, p. 168.
67. Usefuless (II, 101) and Style of the Scriptures
(II, 270).
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incomparably inferior to his: for though some modern
philosophers have made ingenious attempts to explain
the nature of things corporeal, yet their
explications generally suppose the present fabric of
the world, and the laws of motion that are settled in
it~ but God knows particularly, both why and how the
universal matter was first contrived into this
admirable universe, rather than a world of any other
of the numberless constructions he could have given
it~ and both why those laws of motion, rather than
others, were established~ and how senseless matter,
to whose nature motion does not at all belong, comes
to be both put into motion, and qualified to transfer
it according to determinate rules, which itself
cannot understand.68
Boyle considered it improper for the Cartesians to argue a
priori that divine immutability implied the conservation of
the quantity of motion.

To do so was to presume too much

knowledge of God's intentions.

Nor did he see how that law

could be demonstrated~ posteriori, since its agreement
with terrestrial motions was questionable, and no one had
directly experienced the propogation of celestial bodies.
The "truth of the Cartesian rules [of impact] being evinced
neither~ priori, nor~ posteriori," he concluded, it would
not be unreasonable to think that God might have done
things otherwise.69

Similarly, Descartes' identification

of body and extension suffered from the "inconvenience"
that God could not "annihilate the least particle of
matter" without creating another "at the same instant and
place"--which, as Boyle perceptively commmented, agreed
68. High Veneration (V, 149f).
69. Ibid., p. 140. Cf. Final Causes (V, 396f), where Boyle
challenged the logic of arguing from divine immutability to
uniformity in nature.
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"very ill with that necessary and continual dependence,
which he [Descartes] asserts matter itself to have on God
for its very being."70

Reason concluded many other things

which, if not directly repugnant to God's freedom, were
clearly contradicted by his works.

Experience showed, for

example, that "bodies of very unequal weight, let fall
together, will reach the ground at the same time": that
"weaker sounds are.

transmitted through the air as

swiftly as stronger ones": and that water expands rather
than contracts upon freezing.71

Experience had likewise

disproved "diverse very plausible and radicated opinions,
such as that of the uninhabitableness of the torrid zone,
of the solidity of the celestial part of the world, of the
blood's being conveyed from the heart by the veins (not the
arteries) to the outward parts of the body," all of which
had to be abandoned upon the discovery of phenomena with
which they were inconsistent.72
Boyle's suspicion of pure reason was intimately
connected with his theological voluntarism.

Revelation had

already answered the larger questions of lifer further
speculation on God's purposes and decrees was pointless,

70. Excellency of Theology (IV, 43). Professor Edward
Grant has suggested that Boyle chose the word
"inconvenience" because of its Latin root inconveniens,
"unsuitable."
71. Christian Virtuoso (V, 527f).
72. Certain Physiological Essays (I, 312).
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even dangerous, for it could lead us into error.

Science

could progress without knowledge of ultimate realities,
without encroaching on theological ground.73

Unlike

Descartes, Boyle did not consider himself "obliged to treat
of the cause of gravity in general" in order to use it in
his explanations.74

The elasticity of air could be

explained in two different ways, one atomist and the other
Cartesian.

To determine whether "the parts of a body are

put into motion by the bending of the spring, or from the
endeavor of some subtle ambient body" was a difficult
business with which Boyle declined to meddle.

His purpose

was "only to mainifest, that the air hath a spring, and to
relate some of its effects,"75 a position he maintained
when attacked by Hobbes, who was contemptuous of
"experimentarian philosophers" and criticized Boyle for
refusing to specify the causes of the elasticity of air and
of gravity.76

The nature of the continuum--whether or not

matter was infinitely divisible--was probably insoluble,
but "natural philosophy may be daily advanced without the
decision of it, because there is a multitude of
considerable things to be discovered and performed in
73. For a similar interpretation, see the books by Fisher
and Hunt.
74. An Hydrostatical Discourse (III, 601).
75. Spring of the Air (I, 12).
76. See Hobbes' Dialo
sive de Natura Aeris
(1661) and Boyle's reply 1662) in Works I, 186-242. Also
see Greene, "Henry More and Robert Boyle," pp. 462f.
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nature, without so much as dreaming of this
controversy

. . . n77

Thus Boyle eschewed the kind of rationalistic science
pursued by Descartes and others.

It was better to know a

little with certainty from experiment than to construct
speculative systems of the universe.78

Although he saw the

advantage of knowing "in general, how the qualities of
things are deducible from the primitive affections of the
smallest parts of matter," he affirmed that knowing merely
how one body affects another was sufficient.

We might,

"without ascending to the top in the series of causes,
perform things of great moment; and such, as without the
diligent examination of particular bodies, would, I fear,
never have been found out a priori, even by the most
profound contemplators."79

Arguments~ posteriori were

just as valid, and more useful, than those~ priori.SO

77. Excellency of Theology (IV, 43).
78. Certain Physiological Essays (I, 299ff).

Cf. page 307.

79. Certain Experimental Physiological Essays (I, 310).
Cf. the Short Memoirs for the Natural History of Mineral
Waters (IV, 796), where Boyle stated that the ingredients
and proportions of mineral waters "may be numberless, and
the qualities resulting from these commixtures may be very
differing from those of the separate ingredients; I am apt
to look upon the difficulty of securely determining the
effects of mineral waters~ priori, as little, if at all
less than insuperable to human understandings."
80. See the continuation of Spring and Weight of the Air
(III, 279). Cf. Of the Strange Subtilty of Effluviums
(III, 661) and Experiments and Considerations touching
Colours (I, 663) for two of many similar statements.
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Boyle devoted a short essay, "Of Unsucceeding Experiments,"
to the defense of experimentally derived knowledge in the
face of contingencies.

His heavy emphasis on Baconian

natural histories is wholly consistent with this.
Properties, not essences, were the aspects of nature he
sought to determine.

It is no accident that among Boyle's

chief contributions to science are his discoveries of new
chemical indicators and the establishment of almost all the
properties of phosphorus known for the next two hundred
years.

*

*

*

*

*

To say that God's thoughts are higher than ours, even
to stress this point as fundamental to human knowledge, is
not to say that God is unfettered by any considerations
whatsoever.

Boyle could not deny "that some things, that

men may call bounds, may be assigned to the divine power,"
but only those boundaries which prevented one from holding
"what is manifestly repugnant to the nature either of
things, or of God."

To turn a sphere of silver into a

sphere of gold, though difficult, was not absolutely
impossible, but to make a cylindrical sphere of gold was
impossible, for "to give gold the necessary properties of a
cylinder, the matter to be transformed must necessarily
lose those of a sphere": and one could no more "make an odd
number that may be divided into two even whole numbers"
than one could "make a square triangle, the ideas of the
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subject and the attribute being manifestly inconsistent.Bl
Boyle therefore distinguished between probationary truths
and absolute or eternal truths.

By absolute truths, he

said,
I understand in the first place those theoretical
principles and axioms, which are the foundations of
our reasonings, such as are, two contradictories
cannot both be true, every thing is, or is not, every
line is either strait or crooked, every number (whole
and finite) is either even or odd. Two quantities,
that are each of them equal to a third, are
themselves equal, and from truth nothing but truth
can be legitimately deduced.
And to this sort of
primary truths may be referred the definitions of our
more simple mental ideas, such as the clear
conceptions we have of a triangle, a square, a
circle, a cube, a cylinder, &c. And because there
neither has [been], nor will be any time, wherein
these principles of knowledge and ratiocinations may
not be safely assented to, without any relation to
contingent circumstances, these self-evident
principles may be called eternal truths~ whereas for
• • • [probationary truths], though a man may
rationally look upon them as truths, as long as he
sees just cause to believe them, or no sufficient
cause to question them, yet he cannot safely judge
them to be more than truths upon supposition, or to
express it shorter, conditional • • • • For there are
many doctrines and assertions, that for a long time
(amounting perhaps to many ages) were generally
received by philosophers themselves for true, which
yet, by the happy discoveries of latter times, appear
to unprejudiced judges to be errors •
• • • I conceive, then, that there are two kinds or
orders of principles and dictates of reason~ the one
comprises those primary and universal notices and
axioms, that are applicable to all kinds of subjects~
• • • [which] hold on all occasions~ and therefore
may be distinguished from other rules or dictates of
philosophy, which, though they will hold in most
81. Christian Virtuoso (VI, 677f).
"Thinkers in the
voluntarist tradition do not usually deny that God is bound
by the laws of logic~ rather they are concerned to
emphasize the power of God--PANTOKRATOR--and the
inscrutability of Divine Will." J.E. McGuire, "Boyle's
Conception of Nature," p. 527 nlO.
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cases, do not hold in all cases, and are, on that
account, subordinate, or at least of an inferior
nature, to the primary and catholic principles lately
mentioned •
• • • I look upon the metaphysical and mathematical
principles, we have been speaking of, to be truths of
a transcendental kind, that do not properly, and
exclusively to the other, belong either to philosophy
or theology~ but are universal foundations and
instruments of all the knowledge we mortals can
acquire.82
Thus Boyle agreed with Descartes in identifying the basic
principles of logic and mathematics as eternal truths which
functioned as the foundation of all knowledge.

He also

agreed that God, as "the author of our reason, cannot be
supposed to oblige us to believe contradictions"~ God's
veracity and boundless knowledge prevented him from
deceiving us.83
ended.

But here Boyle's similarity to Descartes

Where the Frenchman moved on to embrace the

proposition that all things perceived clearly and
distinctly are true, the Englishman reminded us that we
"mistake and flatter human nature too much, when we think
our faculties of understanding so unlimited, • • • as many
philosophers seem to suppose."

Created and finite beings

came we into the world, "as it pleased the almighty and
most free author of our nature to make us."

It followed

from this that our mental abilities were "proportionable to

82. These quotations have been taken from three separate
speeches by the character Eleutherius, who speaks for Boyle
in the dialogue appended to the first part of the Christian
Virtuoso (VI, 709-711).
83. Ibid., p. 712, and V, 529.
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God's designs in creating us, and therefore may probably be
supposed not to be capable of reaching to all kinds •
of truths, many of which may be unnecessary for us to know
here • • • "

Thus it was not unreasonable to think that "in

our present mortal condition there should be some objects
beyond the comprehension of our intellects," so that "we
cannot attain to a clear and full knowledge of them."84
Therefore Boyle distinguished three degrees of
demonstration and certainty.

In metaphysical

demonstration, built on the eternal truths, the conclusion
was true and could not be otherwise.

Physical

demonstration, which presupposed physical principles (such
a s ~ nihilo nihil fit), was less certain because subject
to God's absolute power.

Moral demonstration relied on the

concurrence of probablities, as in the agreement of
testimony from two different witnesses in a murder trial.BS
Articles of religion Boyle assigned to the level of moral
certainty, where he also placed most reasoning in physics:
"in many things, that are looked upon as physical
demonstrations, there is really but a moral certainty."
For example, when astronomers discussed the paths and
nature of comets, some did so without ever having seen a
comet in their lives, but relied on their predecessors for
information.

Though the inferences they drew might "have a

84. Things above Reason (IV, 410).
85. Reason and Religion (IV, 182).
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demonstrable certainty; yet the premises they are drawn
from having but an historical one, the presumed
physico-mathematical demonstration can produce in a wary
mind but a moral certainty," and not even the greatest
degree of that.

It was no easy task to make the exacting

observations required for constructing "an undoubted theory
upon them."

Boyle knew not "how many things in physics,

that men presume they believe upon physical and cogent
arguments, wherein they really have but a moral
assurance • • • n86
In adopting this view of knowledge, Boyle rejected
both Cartesian and Baconian views.

If Descartes had

admitted into natural philosophy knowledge which was not
more than morally certain, the basic propositions of his
physics were derived, in his opinion, from reason alone and
partook of absolute certainty.

Bacon, though differing

from Descartes on the means of obtaining scientific
knowledge, also believed it to be demonstrable and
absolutely certain.

For both men, philosophers could learn

the true structure or essence of the macroscopic and the
microscopic.

For Boyle, only God could have such a

science; finite and fallen men could expect no more than
moral certainty.87

As Henry Van Leeuwen has shown, the

86. Excellency of Theology (IV, 42).
87. Boyle put it more forcefully in Excellency of Theology
(IV, 50): "our knowledge is not very deep, not reaching
with any certainty to the bottom of things, nor penetrating

171
theory of certainty that had been worked out by liberal
Anglican divines in defense of Protestantism--the certainty
of reasonable men--was later adopted by the most
influential members of the Royal Society.

That this theory

appealed to the voluntarist (and liberal Anglican) that
Boyle was, is not at all surprising.88

*

*

*

*

*

If Boyle rejected Baconian and Cartesian notions of
scientific certainty, he also drew from each tradition
elements which harmonized more readily with his
understanding of God's creative power: from Bacon, the
conviction that experiments were the source of science~
from Descartes, a hypothetical corpuscularism in explaining
natural phenomena.

Many atomists, Boyle observed,

confidently
presume to know the true and genuine causes of the
things they explicate~ yet very often the utmost they
can attain to, in their explications, is, that the
explicated phaenomena may be produced after such a
manner, as they deliver, but not that they really are
so.
For as an artificer can set all the wheels of a
clock a going, as well with springs as with weights~
and may with violence discharge a bullet out of the
barrel of a gun, not only by means of gunpowder, but
to their innate or inmost natures • • • " For Boyle's
belief that the fall had affected our minds, see Reason and
Religion (IV, 165f).
88. The Problem of Certaint
1630-1690
(The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1963 •
Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England: A
Study of the Relationships between Natural Science,
Religion, History, Law, and Literature Princeton: UP,
1983), has a wider scope but a similar argument.

172
of compressed air, and even of a spring: so the same
effects may be produced by diverse causes different
from one another~ and it will oftentimes be very
difficult, if not impossible, for our dim reasons to
discern surely, which of these several ways, whereby
it is possible for nature to produce the same
phaenomena, she has really made use of to exhibit
them • • • • [It] is a very easy mistake for men to
conclude, that because an effect may be produced by
such determinate causes, it must be so, or actually
is so • • • • For it is one thing to be able to shew
it possible, for such and such effects to proceed
from the various magnitudes, shapes, motions, and
concretions of atoms~ and another thing to be able to
declare what precise, and determinate figures, sizes,
and motions of atoms, will suffice to make out the
proposed phaenomena, without incongruity to any
others to be met with in nature • • •
Atomists were wont to assume "that either the proposed
explication must be allowed, or men can give none at all,
that is intelligible," an attitude which Boyle found
wanting.

No one, he thought, had shown "that men must be

able to explicate all nature's phaenomena"~ how could it be
proved that the omniscient God could not exhibit phenomena
in ways other than those "explicable by the dim reason of
man?"

If we admit that God is the author of the universe,

he argued, how could it be "that he, whose knowledge
infinitely transcends ours, and who may be supposed to
operate according to the dictates of his own immense
wisdom, should, in his creating of things, have respect to
the measure and ease of human understandings" rather than
to any other?89

God had made a very complex world indeed.

89. Usefulness (II, 45f). On Boyle's use of the Cartesian
clock metaphor and the methodology it implies, see Laurens
Laudan, "The Clock Metaphor and Probabilism: The Impact of
Descartes on English Methodological Thought, 1650-65,"
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There were often "so many subordinate causes between
particular effects and the most general causes of things,
that there is left a large field, wherein to exercise men's
industry and reason" in the framing of causal schemes for
various illnesses.

Since we knew "very little~ priori,"

it was without question "a great advantage" to have learned
"by a variety of experiments" the "differing ways, whereby
nature produces the same effects."90

Boyle had met with

Annals of Science 22 (1966), 73-104. Cf. this passage from
Joseph Glanvill's Scepsis scientifica (London, 1665): "And
though the Grand Secretary of Nature, the miraculous
Des-Cartes, hath here infinitely out-done all the
Philosophers that went before him, in giving a particular
and Analytical account of the Universal Fabrick: yet he
intends his principles but for Hypotheses, and never
pretends that things are really or necessarily, as he hath
supposed them: but that they may be admitted pertinately to
solve the Phaenomena, and are convenient supposals for the
use of life. Nor can any further account be expected from
humanity,but how things possibly may have b e e n ~
.
consonantly to sensible nature: but infallibly to determine
how they t r u l y ~ effected, is proper to him only that
saw them in the Chaos, and fashion'd them out of that
confused~For to say the principles of Nature must
needs be such as our Philosophy makes them is to set bounds
to Omnipotence, and to confine infinite power and wisdom to
our shallow models." I am quoting here from pp. 182ff of
the 1885 reprint, ed. John Owen (London: Kegan Paul, Trench
& Co.), italics Glanvill's.
90. Certain Physiological Essays (I, 309) and Usefulness
(II, 76). Cf. Experimental History of Colours (I, 692):
"though by making the experiments and reflections deliver'd
in this paper, I have endeavoured somewhat to lessen my
ignorance in this matter, and think it far more desirable
to discover a little, than to discover nothing, yet I
pretend but to make it probable by the experiments I
mention, that some colours may be plausibly enough
explicated in general by the doctrine here proposed; for
whenever I would descend to the minute and accurate
explication of particulars, I find my self very sensible of
the great obscurity of things • • • "
Boyle's "descent" to
the particulars recalls the sixth part of Descartes'
Discourse on Method.
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many things which could not be assigned a single, probable
cause and some things which could be assigned several
causes of widely differing character.

He had often

encountered "such difficulties in searching into the causes
and manner of things," and was so aware of his "own
disability to surmount those difficulties," that he dared
to speak "confidently and positively of very few things,
except matters of fact."

No theory could be expected to

endure all experimental tests.

Boyle had seen many

doctrines "confuted by the discovery of some new phaenomena
in nature, which was either unknown • • • , or not
sufficiently considered," a fate which any theory could
suffer if proposed too hastily.91
The contingency of all hypotheses was deeply ingrained
in Boyle's thought.

Among "The Requisites of a Good

Hypothesis" was the requirement "That it be, at least
consistent, with the rest of the Phaenomena it particularly
relate to: and do not contradict any other known Phaenomena
of Nature: or manifest Physical Truth. 11 92

But he who

established a theory and expected it to last long enough to
make him famous "must not only have a care, that none of
the phaenomena of nature, that are already taken notice of,
91. Certain Physiological Essays (I, 307f).
92. Boyle's manuscript is reprinted by M.B. Hall, Robert
Bo le on Natural Philoso h: An Essa , with Selections from
his Writings (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1965 , pp. 134f, and
R.S. Westfall, "Unpublished Boyle Papers Relating to
Scientific Method," Annals of Science 12 (1956), 116f.
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do contradict his hypothesis at the present, but that no
phaenomena, that may be hereafter discovered, shall do it
for the future."

Boyle seriously questioned whether

philosophers realized how incomplete the history of nature
was, and how difficult it was "to build an accurate
hypothesis upon an incompleat history of the phaenomena" it
had to explain.

The future might bring new discoveries

which "may yet overthrow doctrines speciously enough
accommodated to the observations, that have been hitherto
made."

The uninhabitability of the torrid zone, the

solidity of the celestial orbs, and the received number of
planets had all been overturned by recent observations. 93
I know not, he said, "but that future discoveries by
improved telescopes and other philosophical instruments may
reduce us to make changes in the grand system of the
universe itself, and in • • • the terraquaeous globe we
live on."94

Thus Boyle preferred to finish his

Experimental History of Cold before asserting a particular
hypothesis concering the cause of cold.95

Although he

nevertheless ventured an hypothesis in the preface, Boyle
emphasized, not the hypothesis, but the phenomena he had
studied.

Even the most well established laws of his time,

93. Excellency of Theology (IV, 59f). He had noted earlier
(p. 50) that the extent of our knowledge was "not very
large," for experience had acquainted us with only the
"crust or scurf" of our own planet.
94. Cosmical Suspicions (III, 318).
95. Works II, 478.
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about the motions of the planets, he was unwilling to place
beyond doubt.

"There may be less of accurateness, and of

constant regularity, than we have been taught to believe,
in the structure of the universe," he suspected.

It could

be the case that some things taken "for deviations and
exorbitancies from the settled course of nature," if
observed for a sufficiently long time, would "be found to
be but periodical phaenomena, that have very long intervals
between them," as was the case with the "strangely varying
appearances of Saturn" due to the changing inclinations of
the ring system.96
Voluntarism and Empiricism: A Manifest Connection
The ultimate goal of Boyle's scientific work, as Mrs.
Hall has so eloquently shown, was the advancement of what
he was the first to call the "mechanical philosophy" of
nature.97

Boyle believed that matter and motion alone

could explain almost everything, except the free actions of
rational agents.

This was the focus of his brief essay,

"About the Excellency and Grounds of the Mechanical
Hypothesis."98

No other philosophy of nature, he argued,

rivals the mechanical in clarity, simplicity, and

96. Cosmical Suspicions (III, 322-24).
97. "The Establishment of the Mechanical Philosophy,"
Osiris 10 (1952), 412-541, and Robert Boyle and
Seventeenth-Century Chemistry (Cambridge: UP, 1958).
98. Works IV, 67-78.
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versatility~ more than this, no other is even intelligible.
For Boyle, then, the mechanical hypothesis represented the
true system of the world, the correct picture of
reality--at least in so far as man could discover it.
Nevertheless a hypothesis it remained, however much he
may have believed in its veracity.

When contrasted with

the absolutely certain axioms of metaphysics, its
provisional character stands out.

Absolute proof is

something which Boyle never claimed for the mechanical view
of nature.

"That which I need to prove," he wrote in The

Mechanical Origin of Qualities, "is not that mechanical
principles are the necessary and only things, whereby
qualities may be explained, but that probably they will be
found sufficient for their explication."99

To be sure,

Boyle believed that mechanical principles were in fact the
only things whereby qualities could be explained.

It is

however wholly in keeping with his conception of science
that he chose to demonstrate this from the phenomena, not
from any innate truths implanted in his soul.
In his astute critique of the "revisionist" thesis of
M.B. Foster and others, Rolf Gruner concludes that modern
science did not grow out of Christianity "as an oak tree
grows out of an acorn."

He is certainly correct.

There is

no necessity in the process of history--"nothing natural,

99. Works IV, 232.
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predestined, [or] logical about historical development."100
It is not the case, as Reijer Hooykaas would have it, that
"things happened thus and therefore, thus they must have
happened."101

If the preceding study of Robert Boyle has

shown anything, however, it is this: within the thought of
a given individual, setting aside all questions of the flow
of ideas from one person to another, a strong connection
can be found between theological voluntarism and an
empirical science of nature.

Without a doubt, Boyle

understood God's relation to the world in unabashedly
voluntaristic terms.

Transcendent and omniscient, God was

known only as he chose partially to reveal himself in
nature and scripture.

Revelation, not ontology, was the

road to religion~ worship, not contemplation, was the way
to God.

Omnipotent and free, God the creator was not bound

to make the best possible world or to employ, in the world
he did make, notions wholly comprehensible to merely human
minds.

As the product of uninterrupted and direct divine

action, the universe reflected the laws by which its Author
freely governed the brute matter he had made.

Not

necessary truths binding on God, the laws of nature were
only collected or emergent truths arising from the
phenomena rather than from unaided reason.

Even with much

100. "Science, Nature, and Christianity," Journal of
Theological Studies n.s. 26 (1975), 55-81, on the last
page.
101. Religion and the Rise of Modern Science (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1972), p. 162.
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aid from experience and observation, reason could easily go
awry.

Influenced perhaps by his Calvinist tutor Marcombes

or by the moderate Anglicans of seventeenth century
England, Boyle brought to his natural philosophy a healthy
scepticism about the scope and autonomy of human reason.
All hypotheses, without which there can be no science, were
to a greater or lesser degree contingent on the phenomena
of nature.
It is therefore clear that the voluntarist elements in
Boyle's theology of creation impinged directly on
corresponding aspects of his natural philosophy.

Because

the creator had worked and continued to work in accordance
with his free will and not out of necessity, the order of
nature was contingent and could not be known~ priori.
Because the creator had made us but purblind mortals of
limited capacity, we could not presume to share his
infinite understanding of the inner constitution of things.
The best that could be achieved was a hypothetical
modelling of empirically determined properties, an a
posteriori science of phenomena.

It is not always

necessary, said Boyle,
that he, that propounds an hypothesis in astronomy,
chemistry, anatomy, or other part of physicks, be
able~ priori, to prove his hypothesis to be true, or
demonstratively to show, that the other hypotheses
proposed about the same subject must be false.
For
• • • in the physical explications of the parts and
system of the world, methinks, there is somewhat like
what happens when men conjecturally frame some
several keys to enable us to understand a letter
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written in cyphers.
For though one man by his
sagacity have found out the right key, it will be
very difficult for him, either to prove otherwise
than by trial, that this or that word is not such, as
it is guessed to be by others, according to their
keys~ or to evince,~ priori, that theirs are to be
rejected, and his to be preferred~ yet, if due trial
being made, the key that he proposes, shall be found
so agreeable to the characters of the letter, as to
enable one to understand them, and make a coherent
sense of them, its suitableness • • • [is] sufficient
to make it be accepted as the right key of that
cypher. And so, in physical hypotheses, there are
some, that, without noise, or falling foul upon
others, peaceably obtain discerning men's approbation
only by their fitness to solve the phaenomena, for
which they were devised, without crossing any known
observation or law of nature. And therefore, if the
mechanical hypothesis go on to explicate things
corporeal at the rate it has of late years proceeded
at, it is scarce to be doubted, but that, in time,
unprejudiced persons will think it sufficiently
recommended by its consistency with itself, and its
appreciableness to so many phaenomena of nature.102
Such an attitude could hardly go unnoticed in the vigorous
debate from which the modern philosophy of nature emerged.
Gottfried Leibniz, that great rationalist, complained to
Christiaan Huygens that
Mr. Boyle spends too much time, to be truthful,
drawing from an infinity of splendid experiments no
other conclusions than those which he could have
taken for principles of nature • • • which one can
certify to be true from reason alone, whereas
experiments, no matter how numerous, cannot prove
them.103

102. Of the Excellency and Grounds of the Mechanical
Hypothesis (IV, 77).
Boyle employed the Cartesian cypher
metaphor (from Book IV of the Principles) in other ways at
other times too numerous to explore here.
103. Letter of 8 January 1692, Oeuvres completes des
Christiaan Huygens (22 vols.~ The Hague, 1882-1944) x,
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By the time Huygens read these words, Boyle was dead.

But

ideas, like states and institutions, do not die with the
individuals who shape them.

Empiricism, that attitude

toward nature which Boyle so strongly endorsed, and
voluntarism, the theological orientation in which it
thrived, both lived on in the person of Isaac Newton.

228f, quoted by M.B. Hall, Robert Boyle on Natural
Philosophy, p. 43.

CHAPTER FIVE:
ISAAC NEWTON, DIVINE FREEDOM, AND THE REJECTION
OF RATIONALISTIC NATURAL PHILOSOPHY
In distinguishing matter from extension, and in
transferring the intelligibility of extension to the neuter
realm of space, Newton denied the program and method of
Cartesian science. Man faces an arbitrary universe created
by omnipotent will and comprehensible only to omniscient
wisdom.
In such a universe we can never achieve necessary
demonstrations. Our information is limited to sensations~
our knowledge is confined to phenomena.
--R.S. Westfall, "Newton and Absolute Space," Arch.
int. hist. sci. 17 (1964), pp. 129f
"Metaphysical hypotheses," so Newton told us, "have no
place in experimental philosophy." Yet it seems quite
clear that metaphysical convictions play, or at least have
played, an important part in the philosophy of Sir Isaac
Newton.
It is his acceptance of two absolutes--space and
time--that enabled him to formulate his fundamental three
laws of motion, as it was his belief in an omnipotent and
omniactive God that enabled him to transcend both the
shallow empiricism of Boyle and Hooke and the narrow
rationalism of Descartes, to renounce mechanical
explanations, and, in spite of his own rejection of all
action at a distance, to build up his world as an interplay
of forces, the mathematical laws of which natural
philosophy had to establish.
By induction, not by pure
speculation. This because our world was created by the
pure will of God~ we have not, therefore, to prescribe his
action for him~ we have only to find out what he has done.
The belief in creation as the background of empiricomathematical science--that seems strange. Yet the ways of
thought, human thought, in its search for truth are,
indeed, very strange.
--Alexandre Koyre, Newtonian Studies, pp. 113f
It is noticable that Newton, in common with the whole
voluntaristic British tradition in medieval and modern
philosophy, tended to subordinate in God the intellect to
the will~ above the Creator's wisdom and knowledge is to be
stressed his power and dominion.
In some passages this
emphasis is not present, but usually the proportions are
unmistakable.
--E.A. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern
Physical Science, p. 294
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Without question, Isaac Newton was a deeply religious
man.

His private theological writings contain over a

million words devoted primarily to prophecy, sacred
history, and doctrine.

Though far less extensive, his

public utterances leave no doubt that natural theology also
received its fair share of attention.I

Yet in spite of

substantial recent study, the relationship between Newton's
public scientific life and his private religious life
remains, like almost all facets of this complex man,
enigmatic.2

I do not propose here completely to clarify

1. Modern scholarship of Newton's religion began with Louis
Trenchard More, Isaac Newton, A Biography (New York:
Scribner's, 1934), the first work to accept at face value
the Arianism which so permeated Newton's private papers.
Herbert McLachlan, hardly a disinterested party as a
Unitarian himself, poorly edited a collection of
unpublished papers bearing on soteriology and polity in
Isaac Newton: Theological Manuscripts (Liverpool: UP,
1950). Hereafter this will be cited as "McLachlan."
Richards. Westfall, "Newton's Theological Manuscripts," in
Contemporary Newtonian Research, ed. Zev Bechler (Boston:
Reidel, 1982), pp. 129-43, surveys all the accessible
collections and attempts an overview of their contents.
Prophecy is the focus of Leonard Trengove, "Newton's
Theological Views," Annals of Science 22 (1966), 277-94.
Natural religion receives special attention in "Isaac
Newton's Theologiae Gentilis Origines Philosophicae,"
Westfall's contribution to The Secular Mind, ed. w. Warren
Wagar (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1982), pp. 15-34.
2. Westfall's basic thesis, that Newton was a precursor of
the Enlightenment, is developed in the final chapter of
Science and Religion in Seventeenth-Century England (New
Haven: Yale UP, 1958), in "Isaac Newton: Religious
Rationalist or Mystic?" Review of Religion 22 (1958),
155-70, and in his justly praised Never at Rest, A
Biography of Isaac Newton (Cambridge: UP, 1980), which will
be cited hereafter by its title alone.
I am inclined to
agree more with Frank E. Manuel, whose study of The
Religion of Isaac Newton (Oxford: Clarendon Pres~l974)
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that relationship.

Rather it is my intention to focus on

one aspect of Newton's theological thought, his
voluntarism, in an attempt to show how his concept of God
influenced the content and the character of his natural
philosophy.3
stresses those aspects which remind us that Newton was not
a modern man. Unfortunately Manuel's A Portrait of Isaac
Newton (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1968) suffers fatally from
the assumption that Newton was not a man at all--he
remained perpetually the fatherless boy whose mother played
the harlot with a lascivious cleric. Neither Westfall nor
Manuel sees a significant interaction between Newton's
science and his religion, apart from his pursuit of natural
theology. William H. Austin, "Isaac Newton on Science and
Religion," JHI 31 (1970), 521-42, denies that Newton's
theology derived from his science: E.W. Strong, "Newton and
God," JHI 13 (1952), 147-67, denies the reverse. Varying
degreesof synthesis are attempted with varying degrees of
success by Klaus-Dietwardt Buchholtz, Isaac Newton als
Theolo e: ein Beitra zum Ges rach zwischen
Naturwissenschaft und Theologie Witten: Luther-Verlag,
1965): Richard Stoddard Brooks, "The Relationships between
Natural Philosophy, Natural Theology and Revealed Religion
in the Thought of Newton and their Historiographical
Relevance," doctoral dissertation at Northwestern
University (1976): and David Castillejo, The Expanding
Force in Newton's Cosmos (Madrid: Ediciones de Arte y
Bibliofilia, 1981).
3. Many scholars have recognized voluntaristic elements in
Newton's natural philosophy, but few have written at length
on this. Rare exceptions are Alexandre Koyr,, "Newton and
Descartes," in Newtonian Studies (Cambridge: Harvard UP,
1965), pp. 53-114: J.E. McGuire, "Force, Active Principles,
and Newton's Invisible Realm," Ambix 15 (1968), 154-208,
hereafter cited as "FAN": and Martin Tamny, "Newton,
Creation, and Perception," Isis 70 (1979), 48-58.
Henry
Guerlac's article on "Theological Voluntarism and
Biological Analogies in Newton's Thought," JHI 44 (1983),
219-29, says little about biological analogies and less
about voluntarism.
In typical Marxist fashion, Simon John
Schaffer, "Newtonian Cosmology and the Steady State,"
doctoral dissertation at Cambridge University (1980), sees
Newton as avoiding "extreme voluntarism" for political
reasons.
He also sees the theological tension between
God's potentia ordinata and his potentia absoluta as a
contradiction, which it is not.
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"In dealing with Philosophy, one must abstain from
religion," Newton wrote in a private manuscript.4

If he

meant this absolutely, or practiced it faithfully,

there

would be no point to this investigation.

Fortunately he

qualified himself elsewhere: "religion and Philosophy are
to be preserved distinct.

We are not to introduce divine

revelations into Philosophy nor philosophical opinions into
religion."5

What Newton intended to proclaim was not the

divorce of science and religion--this would have been
anathema to a man who believed he had rediscovered the
prisca theologia of true religion hand in hand with the
true system of the world--but their relative autonomy
within the bounds of holy matrimony.

Like Bacon and Boyle

before him, Newton refused to use the Bible as an authority
on matters scientific.

If he went beyond his illustrious

predecessors in seeking also to purge Christianity of what
he perceived to be dangerous metaphysical errors, this was
done for the fear of God and the love of true, biblical
religion.

The fact that the first editions of the

Principia and the Opticks do not contain the theological
material found in later editions must not be
misinterpreted.6

To be sure, Newton wrote the General

4. ULC Add. MS. 3965.13, quoted by Castillejo, The
Expanding Force, p. 77.
5. Keynes MS. 6, folio lr, printed by McLachlan, p. 58.
6. See I.B. Cohen, "Isaac Newton's Principia, the
Scriptures, and the Divine Providence," in Philosophy,
Science, and Method, ed. Sidney Morgenbesser (New York: St.
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Scholium only in reply to critics like Berkeley and
Leibniz, who charged him with atheism and impiety.

But his

reluctance to mingle religion with science stemmed more
from discretion than from principle.

Always one to dodge

disputes in an age much given to them, Newton knew that a
full disclosure of his theological views would cost him his
position and destroy his reputation.

Publicly, he was

content to leave theology to others, Bentley and Clarke
among them.

But privately--and we must remember that

Newton's natural philosophy grew to fruition in
solitude--he gave himself wholeheartedly to the God of
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and he took no pains to keep his
God out of his natural philosophy.
Newtonian Voluntarism Versus Cartesian Materialism
and Leibnizian Rationalism: The Primacy of Divine Will
The divine being has always been associated with
perfection, but this has not always meant the same thing.
For Galileo, a perfect God had perfect knowledge, a portion
of which the human mind could share~ for Descartes,
perfection meant that God could not be a deceiver and had
to be immutable in his actions.

For Newton, perfection

entailed the constant activity of the divine will.

The

highest idea of a perfect entity was

Martin's Press, 1969), pp. 523-48. His letters to Bentley,
discussed below, make it abundantly clear that Newton
composed the Principia with a full awareness of its value
for theology.
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that it should be one substance, simple, indivisible,
living and life-giving, always everywhere of
necessity existing, in the highest degree
understanding all things, freely willing good things:
by his will effecting things possible: communicating
as far as is possible his own similitude to the more
noble effects: containing all things in himself as
their principle and location: decreeing and ruling
all things by means of his substantial presence (as
the thinking part of a man perceives the appearances
of things brought into the brain and thence rules its
own body): and constantly co-operating with all
things according to accurate laws, as being the
foundation and cause of the whole of nature, except
where it is good to act otherwise.7
Newton's conception of worship was equally voluntaristic.
In a manuscript commentary on 2 Kings 17:15-16, after
acknowledging the piety of celebrating God "for his
eternity, immensity, omnisciency, and omnipotence," Newton
added that these attributes spring "not from the freedom of
God's will but the necessity of his nature •

II

The

wisest of beings, he continued, "required of us to be
celebrated not so much for his essence as for his actions,
the creating, preserving, and governing of all things
according to his good will and pleasure. 11 8

The word God

referred "not to the metaphysical nature of God but to his

7. Royal Society, Gregory MS. 245, folio 14a, translated
from the Latin by J.E. McGuire, "FAN," p. 190. McGuire has
published an almost identical statement (from ULC Add. MS.
3965.13) on p. 123 of "Newton on Place, Time, and God: An
Unpublished Source," BJHS 11 (1978), 114-29.
8. Yahuda MS. 21, folio lr, quoted by Manuel, Religion, pp.
2lf. The circumstances surrounding the composition of this
manuscript are set forth in Never at Rest, p. 355.
2 Kings
17:15f condemns idolatry.
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dominion," relating us to him as servants.9

Whoever could

demonstrate that there is a perfect being without at the
same time demonstrating that he is Lord of the Universe
would not have shown that God exists, for "A Being eternal,
infinite, all-wise and most perfect without dominion is not
God but only Nature."10

So great was Newton's emphasis on

God's will that even God's power, upon which voluntarists
traditionally placed much weight, was relegated to a
secondary role.

"If God be called PANTOKRATOR the

omnipotent," he wrote in a fragment on true religion, "they
take it in a metaphysical sense for Gods power of creating
all things out of nothing whereas it is meant principally
of his universal irresistible monarchical power to teach us
obedience."11
The salient features of Newton's religion--his
9. Yahuda MS. 15.7, folio 154r, quoted by Manuel, loc. cit.
This idea worked its way into the General Scholiurn-.-Se~
the Mathematical Princi les of Natural Philso h , trans.
Andrew Motte and revised by Florian Cajori Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1934), p. 544.
Hereafter
this edition will be called "Cajori."
10. From a draft of the General Scholium, translated and
printed by A. Rupert Hall and Marie Boas Hall in
Unpublished Papers of Isaac Newton (Cambridge: UP, 1962),
p. 363. This volume will be referred to simply as "Halls."
11. "Of the faith which was once delivered to the Saints,"
Yahuda MS. 15.5, folios 96v, 97r, and 98r, quoted by
Manuel, loc. cit. Yahuda MS. 9.2, folio 140r, which Manuel
cites on pp. lOlf, shows that Newton had no small view of
God's power, in spite of his placing it under God's will:
"He that shall well consider the strange and wonderful
nature of life and the frame of Animals, will think nothing
beyond the possibility of nature, nothing too hard for the
omnipotent power of God."
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Arianism, his desire to avoid metaphysical formulations,
his abiding interest in prophecy, his insistence on the
importance of natural theology--are all consistent with his
concept of God exercising his dominion by absolute will.
As the sole Lord of the Universe, God the Father could have
no equals, not even God the Son.

Christ did not deserve

our worship because of who he was--a better man than us--he
earned it by his perfect obedience unto death.

And this

was the Christ of unadorned scripture, the Christ whom God
had revealed to men, not the Christ of idolatrous reason.
It was not enough to say that an article of faith could be
deduced from scripture.

"It must be exprest in the very

form of sound words in which it was delivered by the
Apostles," for men were apt to "run into partings about
deductions.

All the old Heresies lay in deductions~ the

true faith was in the text."12

This was the meaning of

Newton's remark about keeping philosophical opinions out of
theology.

Although he thought that true religion was

indeed reasonable, rationalism in religion is something
Newton never sought.

His Sovereign Ruler was no

constitutional monarch, no petty prince bound by the wishes
and understanding of his subjects.

It was "contrary to

God's purposes that the truth of his religion should be as
obvious and perspicuous to all men as a mathematical

12. Commenting on 2 Timothy 1:13, "Hold fast to the form of
sound words, which thou hast heard of me • •
" Yahuda MS.
15.1, folio llr, quoted by Manuel, Religion, pp. 54f.
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demonstration."

God moved the assent of those whom he had

chosen to save, allowing the rest to "dy in their sins."13
Men erred when they pretended to foreknow events by
interpreting prophecy according to their fancies, for "the
design of God was much otherwise."

Prophecy was intended

"not to gratify men's curiosities by enabling them to
foreknow things, but that after they were fulfilled they
might be interpreted

,ey the event," thereby manifesting

divine Providence to the world.14

Newton's argument for

the existence of God was equally~ posteriori.

"The

dominion or Deity of God," he wrote in a draft of the
General Scholium, "is best demonstrated not from abstract
ideas but from phenomena, by their final causes."15
Being the voluntarist that he was, Newton rejected the
ontological argument in favor of the teleological.

God had

to exist not by the necessity of his being or the force of
innate ideas, but by the clear evidence of his willful
actions in nature, evidence to which Newton believed he had
13. Fragments from a treatise on Revelation, Yahuda MS. 1,
folio 19r, printed as an appendix to Manuel, Religion, p.
124.
14. Observations upon the Prophecies of Daniel and the
Apocalypse of St. John, in Isaac Newton opera quae existant
omnia, ed. Samuel Horsley (5 Vols.: London, 1779-85) V,
449, emphasis mine.
"It is not for us to know the times &
seasons which God has put in his own breast." Yahuda MS.
7.3g, folio 13, quoted in Never at Rest, p. 816.
15. Halls, p. 363. The final version of the Scholium put
it like this: "We know him only by his most wise and
excellent contrivances of things, and final causes • •
"
(Cajori, p. 546)
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contributed in no small measure.

"When I wrote my treatise

about our Systeme," he told the Rev. Mr. Richard Bentley,
"I had an eye upon such Principles as might work with
considering men for the beliefe of a Deity

&

nothing can

rejoyce me more than to find it useful! for that
purpose."16

Bentley had asked the great man to comment on

the first set of Boyle lectures, which he had been
appointed to deliver.

There is reason to believe that

Newton may have had a hand in the selection of Bentley as
the inaugural lecturer.17
more than a bit helpful.

Certainly he was receptive and
In the correspondence which

followed, and in the General Scholium which was added to
the 1713 edition of the Principia, Newton answered
Bentley's every inquiry, including these:

Could the system

of the world have been produced by purely natural causes
from an initial uniform distribution of matter in space?
Could the planetary motions have resulted from gravitation
alone, unassisted by God?
negative.

The answer to both was in the

The only possible cause of the frame of the

world and the diversity of creatures was the will of a
sovereign God.

The six planets, Newton observed in the

General Scholium, all revolve about the sun in concentric
16. Letter of 10 December 1692, in The Correspondence of
Isaac Newton, ed. H.W. Trumbull et al. (7 Vols.: Cambridge:
UP, 1959-77) III, 233. All future references will be given
as Corres.
17. See Henry Guerlac and M.C. Jacob, "Bentley, Newton, and
Providence (The Boyle Lectures Once More)," JHI 30 (1969),
307-18.
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circles in the same direction and almost in the same plane;
the ten moons show a similar regularity.

Though their

orbits might continue "by the mere laws of gravity, yet
they could by no means have at first derived the regular
position of the orbits themselves from those laws."

It was

inconceivable that "mere mechanical causes could give birth
to so many regular motions.

"

Such a beautiful system

"could only proceed from the counsel and dominion of an
intelligent and powerful Being."18
that Being, Newton could.have added.

From the direct hand of
Gravity alone might

have sufficed to give the planets their orbital speeds, but
the divine arm had been required to bend them into their
proper orbits around the sun.19

The astronomical bodies

required divine agency also for their formation, in order
to separate the opaque matter of the planets from the lucid
matter of the stars.20

Newton summarized his general

position in a letter to Thomas Burnet: "Where natural

18. Cajori, pp. 543f. For similar comments to Bentley, see
Corres III, 235 and 254f. Cf. the drafts of the General
Scholium in Halls, pp. 353, 360, and 362f.
19. Corres III, 240 and 244.
For the details of Newton's
consideration of Galileo's "Platonic" cosmogony, which
Newton attributed to Blondel's L'Art de jetter les bombes
(Amsterdam, 1683), see Alexandre Koyri, "Newton, Galileo,
and Plato," in Newtonian Studies, pp. 201-220; I.B. Cohen,
"Galileo, Newton, and the Divine Order of the Solar
System," in Galileo: Man of Science, ed. Ernan McMullin
(New York: Basic Books, 1967), pp. 207-231: and Shigeru
Nakamaya, "Galileo and Newton's Problem of WorldFormation," Japanese Studies in the History of Science 1
(1962), 76-82.
20. Ibid., p. 234.
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causes are at hand God uses them as instruments in his
works, but I do not think them alone sufficient for ye
creation."21
Divine counsel and contrivance were no less apparent
in the animal kingdom.

It could be no accident that birds,

beasts, and men had a perfect symmetry of parts on both
sides of their bodies, a matched pair of limbs, wings,
eyes, and ears.

The specialized organs of sense and

motion--above all the eye--had to have been made by one who
understood the nature of light, sound, and the rest of the
world in which creatures had been placed.

"In ye frame of

animals," as Newton told William Briggs, God "has done
nothing without reason."22
If regularity pointed to choice rather than chance,
variety pointed to will rather than necessity.

"Blind

metaphysical necessity," argued Newton in the General
Scholium, "could produce no variety of things.

All that

diversity of natural things which we find suited to
different times and places could arise from nothing but the
will of a Being necessarily existing."23

Because it became

21. January 1681 (Corres II, 234).
22. 12 September 1682 (Corres II, 384). Also see "A Short
Scheme of the True Religion," in McLachlan, pp. 48f; the
early notebook Certain Philosophical Questions, ed. J.E.
McGuire and Martin Tamny (Cambridge: UP, 1983), p. 447 and
the commentary on p. 254; and Query 31 from the Opticks
(4th ed; New York: Dover, 1952), pp. 402f.
23. Cajori, p. 546.

This passage was added in the third
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him who created all material things to set them in order,
Newton found it "unphilosophical to seek for any other
Origin of the World, or to pretend that it might arise out
of a Chaos by the mere laws of Nature •

"

To discourse

of God from the appearances of things, he proclaimed in the
General Scholium, "does certainly belong to Natural
Philosophy."24

Far from excluding teleology from natural

philosophy as Descartes had done, Newton made divine
purpose the ultimate explanation within natural philosophy.
Indeed the "main Business of natural Philosophy" was
to argue from Phaenomena without feigning Hypotheses,
and to deduce Causes from Effects, till we come to
the very first Cause, which certainly is not
mechanical: and not only to unfold the Machanism of
the World, but chiefly to resolve • • • [ultimate]
Questions.25
Thus Newton proposed a hierarchy of causes, each inferred
from effects.

Embracing both mechanisms and minds, his was

truly a natural philosophy: all of created nature, together
with the Creator, fell within its domain.

The frame of the

world spoke volumes of the counsel and dominion of God.
(1726) edition. Cotes expressed a similar view in his
preface to the second edition (Cajori, pp. xxxi-xxxii).
Cf. the selection from ULC Add. MS. 3965.13, printed by
McGuire in "Newton on Place, Time, and God," p. 123.
24. Query 31 (Opticks, p. 402) and Cajori, p. 546.
Halls, pp. 360 and 363.

Cf.

25. Query 28 (Opticks, p. 369). Cf. the drafts for the
beginning of Book III of the Principia, from ULC Add. MS.
3965, printed by Anita Pampusch in '"Experimental,'
'Metaphysical,' and 'Hypothetical' Philosophy in Newtonian
Methodology," Centaurus 18 (1974), 289-300.
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Natural causes alone were insufficient to explain its
regularity and variety.

There was only one ultimate cause

of phenomena, and all true science sought that cause.

True

science and true religion literally went hand in hand;
heliocentrism and monotheism were partners.

The ancients

had known the true system of the world and had possessed
the prisca theologia which Newton thought he had
rediscovered in his chronological and prophetical studies.
Noah and his sons took the heavens for "ye true

&

real

temple of God," so they framed their own Temple "in the
fittest manner to represent the whole system of the
heavens," placing fire in the center to represent the sun.
Geocentrism, a corruption of true philosophy, resulted from
the corruption of true religion when the vestal fire was
erroneously taken for a fire in the center of the earth.26
This is just what Newton had in mind when he concluded
Query 31 with the following observation:
And if natural Philosophy in all its Parts, by
pursuing this Method [of analysis and synthesis],
shall at length be perfected, the Bounds of Moral
Philosophy will also be enlarged.
For so far as we
can know by natural Philosophy what is the first
Cause, what Power he has over us, and what Benefits
we receive from him, so far our Duty towards him, as
well as that towards one another, will appear to us
by the Light of Nature. And no doubt, if the Worship
26. Yahuda MS. 41, folios 6-8. See Westfall, Never at
Rest, p. 355, and '!Isaac Newton's Theologiae Gentilis
Origines Philosophicae," pp. 24-26; and Manuel, Religion,
pp. 42-48. On Newton's rediscovery of ancient science and
religion, see J.E. McGuire and P.M. Rattansi, "Newton and
the 'Pipes of Pan'," Notes and Records of the Royal Society
of London 21 (1966), 108-43.
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of false Gods had not blinded the Heathen, their
moral Philosophy would have gone farther than to the
four Cardinal Virtues: and instead of teaching the
Transmigration of Souls, and to worship the Sun and
Moon, and dead Heroes, they would have taught us to
worship our true Author and Benefactor, as their
Ancestors did under the Government of Noah and his
Sons before they corrupted themselves.~

*

*

*

*

*

Of all the competing natural philosophies which rushed
into the vacuum left behind by the disintegration of
Aristotelianism, two stand out as prime examples of an
approach to nature which Newton particularly loathed: the
materialism of Ren~ Descartes and the rationalism of
Gottfried Leibniz.

Neither one, as Newton saw it, allowed

God to exercise dominion over the creation he had made.
Already in the early treatise De gravitatione et equipondo
fluidorum, written around 1670, a strong aversion to
Cartesianism was clearly well advanced.

It was Descartes'

relativistic definition of motion which, in the words of
one scholar, "first aroused Newton's opposition to
Cartesian physics."28

According to Descartes, as Newton

pointed out, place was only a relative notion.

But since

"there are no bodies in the world whose relative positions
remain unchanged with the passage of time," there are no
fixed points of reference which enable us to locate the
27. Opticks, pp. 405f.
28. Alexandre Koyr~, Newtonian Studies, p. 82.
The Latin
text of De gravitatione is printed with an English
translation in Halls, pp. 89-156.
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past positions of bodies.

From this Newton inferred that

"not even God himself could define the past position of any
moving body accurately • • • , since in fact, due to the
changed positions of [all] the bodies, the place does not
exist in nature any longer."

Such a conception of motion

was absurd to Newton, for a body could not meaningfully be
said to have moved from place to place.

Following the same

definition of motion, he said, "God himself could not
generate motion in some bodies even though he impelled them
with the greatest force."

If, for example, God were to

apply a very great force to the starry heaven, causing it
to revolve about the earth, Descartes would maintain that
"the Earth alone and not the sky would be truly said to
move," as if there were no difference between moving the
heavens in one direction with a tremendous force and moving
the earth in the opposite direction with a small force.
Again, "if God should cause any Planet to stand still and
make it continually keep the same position with respect to
the fixed stars," Descartes would say that the planet moves
because it is no longer at rest relative to the solar
vortex.29

Though unstated, the clear implication of

Newton's argument was that Descartes' definition of motion
placed unacceptable limits on God's ability to know and to
control his universe.

The same could be said of Descartes'

description of the world as being of "indefinite"

29. Halls, pp. 127-30.
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dimensions.

Recall that Descartes reserved the term

"infinite" for God alone, because only he could be known
positively to have no limits.

Other entities might have no

perceivable limits and might appear to be boundless, but
since we could not know positively that they were infinite,
we should call them "indefinite."

Newton disagreed.

The

world was "indefinite" in size, he said, only before God
had decreed anything about its creation--if there ever was
such a time.

After that time, however, the quantity of

matter and the number of stars were very definitely
defined.

And though we were ignorant beings incapable of

grasping infinity, "God at least understands that there are
no limits [to space] not merely indefinitely but certainly
and positively • • • "30

The scope of the imaginable could

not be presumed to be the same as that of God's creative
act.
Newton's most vociferous--and most voluntaristic-objection to Cartesian physics was directed at Descartes'
conception of matter, which Newton took for a path to
atheism.

Body "does not exist necessarily but by divine

will," Newton began.

Our notion of it was therefore

uncertain,

30. Ibid., p. 135. Cf. Certain Philosophical Questions, p.
453: "To say that extension is but indefinite • • • because
we cannot perceive its limits, is as much as to say, God is
but indefinitely perfect because we cannot apprehend his
whole perfection." Henry More also attacked Descartes on
this point. See Koyre, Newtonian Studies, p. 89.

199
because it is hardly given to us to know the limits
of the divine power, that is to say whether matter
could be created in one way only, or whether there
are several ways by which different beings similar to
bodies could be produced.
Newton went on to "describe a certain kind of being similar
in every way to bodies, and whose creation we cannot deny
to be within the power of God, so that we can hardly say
that is is not body."

The analogy upon which he relied was

the human ability to move the body at will, by thought
alone.

The same "free power of moving bodies at will can

by no means be denied to God, whose faculty of thought is
infinitely greater and more swift."

By "the sole action of

thinking and willing," God could "prevent a body from
penetrating any space defined by certain limits."

If by

his power God should cause some part of space to be
impenetrable, to reflect light, and to resonate when
struck, it would be impossible to distinguish that space
from true body.
Thus we may imagine that there are empty spaces
scattered through the world, one of which, defined by
certain limits, happens by divine power to be
impervious to bodies, and~ hypothesi it is manifest
that this would resist the motions of bodies and
perhaps reflect them, and assume all the properties
of a corporeal particle, except that it will be
motionless.
If we may further imagine that that
impenetrability is not always maintained in the same
part of space but can be transferred hither and
thither according to certain laws, yet so that the
amount and shape of that impenetrable space are not
changed, there will be no property of body which this
does not possess.
It would have shape, be tangible
and mobile, and be capable of reflecting and being
reflected, and no less constitute a part of the
structure of things than any other corpuscle, and I
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do not see that it would not equally operate on our
minds and in turn be operated upon, because it is
nothing more than the product of the divine mind
realized in a definite quantity of space.
For it is
certain that God can stimulate our perception by his
own will, and thence apply such power to the effects
of his will.31
If the whole world were constituted of only such spaces,
"it would seem hardly different."

Thus "we can define

bodies as determined quantities of extension which
omnipresent God endows with certain conditions."32

"I have

deduced a description of this corporeal nature from our
faculty of moving our bodies," Newton added, "so that God
may appear • • • to have created the world solely by the
act of will, just as we move our bodies by an act of will
alone • • • "

Newton allowed the possibility of the

Cambridge Platonist belief in a world soul created by God
with the power to do this, but he did not see "why God
himself does not directly inform space with bodies

"

The point of this voluntarist conception of matter, as
Newton was not reluctant to say, was that "we cannot
postulate bodies of this kind without at the same time
supposing that God exists, and has created bodies in empty
space out of nothing • • • "

The Cartesian identification

of matter and extension, on the other hand, was manifestly
"a path to Atheism, both because extension is not created
31. Ibid., pp. l38f.
If Berkeley had known of this
passage, I doubt that his criticism of Newton would have
been quite so acerbic.
32. Ibid., pp. 139f, emphasis his.
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but has existed eternally, and because we have an absolute
idea of it without any relationship to God," which would
make it "possible for us to conceive of extension while
imagining the non-existence of God."33
Now Descartes had never imagined that matter could
exist, even for a moment, without the ordinary concourse of
God, which he understood as the continuous divine
re-creation of the world.

As I have argued in an earlier

chapter, however, divine sovereignty and freedom were not
unambiguously on the cutting edge of Cartesian natural
philosophy, so Newton can readily be excused for failing to
find them here.

Less warranted was his implicit

attribution to Descartes of his own view that extension is
uncreated.34

When coupled with Descartes' assumption that

matter and extension are the same thing, the eternity of
extension yields the eternity of matter, a conclusion which
Descartes not only never drew but surely never believed.
The source of Newton's idea of an uncreated, infinite
extension was probably the Neoplatonic philosophy of Henry
33. Ibid., pp. 141-43. Cf. pp. 132 and 145. This entire
argument recalls Boyle's simile, which compared God's
ability to move the bodies in his world to a man's ability
to move his own shadow by an act of pure volition. See
Occasional Reflections and The Christian Virtuoso, in The
Works of the Honourable Robert Bo le, ed. Thomas Birch~nd
edn., 6 Vols.r London, 1772 , II, 402, and VI, 678-80,
respectively.
34. This is McGuire's point. See "Space, Infinity, and
Indivisibility: Newton on the Creation of Matter," in
Contemporary Newtonian Research, ed. Zev Bechler (Boston:
Reidel, 1982), pp. 145-90.
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More, Newton's colleague at Cambridge.35

Space, Newton

proclaimed in De gravitatione, is fundamental to the
existence of every being.
God is everywhere, created minds are somewhere, and
body is in the space that it occupies~ and whatever
is neither everywhere nor anywhere does not exist.
And hence it follows that space is an effect arising
from the first existence of being, because when any
being is postulated, space is postulated. And the
same may be asserted of duration: for certainly both
are dispositions of being or attributes according to
which we denominate quantitatively the presence and
duration of any existing individual thing.36
Thus space and time were coeval with God--to assert God's
existence was to assert his duration in time and his
presence in space--and logically prior to God's existence,
though not to his being, of which they were emanent
effects.37

God's relation to the frame of time and space

35. For details see E.A. Burtt, The Metaphysical
Foundations of Modern Physical Science (London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1932), pp. 135-150 and 231-264; Marcus Pierz,
"fiber den Ursprung und die Bedeutung des Lehre Isaac
Newtons vom Absoluten Raum," Gesnerus 11 (1954), 62-120~
Koyre, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe, pp.
125-189 and 206-234~ Westfall, "Newton and Absolute Space,"
Archives internationales d'histoire des sciences 17 (1964),
121-32~ and McGuire, "Existence, Actuality and Necessity:
Newton on Space and Time," Annals of Science 35 (1978),
463-508, and "Newton on Place, Time, and God." In Never at
Rest (p. 318), Westfall has noted that Newton went beyond
the Cambridge Platonists "directly to the [Patristic]
sources on which they drew."
36. Halls, p. 136.
In the early notebook Certain
Philosophical Questions, Newton had interpreted Genesis 1,
Colossians 1:16, and Hebrews 1:2 to mean that God created
time (seep. 449). Obviously he changed his mind in the
few years before De gravitatione was written.
37. Ibid., p. 137. See the comments of the Halls on pp.
78f and of McGuire in "Existence, Actuality and Necessity,"
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was indeed an intimate one.

As the eternal and infinite

PANTOKRATOR,
he governs all things, and knows all things that are
or can be done.
He is not eternity and infinity, but
eternal and infinite: he is not duration or space,
but he endures and is present. He endures forever,
and is everywhere present: and, by existing always
and everywhere, he constitutes duration and space.
Since every particle of space is always, and every
indivisible moment of duration is everywhere,
certainly the Maker and Lord of all things cannot be
never and nowhere • • • • He is omnipresent not
virtually only, but also substantially: for virtue
cannot subsist without substance.
In him are all
things contained and moved: yet neither affects the
other: God suffers nothing from the motion of bodies:
bodies find no resistance from the omnipresence of
God.
It is allowed by all that the Supreme God
exists necessarily: and by the same necessity he
exists always and everywhere.38
Because God had "a propensity to action," it concerned his
glory and majesty "that he should never and nowhere be
idle."39

The omnipresent, eternal God "is more able by his

Will to move the Bodies within his boundless uniform
Sensorium, and thereby to form and reform the Parts of the
Universe, than we are by our Will to move the Parts of our
own Bodies."40
p. 481.
38. From the General Scholium to the second (1713) edition
of the Principia (Cajori, p. 545), italics Newton's. The
third (1726) edition contains three additional sentences
which I have replaced with an ellipsis. Cf. the draft
version in Halls, pp. 359f.
39. ULC Add. MS. 3965.13, folio 541v, quoted by McGuire,
"FAN," p. 201.
40. Query 31 (Opticks, p. 403). Cf. Query 28 (p. 370). On
Newton's belief in space as the literal sensorium of God, a
position which he later tried to hide, see Koyre and Cohen,
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Activity was for Newton "the province of divinity," as
Mrs. Dobbs has put it.41

Influenced by More's Christian

Neoplatonism and his own extensive alchemical
investigations, Newton rejected the brute mechanisms of
traditional mechanical philosophies, infusing the inert
world of matter with the activity of the divine will,
either directly through the hand of God or indirectly
through active prin~iples, which gave the world a structure
and order that evinced providential choice rather than
blind mechanical necessity.

In the end, if Dobbs is

correct, Newton assigned to Christ control over the short
range forces of alchemical, electrical, and vital
phenomena, leaving the cosmic force of gravitation to God
himself. 42

A number of Newton's contemporaries certainly

understood the latter to have been the case.43

According

"The Case of the Missing Tanguam: Leibniz, Newton &
Clarke," Isis 52 (1961), 555-66, and Never at Rest, pp.
646-48.
41. "Newton's Alchemy and His Theory of Matter," Isis 73
(1982), p. 526. Her study of The Foundations of Newton's
Alchemy (Cambridge: UP, 1975) has already become a classic.
Other outstanding contributions to this aspect of Newtonian
thought are McGuire's article "FAN" and Ernan McMullin,
Newton and Matter and Activity (Notre Dame, IN: UP, 1978),
a model of clarity.
42. Ibid., pp. 527ff.
43. This would include Locke, Wren, Gregory, and Whiston.
See Never at Rest, pp. 510 and 647, and Westfall, Force in
Newton's Physics (New York: American Elsevier, 1971), pp.
395-400. Leibniz, another who understood this, will be
discussed below. Newton's return to an aether in his old
age, as seen in Queries 17-24, must not be mistaken for a
return to traditional mechanical explanation. See Never at
Rest, p. 794.
For an account of Newton's changing views on
the cause of gravitation and other forces, see McGuire,
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to Gregory's memorandum from May 1694, Newton also gave God
the responsibility of preventing the stars from collapsing
together under the very attraction which he caused:
"[Newton says] that a continual miracle is needed to
prevent the Sun and the fixed stars from rushing together
through gravity

."44

This is probably what Newton had

in mind fifteen months before when he agreed with Bentley
that if "all ye matter were at first divided into several
systems

&

every system by a divine power [were] constructed

like ours: yet would the outward systemes descend towards
the middlemost so yt this frame of things could not always
subsist without a divine power to conserve it."45

Thus in

Query 31 Newton described Nature as
very conformable to her self and very simple,
performing all the great Motions of the heavenly
Bodies by the Attraction of Gravity which intercedes
those Bodies, and almost all the small ones of their
Particles by some other attractive and repelling
Powers which intercede the Particles. The Vis
inertiae is a passive Principle by which Bodies
persist in their Motion or Rest, receive Motion in
proportion to the Force impressing it, and resist as
much as they are resisted.
By this Principle alone
"FAN."

44. Corres III, 336.
45. Letter of 25 February 1693 (ibid., 255).
In Query 28
(Opticks, p. 369), published first in 1706, Newton implied
that God was "what hinders the fix'd stars from falling
upon one another?" In the General Scholium, however, we
find only the following phrase, added to the third (1726)
edition: "and lest the systems of the fixed stars should,
by their gravity, fall on each other, he [God] hath placed
those systems at immense distances from one another."
(Cajori, p. 544) Apparently the continuous action of God
was no longer thought to be required for the stability of
the universe.
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there never could have been any Motion in the World.
Some other Principle was necessary for putting Bodies
into Motion; and now they are in Motion, some other
Principle is necessary for conserving the Motion.46
On the following pages, Newton elaborated on the
inadequacies of a purely mechanical world.

Without active

principles, he argued, the quantity of motion in the world
would decrease.

What he had in mind here--that collisions

are rarely elastic and that rotating vortices quickly slow
down--fails to distinguish between what we now call
momentum and energy.

But it would not be misleading to

suggest that his insight, despite serious difficulties,
captured the essential thrust of the law of entropy: the
universe is running down.

"Seeing therefore the variety of

Motion which we find in the World is always decreasing," he
concluded,
there is a necessity of conserving and recruiting it
by active Principles, such as are the cause of
Gravity, by which Planets and Comets keep their
Motions in their Orbs, and Bodies acquire great
Motion in falling; and the cause of Fermentation, by
which the Heart and Blood of Animals are kept in
perpetual Motion and Heat; the inward Parts of the
Earth are constantly warm'd, and in some Places grow
very hot; Bodies burn and shine, Mountains take fire,
the Caverns of the Earth are blown up, and the Sun
continues violently hot and lucid, and warms all
things by his Light.
For we meet with very little
Motion in the World, besides what is owing {either}
to these active Principles {or to the Dictates of a
Will}. And if it were not for these Principles the
Bodies of the Earth, Planets, Comets, Sun, and all
things in them would grow cold and freeze, and become
inactive Masses; and all Putrefaction, Generation,
Vegetation, and Life would cease, and the Planets and
46. Opticks, p. 397.
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Comets would not remain in their Orbs.47
The end of this passage, which was added in the 1717
edition, suggests a further, more cosmic, sense in which
Newton believed the universe was running down.

By virtue

of their great masses, Jupiter and Saturn noticeably
perturb one another's orbits and those of passing comets,
which in turn perturb the rest of the planets.

Eventually

these perturbations would accumulate "till this System
wants a Reformation. 11 48

A few years before his death,

Newton confided to John Conduitt what may have been the
full meaning of this cryptic remark.

It was Newton's

conjecture, Conduitt recorded, "that there was a sort of
revolution in the heavenly bodies."

Vapors and light from

the sun "had gathered themselves by degrees into a body and
then attracted more matter from the planets," at length
forming a new planet and then a comet, which eventually
fell into the sun and replenished its matter.

The comet of

1680, Newton thought, would someday meet the same fate, at
which time "this earth would be burnt" and all animals
would perish.

Apparently he believed that something like

this had happened previously, for the earth bore "visible
marks of ruin upon it which could not be effected by a
flood only."

When Conduitt asked how the earth could have

47. Pages 399f. The words in brackets were deleted from
the 1717 edition, in which the last sentence was added.
48. Page 402.
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been repeopled if this had ever happened, Newton replied
that "the power of a creator" was required.49

We have come

a long way from the Cartesian universe of matter and
necessity.

*

*

*

*

*

In 1714 Queen Anne died without surviving heirs.
Under terms of the Act of Settlement the crown passed to
the Elector of Hanover, who became King George I.

When

Caroline, the Princess of Wales, joined her father-in-law
at court in London, she left behind her philosophical
mentor, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, with whom she continued
a personal and intellectual correspondence.

Her efforts to

find a translator for Leibniz's Theodicy (1710) led her to
Dr. Samuel Clarke, a theologian and disciple of Newton.
Although Clarke declined to undertake the translation, he
became a regular courtier and, in time, an advisor to the
Princess.

When in late 1715, in answer to an inquiry about

Clarke's theological position, Leibniz sent a letter to
Caroline charging Newton with theological errors, it was
Clarke who took it upon himself to reply.

Before their

49. King's College, Conduitt Papers, Keynes MS. 130.11,
quoted by Castillejo, The Expanding Force, pp. 95-97.
According to Gregory's memorandum of May 1694 (Corres III,
336), Newton believed that "The Satellites of Jupiter and
Saturn can take the places of the Earth, Venus, Mars if
they are destroyed, and be held in reserve for a new
Creation." Cf. Newton's letter to Bentley of 25 February
1693 (ibid., 253). Whether Newton believed in pre-Adamite
men, I do not know and do not care to speculate.
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correspondence ended just a year later with the death of
Leibniz, the two men had laid bare the fundamental
theological and philosophical differences which separated
Newton from his German rival.SO
It is not immediately apparent that Clarke can be
taken for Newton's spokesman.

He was, after all, an

accomplished theologian capable of debating Leibniz in his
own right--remember that he had been recommended as a
translator for the Theodicy.51

The weight of the evidence,

however, favors the conclusion that Newton worked closely
with him, at least to the extent that Clarke spoke with
Newton's approval.

That Newton preferred to deal with

Leibniz--and Hooke, and others--through intermediaries is
well known.

As a voluntarist52 and fellow Arian--for which

he lost his position as chaplain to Queen Anne-Clarke was worthy of his trust, but it is hard to believe
that Newton, even in his seventies, would have allowed

50. Clarke himself published Leibniz's five papers together
with his own replies in 1717.
I have used the excellent
edition prepared by H.G. Alexander, The Leibniz-Clarke
Correspondence (Manchester: UP, 1956), which will be cited
as "Alexander."
51. See James P. Ferguson, The Philosophy of Dr. Samuel
Clarke and its Critics (New York: Vantage Press, 1974), and
William Whiston, Historical Memoirs of the Life of Dr.
Samuel Clarke (London, 1730).
52. Clarke's voluntarism is discussed in John H. Gay,
"Matter and Freedom in the Thought of Samuel Clarke," JHI
24 (1963), 85-105.
In Gay's opinion, "the reconciliation
of freedom with Newtonian science" was an impossible task.
I am afraid that Gay does not understand Newtonian science.
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anyone to work unsupervised on a project of such importance
as that of refuting charges of impiety.

The documents do

in fact confirm Caroline's report that Clarke consulted
with Newton.53

First of all, Clarke's replies reveal an

intimate understanding of Newton's views on absolute space,
the non-mechanical nature of gravitation, and the need for
miracles in the cosmos.

Secondly, surviving drafts of

Newton's letter to Conti, composed before Clarke sent his
third reply to Leibniz, contain the same views on the
nature of miracles that Clarke defended in his later
replies.

Finally, Des Maizaeux's compilation of the debate

papers prompted Newton in 1720 to draft a letter,
purporting to have been written by Clarke, in which he
explained the significance of principal concepts from the
controversy.

I shall therefore assume that though Clarke

very likely contributed some of his own arguments to the
defense of Newton's ideas, the bulk of the correspondence
was written in consultation with Newton and bore his seal
of approval.
Certainly Newton approved of Clarke's vigorous defense
of theological voluntarism, which reflected the same basic
concerns that Newton himself had expressed forty five years

53. See her letter to Leibniz of 10 January 1716, printed
in Alexander, p. 193. The relevant evidence is evaluated
in Alexandre Koyr, and I.B. Cohen, "Newton and the
Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence with Notes on Newton, Conti,
and Des Maizeaux," Archives internationales d'histoire des
sciences 15 (1962), 63-126.
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earlier in De gravitatione.

The central issue of the

entire debate was the nature of divine freedom:

Is God's

will wholly conformable to his reason? or, to put it
another way, are all of God's actions subject to certain
rational constraints?

Consistently Leibniz answered in the

affirmative: just as consistently, Clarke did not.54

The

position against which Clarke reacted was summarized by
Leibniz in the letter to Princess Caroline which
accompanied his fourth paper.

Clarke "and his like," he

wrote,
do not properly understand that great principle that
nothing happens without a sufficient reason for it
and, what follows, that even God cannot choose
without having a reason for his choice. This is the
error of vague indifference or the absolutely
absolute decree, which I have refuted in the
Theodicy. This error is also the source of the

54. Scholars who have seen divine freedom as the focal
point of the correspondence include Koyre, From the Closed
World to the Infinite Universe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
UP, 1957), pp. 235-72: McGuire, "FAN," p. 197 nl26: and
Denis J. Corish, "Time, Space and Freewill: The
Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence," in The Study of Time, III,
ed. J.T. Fraser et al. (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1978),
pp. 634-55. StevenShapin adds a political context to the
intellectualist-voluntarist dimensions of the debate in "Of
Gods and Kings: Natural Philosophy and Politics in the
Leibniz-Clarke Disputes," Isis 72 (1981), 187-215.
Ernst
Cassirer, "Newton and Leibniz," The Philosophical Review 52
(1943), 366-91, takes for the central issue the side issue
of differing conceptions of science--the two are related,
but Cassirer puts the tail before the dog. Margula R.
Perl, "Physics and Metaphysics in Newton, Leibniz, and
Clarke," JHI 30 (1969), 507-26, insists upon separating the
physical from the metaphysical and therein misconstrues the
whole debate.
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vacuum and atoms.55
Leibniz distinguished between the factual truths of physics
(verites de fait) and the eternal truths of mathematics
(verites eternelles).

The principle of sufficient reason

derived its importance from its ability to bridge the gap
between these two realms, transforming contingent truths
into necessary truths, subsuming all of nature under the
power of pure reason.

The principle of contradiction, he

explained in his second paper, "is sufficient to
demonstrate every point of arithmetic and geometry, that
is, all mathematical principles.

But in order to proceed

from mathematics to natural philosophy, another principle
is requisite," namely the principle of sufficient reason,
"that nothing happens without a reason why it should be so,
and not otherwise."

By that principle one could

"demonstrate the being of a God, and all the other parts of
metaphysics or natural theology: and even, in some measure,
• • • the dynamical principles, or the principles of
force."56

Thus for Leibniz, the goal of science was to

reduce all of nature to rational necessity, a goal which
could be attained because the creative power of God was
bound by the principle of sufficient reason.

As he had

told Varignon at the turn of the century, "the real never
ceases to be governed perfectly by the ideal and the
55. Alexander, p. 195.
56. Ibid., pp. 15f. Cassirer gives a clear analysis of
Leibniz's view of knowledge in "Newton and Leibniz."
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abstract •

• • • This is because everything is governed by

reason~ otherwise there could be no science and no rule,
and this would not at all conform with the nature of the
sovereign principle."57
The principle of sufficient reason had two major
consequences for Leibniz's natural philosophy.

There could

be no void (and therefore no atoms), and there could be no
absolute space.

"When I was a young man, I also gave into

the notion of a vacuum and atoms," he condescended to
confess to Clarke, "but reason brought me into the right
way."

To admit a vacuum in nature "is ascribing to God a

very imperfect work:

'tis violating the grand principle of

the necessity of a sufficient reason •

"

Leibniz took

it for granted that "every perfection, which God could
impart to things without derogating from their other
perfections, has actually been imparted to them"--God is
bound to make the best of all possible worlds.

But God

could have placed some matter in a space wholly empty
"without derogating in any respect from all other things:
therefore he has actually placed some matter in that space:
therefore, there is no space wholly empty: therefore all is
full."

Leibniz based this argument explicitly on the

principle of plenitude.

To this he added "another

57. Letter of 2 February 1702, in Gottfried Wilhelm
Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters, ed. and trans.
by Leroy E. Loemker (2nd edn.~ Dordrecht: Reidel, 1970),
p. 544.
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argument, grounded upon the necessity of a sufficient
reason."

There could be no principle--no sufficient

reason--"to determine what proportion of matter [to space]
there ought to be, out of all the possible degrees from a
plenum to a vacuum, or from a vacuum to a plenum."
atoms,

As for

"what reason can one assign for confining nature in

the progress of subdivision?"

Unwilling to leave such

matters to the unencumbered will of God, Leibniz flatly
asserted that atoms and the void were "fictions merely
arbitrary, and unworthy of true philosophy."58
He was no less convinced of the imaginary quality of
absolute space.

In his second reply, Clarke agreed "that

nothing is, without a sufficient reason why it is, and why
it is thus rather than otherwise."

But he immediately

qualified himself: frequently this sufficient reason was
none other than the pure will of God.

For example,

why this particular system of matter, should be
created in one particular place, and that in another
particular place~ when, (all place being absolutely
indifferent to all matter,) it would have been
exactly the same thing vice versa, supposing the two
systems (or the particles'r'of matter to be alike~
there can be no other reason, but the mere will of
God.59
58. Alexander, pp. 43-45. Cf. pp. 16, 28, 39f and 64ff.
On Leibniz's use of the principles of plenitude and
sufficient reason, see Arthur o. Lovejoy, The Great Chain
of Being (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1936), pp. 142-82.
59. Alexander, pp. 20f.
Later Clarke put ii thusly
(p. 119): "the question is, whether, in some cases, when it
may be highly reasonable to act, yet different ways of
acting may not possibly be equally reasonable~ and whether,
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This was something which Leibniz could in no way allow.

To

say that the mere will of God is a sufficient reason was to
deny the principle entirely, to fall back "into the loose
indifference, which I have confuted at large, and showed to
be absolutely chimerical even in creatures, and contrary to
the wisdom of God, as if he could operate without acting by
reason."

If space were absolutely uniform, then there

could be no reason why God should have placed bodies in
space in one particular manner rather than in another.60
Clarke, a shrewd thinker, then caught his opponent in a
dilemma.

Supposing with Leibniz that space "were nothing

real, but only the mere order of bodies," the situation
would be no different.

There could still be "no other

reason but mere will, why three equal bodies should be
placed or ranged in the order a, b, c rather than in the
contrary order. 11 61

In reply, Leibniz resorted once again

to the denial of divine freedom.

To place three identical

bodies in any order whatsoever w6uld be "a thing
indifferent": and "consequently they will never be placed
in any order, by him who does nothing without wisdom.

But

then he being the author of things, no such things will be
produced by him at all •

II

Therefore there was "no such

thing as two indivisibles indiscernible from each
in such cases, the bare will of God be not itself a
sufficient reason for acting in this or the other
particular manner.
" Cf. pp. 30 and 35.
60. Leibniz's third paper (Alexander, pp. 26f).
61. Clarke's third reply (p. 30).
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other"--another good reason to deny atoms.62

The argument

continued, but the basic disagreement remained.

Leibniz

insisted that God required a sufficient reason for each
creative act~ indifference would paralyze his infinite
wisdom.

Against this, Clarke maintained that God is not a

balance which cannot move itself when the weights on both
sides are equal.

He is a free agent, capable of acting

according to his own will, apart from external
considerations.63
Divine freedom was also fundamental to the debate over
the nature of God's ongoing relation to the world.

Leibniz

spelled out his differences with Newton in a letter to
Johann Bernoulli, dated just a month after his first paper
for Clarke.

What Newton thinks, the German complained,

"seems plainly absurd to me, namely that the motion of the
world-machine will come to cease unless from time to time
restored by God.

Thus miracles are necessary to him, and

he will prove unable to explain his attraction without
perpetual miracles."64

Leibniz believed that vis viva was

conserved in all natural events, so that the world needed
no divine renewal for its continued operation.

In his

opinion, Newton's concept of divine maintenence reflected
poorly on God's wisdom.

If God had "to wind up his watch

62. Page 36.
63. Pages 32-35, 45-50, and 97-107.
64. Corres VI, 261.
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from time to time," then he lacked "sufficient foresight to
make it a perpetual motion."

According to the Newtonians,

Leibniz claimed, God had made a machine so imperfect that
he was "obliged to clean it now and then by an
extraordinary concourse, and even to mend it, as a
clockmaker mends his work • • • "

Against this, Leibniz

held that God worked miracles not "in order to supply the
wants of nature, but those of grace."

To think otherwise

was to "have a very mean notion of the wisdom and power of
God."65

Clarke did not agree.

nor was the world a watch.

God was not a watchmaker:

The skill of a human artificer

lay in combining certain motions which he himself could not
produce, but only adjust.

However God was "himself the

author and continual preserver" of the forces in the world.
Consequently it was
not a diminution, but the true glory of his
workmanship, that nothing is done without his
continual government and inspection. The notion of
the world's being a great machine, going on without
the interposition of God, as a clock continues to go
without the assistance of a clockmakerr is the notion
of materialism and fate, and tends, (under pretence
of making God a supra-mundane intelligence,) to
exclude providence and God's government in reality
out of the world. And by the same reason that a
philospher can represent all things going on from the
65. The first paper for Clarke (Alexander, pp. llf). Cf.
his letter to Conti from late 1715: "I am astonished that
M. Newton and his followers believe that God has made his
machine so badly that unless he affects it by some
extraordinary means, the watch will very soon cease to go.
This is to have very narrow ideas of the wisdom and power
of God.
I call extraordinary every operation of God
demanding something other than the conservation of the
natures of created things." (Ibid., p. 185.)
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beginning of the creation, without any government or
interposition of providence7 a sceptic will easily
argue still farther backwards, and suppose that
things have from eternity gone on (as they now do)
without any true creation or original author at all,
but only what such arguers call all-wise and eternal
nature.
Just as Newton had objected to the Cartesian notion of
matter because it did not require a creator, so Clarke
objected to the Leibnizean notion of the world machine,
which likewise made the creator a dispensible appendage.
Casting away the clockwork metaphor, Clarke turned to the
much more Newtonian image of the world as the dominion of a
sovereign ruler:
If a king had a kingdom, wherein all things would
continually go on (as they now do) without his
government or interposition, or without his attending
to and ordering what is done therein7 it would be to
him, merely a nominal kingdom7 nor would he in
reality deserve at all the title of king or governor.
And as those men, who pretend that in an earthly
government things may go on perfectly well without
the king himself ordering or disposing of any thing,
may reasonably be suspected that they would like very
well to set the king aside: so whosoever contends,
that the course of the world can go on without the
continual direction of God, the Supreme Governor7 his
doctrine does in effect tend to exclude God out of
the world.66
Clarke had gone straight to the heart of the matter: what
is the nature of God's relation to the world?

Is he an

absentee landlord, a perfect watchmaker who has built into
his machine every event which he has foreordained?

Or is

he an omnipotent governor who rules his kingdom directly
66. Clarke's first reply (Alexander, pp. 13f).
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and continually as active cause of all that comes to pass?
Leibniz opted for the former.

Although he denied that

the world is a machine "that goes without God's
interposition," he affirmed it "to be a watch, that goes
without wanting to be mended by him," for "God has foreseen
every thing" and "has provided a remedy for every thing
before-handr there is in his works a harmony, a beauty,
already pre-established."

This opinion, he argued, did not

exclude divine providence or government, but made it
perfect.

True providence required perfect foresight and

advance provision of adequate remedies.67

As he told

Wolff, Clarke "does not realize that the divine governance
of natural things consists in sustention, and must not be
taken in an anthropological sense."68
For his part, Clarke continued his attack on the
purely mechanical universe, upholding in its stead the
picture of the world painted by Newton in the Queries and
the General Scholium.

Contrary to what Leibniz had argued,

neither the motions of heavenly bodies, nor the formation
and motions of plants and animals were merely mechanical in
nature.

Whoever thought so was

obliged in reason to be able to explain particularly,
by what laws of mechanism the planets and comets can
67. Leibniz's second paper (pp. 18f).
68. Letter of 23 December 1715, in Alexander, p. 188.
original Latin letter is printed in Corres VI, 257ff.

The
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continue to move in the orbs they do, thro'
unresisting spaces: and by what mechanical laws, both
plants and animals are formed: and how the infinitely
various spontaneous motions of animals and men, are
performed. Which, I am fully persuaded, is as
impossible to make out, as it would be to show how a
house or a city could be built, or the world itself
have been at first formed by mere mechanism, without
any intelligent and active cause. That things could
not be at first produced by mechanism, is expressly
allowed: and, when this is once granted: why, after
that, so great concern should be shown, to exclude
God's actual government of the world, and to allow
his providence to act no further than barely in
concurring (as the phrase is) to let all things do
only what they would do of themselves by mere
mechanism: and why it should be thought that God is
under any obligation or confinement either in nature
or wisdom, never to bring about any thing in the
universe, but what is possible for a corporeal
machine to accomplish by mere mechanical laws, after
it is once set a going~ I can in no way conceive.69
For Clarke, divine wisdom entailed not the making of a
world capable of operating independently of God, but rather
"the perfect and complete idea of a work, which began and
continues, according to that original perfect idea, by the
continued uninterrupted exercise of his power and
government."

Nothing prevented that perfect idea from

involving disorder and divine renovation, or even miracles.
The wisdom of God did not consist in making the present
frame of the world eternal, but only in making it "to last
as long as he thought fit."

Nor did it consist in

providing remedies for natural disorders, for "with regard
to God, there are no disorders, and consequently no
remedies, and indeed no powers of nature at all, that can

69. Clarke's fifth reply (pp. 117f).

Cf. p. 51.
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do anything of themselves • •

"

From God's point of view,

the world never needed correction or amendment: it always
followed his original perfect design, which could certainly
include the reformation of what he had made.70

Where

Leibniz insisted upon limiting God's actions by the
ordinary course of nature and the principle of sufficient
reason, Clarke allowed God to act in any way he pleased for
reasons known only to him.

Leibniz was operating with a

rationalistic definition of perfection--God's design must
not involve "corrections"--but Clarke conceived of
perfection in a voluntaristic sense--perfection was
whatever God had intended to do, for God is perfect:
For why was not God at liberty to make a world, that
should continue in its present form as long or as
short a time as he thought fit, and should then be
altered (by such changes as may be very wise and fit,
and yet impossible perhaps to be performed by
mechanism,) into whatever other form he himself
pleased?71
Thus for Clarke, as for Newton, divine wisdom and
foresight were identified with dominion, with God's
activity "in continuing at once, what his power and
government is continually putting in actual execution."
God's ordinary concourse meant "his actual operation and
government, in preserving and continuing the beings,
powers, orders, dispositions and motions of all things":

70. Clarke's second reply (pp. 22f).
71. Clarke's fifth reply (p. 113).
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anything less would make him "a governor only nominal."
This conception of divine governance implies that the
distinction between natural and supernatural is an
artificial one, of merely human convenience.

This was

indeed the next step in Clarke's argument:
To cause the sun (or earth) to move regularly, is a
thing we call natural: to stop its motion for a day,
we call supernatural: but the one is the effect of no
greater power, than the other~ nor is the one, with
respect to God, more or less natural or supernatural
than the other • • • • God is present to the world,
not as a part, but as a governor~ acting upon all
things, himself acted upon by nothing. He is not far
from every one of us, for in him we (and all things)
live and move and have our beings.72
With regard to God, no one possible thing was more
miraculous than another.

Miracles were simply unusual acts

of God, but no more or less acts of God than ordinary
events of nature.

The raising of a dead human body and the

sudden stopping of the earth's motion were called miracles~
the ordinary generation of a human body and the continual
motion of the earth were called natural, "for no other
reason, but because the power of God effects one usually,
the other unusually."73

This was precisely the same view

of miracles which Newton himself expressed.

In an undated

72. Clarke's second reply (pp. 23f).
For a provocative
treatment of the breakdown of the natural/supernatural
distinction in theological and scientific literature of the
Middle Ages and the Renaissance, see Keith Hutchinson,
"Supernaturalism and the Mechanical Philosophy," History of
Science 21 (1983), 297-333.
73. Clarke's fifth reply (p. 114).

Cf. pp. 35 and 53.
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manuscript now in the library of Lehigh University, he
wrote:
For Miracles are so called not because they are the
works of God but because they happen seldom & for
that reason create wonder.
If they should happen
constantly according to certaine laws imprest upon
the nature of things, they would no longer be wonders
or miracles, but might be considered in Philosophy as
part of the Phenomena of Nature {notwithstanding
their being the effects of the laws impressed upon
Nature by the powers of God} notwithstanding that the
cause of their causes might be unknown to us.74
The identical opinion is found in several drafts of
Newton's February 1716 letter to Conti, certainly written
before Clarke wrote his third reply and perhaps before the
second reply had been completed.

The drafts also contain

Newton's views on Leibniz's perfect watch, which are
similar to those of Clarke. 75

It is possible that Clarke

74. Quoted by Guerlac and Jacob, "Bentley, Newton, and
Providence," p. 309 n8, and McLachlan, pp. 17f. The
passage in brackets was crossed out.
75. The drafts are printed in Koyr, and Cohen, "Newton and
the Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence," pp. 72-75 and 108-115.
The dating of the drafts is discussed on p. 115, where it
is stated that the letter from Caroline which accompanied
Clarke's second reply is dated 20/30 December 1715.
Following Onno Klopp, the editor of Leibniz's
correspondence with the Princess, Alexander gives the date
as 10 December. Probably someone has erred in moving
between Continental dates and English dates. The following
are representative of Newton's opinions in the drafts (as
printed by Koyr~ and Cohen): "Miracles are so called not
because they are the actions of God but because they happen
seldom & by happening seldom create wonder.
If they
happened constantly they would not be wonders." (p. 74)
"[Leibniz] calls the world Gods Watch, & insinuates that it
is the fault of the workman & not of the materials if a
Watch will at length cease to go, & in like manner that it
would be Gods fault if his Watch should ever decay & want
an amendment. And by the same way of arguing a man may say
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influenced Newton on these points, but I think it was more
likely the other way around.

In any case it is clear that

Clarke and Newton both held the highly voluntaristic
interpretation of miracles which Clarke defended in his
correspondence with Leibniz.
Of course Leibniz wanted no part of this voluntarism.
There is a vast difference between the natural and the
supernatural, he maintained, for the latter "exceeds all
the powers of creatures."

He offered an example,

deliberately chosen to arouse the ire of any good
Newtonian: the free motion of a body in the aether around
"a certain fixed centre, without any other creature acting
upon it," was something which "could not be done without a
miracler since it cannot be explained by the nature of
bodies."

Since a free body would naturally recede from a

curved path along the tangent, Leibniz concluded that "the
attraction of bodies, properly so called, is a miraculous
thing, since it ~annot be explained by the nature of
bodies. 11 76

It was not a new complaint.

Leibniz had first

aired it in a February 1711 letter to Hartsoeker which was
published in the 5 May 1712 issue of the weekly paper
Memoirs of Literature, where Cotes saw it and called it to
that it would be Gods fault if matter doth not think."
(p. 73)
76. Leibniz's third paper (pp. 29f). Cf. pp. 42f and
90-95r his letter to Johann Bernoulli of 27 May 1716,
printed with a translation in Corres VI, 353-56~ and his
letter to Conti in Alexander, pp. 184-86.
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Newton's attention.

In an undated reply to the editor of

the Memoirs, Newton argued that gravitation had been
"proved by mathematical demonstrations grounded upon
experiments & the phaenomena of nature: & Mr Leibnitz
himself cannot deny [this]."

Gravity should not be called

a miracle just because no mechanical hypothesis has been
offered to explain its operation, Newton said.

Hardness,

inertia, and extension were
the natural real reasonable manifest qualities of all
bodies seated in them by the will of God from the
beginning of creation & perfectly uncapable of being
explained mechanically • • • And therefore if any
man should say that bodies attract one another by a
power whose cause is unknown to us or by a power
seated in the frame of nature by the will of God,
• • • I know not why he should be said to introduce
miracles & occult qualities & fictions into ye world.
For Mr Leibnitz himself will scarce say that thinking
is mechanical as it must be if to explain it
otherwise be to make it a miracle an occult quality
and a fiction.
But he goes on & tells us that God could not create
Planets that should move round of themselves without
any cause that should prevent their removing through
the tangent.
For a Miracle at least must keep the
Planet in. But certainly God could create Planets
that should move round of themselves without any
other cause then gravity that should prevent their
removing through ye tangent.
For gravity without a
Miracle may keep the Planets in.77
Newton had spelled out precisely the fundamental
disagreement with his archrival: mechanical explanation did
not wholly exhaust the range of natural phenomenar the

77. Corres VI, 299f. Here Newton seems to allow that
gravity might be innate to bodies, a position he explicitly
denied elsewhere. See the appropriate comments of A.R.
Hall and Laura Tilling on p. 301 n6.
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process of thought was neither mechanical nor miraculous,
and the same was true of gravitation.

The ontology which

Newton employed recognized categories which Leibniz could
only label "occult" and wish to go away.

In a set of notes

on Leibniz's "Tentamen," Newton took exception to the
hypothesis that the centrifugal tendency of a body
describing a curved line in a fluid "is only overcome by a
contiguous moving [body]."

"Then a body is only moved by a

corporeal agent," Newton observed, and "not by the human
mind (unless it be corporeal) nor by God (unless he be
corporeal)."

If so, then "God does not govern the world

and so he is not the Lord God."78

The first cause was

certainly not mechanical~ if only mechanical causes could
keep bodies in curved paths, then the first cause was
certainly not the Lord God, either.
I wish further to clarify an important point.

Like

Leibniz, Newton called non-mechanical causes "occult."
Unlike Leibniz, he asserted that they were no less real and
natural.

This is apparent from a draft of his letter to

Conti:
[Leibniz] gives the name of Miracles or Wonders to
the laws impressed by God upon Nature tho by reason
of their constant working they create no Wonder~ &
that of occult qualities to qualities which are not
occult but whose causes are occult tho the qualities
78. Corres VI, 117. Leibniz's "Tentamen de motuum
coelestium causis," which appeared in the Acta Eruditorum
for February 1689, developed a vortex theory of planetary
motion.
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themselves be very manifest."79
Provided that a quality itself was not occult--that is,
provided that an effect was manifest and not hidden--Newton
did not hesitate to accept its reality, whether or not the
cause was equally demonstrable.

God was free to impress on

nature whatever laws he pleased.

If he chose to produce

gravitation mechanically, then let a mechanical cause be
sought: if not, the phenomenon was no less lawlike and
subject to philosophical understanding.

"Gravity must be

caused by an agent acting constantly according to certain
laws," Newton explained to Bentley, "but whether this agent
be material or immaterial is a question I have left to ye
consideration of my readers."80

One reader who had

considered this, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, was unwilling
to allow an immaterial agent.

Those who avow that gravity

is an occult quality are correct, if they mean "that there
is a certain mechanism unknown to them" by which bodies
fall to earth, he told Hartsoeker in the letter later

79. Printed by Koyrfi and Cohen, "Newton and the
Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence," p. 73, italics Newton's.
Cf. McGuire, "FAN," p. 168.
In his article, "What Happened
to Occult Qualities in the Scientific Revolution?" Isis 73
(1982), 233-53, Keith Hutchinson is conscious of therole
of voluntarism in Newton's understanding of occult
qualities.
80. Letter of 25 February 1693 (Corres III, 254).
same paragraph Newton showed his hand:

In the

"Tis inconceiveable

that inanimate brute matter should (without ye mediation of
something else wch is not material) operate upon & affect
other matter wthout mutual contact • • • " Cf. his earlier
letter to Bentley in ibid., 240.
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published in the Memoirs.

But if they mean "that this

transpires without any mechanism, by a simple primitive
property, or by a law of God which brings about this effect
without using any intelligible means, then it is a
senseless occult quality • • • 11 81
Newton could not abide such an attitude.

It was bad

science and bad theology, perhaps even more the latter than
the former.

"It must be allowed that these two Gentlemen

differ very much in Philosophy," he smugly addressed the
readers of the Philosophical Transactions in his anonymous
"Account of the Book Commercium epistolicum."82

For want

of decisive experiments, he wrote, the one
doth not affirm whether the Cause of Gravity be
Mechanical or not Mechanical: the other that it is a
perpetual Miracle if it be not Mechanical. The one
(by way of Enquiry) attributes it to the Power of the
Creator that the least Particles of Matter are hard:
the other attributes the Hardness of Matter to
conspiring Motions, and calls it a perpetual Miracle
if the Cause of this Hardness be other than
Mechanical. The one doth not affirm that animal
Motion in Man is purely mechanical: the other teaches
that it is purely mechanical, the Soul or Mind
(according to the Hypothesis of an Harmonia
Praestablitia) never acting upon the Body so as to
alter or influence its Motions. The one teaches that
God (the God in whom we live and move and have our
Being) is Omnipresent; but not as a Soul of the
81. Quoted by Cajori, pp. 668f.
82. Found in volume 29 (1714). The Commercium, a
collection of documents pertaining to the calculus priority
dispute, was compiled by Newton and published by the Royal

Society during Newton's presidency. Not exactly intended
to please Leibniz and his retinue, it poured oil on the
flames of controversy.
Newton's review added insult to
injury by casting aspersion on Leibniz's theology.
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World: the other that he is not the Soul of the
World, but INTELLIGENTIA SUPRAMUNDANA, an
Intelligence above the Bounds of the World7 whence it
seems to follow that he cannot do any Miracle.
The
one teaches that Philosophers are to argue from
Phaenomena and Experiments to the Causes thereof, and
thence to the Causes of those Causes, and so on till
we come to the first Cause: the other that all the
Actions of the first Cause are Miracles, and all the
Laws imprest on Nature by the Will of God are
perpetual Miracles and occult Qualities, and
therefore not to be considered in Philosophy.
But
must the constant and universal Laws of Nature, if
derived from the Power of God or the Action of a
Cause not yet known to us, be called Miracles and
occult Qualities, that is to say, Wonders and
Absurdities? Must all the Arguments for a God taken
from the Phaenomena of Nature be exploded by new hard
Names?83
-- --"Certainly these things deserve to be better considered,"
Newton concluded.

In the following pages I will consider

more closely the relationship between Newton's voluntarist
God and his conception of natural philosophy.
Newtonian Voluntarism and a Science of Phenomena
"Hitherto I have not been able to discover the cause
of those properties of gravity from phenomena," Newton
declared in the General Scholium.

Although as we have seen

he did not lack ideas about the ultimate cause of
gravity--he knew that it was not mechanical--he preferred
here to feign no hypotheses, "for whatever is not deduced
from the phenomena is to be called an hypothesis7 and
hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, whether of
83. Ibid., p. 224, italics his.
Clarke raised the same
issues in his debate with Leibniz. See Alexander, pp.
114-119.
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occult qualities or mechanical, have no place in natural
philosophy."

It is enough, he said, "that gravity does

really exist, and act according to the laws which we have
explained, and abundantly serves to account for all the
motions of the celestial bodies, and of our sea."84

Newton

captured in this passage the essence of his conception of
natural philosophy: that natural phenomena could be
understood adequately as phenomena, apart from any
knowledge of their causes.

As he wrote in Query 31, "we

must learn from the Phaenomena of Nature what Bodies
attract one another, and what are the Laws and Properties
of the Attraction, before we enquire the Cause by which the
Attraction is perform'd."85

Fully aware of alternatives,

Newton intended his approach to be seen as the deliberate
rejection of the kind of science advocated by his
Continental rivals, who sought to derive all of nature from
a few principles arising from their own fertile
imaginations.

He summarized his position in a draft of a

letter to Roger Cotes, the gifted mathematician who was
supervising the publication of the second edition of the
Principia:
Experimental philosophy reduces Phaenomena to general
Rules & looks upon the Rules to be general when they
hold generally in Phaenomena.
It is not enough to
object that a contrary phaenomenon may happen but to
make a legitimate objection a contrary phaenomenon
84. Cajori, p. 547.

Cf. the draft in Halls, pp. 352f.

85. Opticks, p. 376~ cf. pp. 40lf.
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must be actually produced. Hypothetical Philosophy
consists in imaginary explications of things &
imaginary arguments for or against such explications,
or against the arguments of Experimental Philosophers
founded upon Induction. The first sort of Philosophy
[i.e., experimental philosophy] is followed by me,
the latter too much by Cartes, Leibnitz & some
others."86
The letter which Cotes actually received made no mention of
those two gentlemen or their philosophies, but Cotes did
not need to be told what he could see for himself.

Natural

philosophers may be reduced to three classes, he advised
readers in his preface to the new edition.

Some follow

Aristotle and reduce the effects of bodies to natures and
qualities, which is to tell us nothing.

Others assume

hypotheses as first principles of their speculations,
forming an "ingenious romance" with little resemblance to
reality.

The third class pursue experimental philosophy,

assuming as a principle nothing not proved by phenomena.87

86. ULC Add. MS. 3984.14, folio 1, printed in Corres V,
398f.
87. Cajori, p. xx. Cotes probably borrowed the term
"romance" from Newton, who used it in a draft on
methodology which McGuire has dated to around 1700: "But if
without deriving the properties of things from Phaenomena
you feign Hypotheses & think by them to explain all nature
you may make a plausible systeme of Philosophy for getting
your self a name, but your systeme will be little better
than a Romance.
To explain all nature is too difficult a
task for any one man or any one age. Tis much better to do
a little with certainty & leave the rest for others that
come after you then to explain all things by conjectures
without making sure of any thing." ULC Add. MS. 3970.3,
folio 480v, printed in McGuire, "Newton's 'Principles of
Philosophy': An Intended Preface for the 1704 Opticks and a
Related Draft Fragment," BJHS 5 (1970), p. 183. Cf. the
drafts of his letter to Conti (see note 74), where he also
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Later in his preface Cotes revealed the religious
foundation of this third kind of philosophy:
Without all doubt this world, so diversified with
that variety of forms and motions we find in it,
could arise from nothing but the perfectly free will
of God directing and presiding over all.
From this fountain it is that those laws, which we
call the laws of Nature, have flowed, in which there
appear many traces indeed of the most wise
contrivance, but not the least shadow of necessity.
These therefore we must not seek from uncertain
conjectures, but learn them from observations and
experiments. He who is presumptuous enough to think
that he can find the true principles of physics and
the laws of natural things by the force alone of his
own mind, and the internal light of his reason, must
either suppose that the world exists by necessity,
and by the same necessity follows the laws proposed:
or if the order of Nature was established by the will
of God, that himself, a miserable reptile, can tell
what was fittest to be done.
All sound and true
philosophy is founded on the appearances of things:
and if these phenomena inevitably draw us, against
our wills, to such principles as most clearly
manifest to us the most excellent counsel and supreme
dominion of the All-wise and Almighty Being, they are
not therefore to be laid.aside because some men may
perhaps dislike them.
These men may call them
miracles or occult qualities, but names maliciously
given ought not to be a disadvantage to the things
themselves, unless these men will say at last that
all philosophy ought to be founded in atheism.
Philosophy must not be corrupted in compliance with
these men, for the order of things will not be
changed.88
To be sure, Newton himself did not write this: nor did
he read what Cotes had written before it went to press.89
But Cotes said nothing which Newton had not already said in
spoke of a "Romance."
88. Cajori, page xxxii. Cf. page xxvii.
Locke had the
same impression of Newtonian science. See Koyre, Newtonian
Studies, pp. 154f.
89. Samuel Clarke did, however.

See Never at Rest, p. 749.
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the course of his long and distinguished career.

It was by

divine will that matter existed and possessed the
properties that it did: the same will had ordered the
universe and would re-order it again some day.

Natural

laws were actively imposed by that will and, it seems,
could be changed by that will: "it may be allow'd that God
is able to create Particles of Matter of Sizes and Figures
and in several Proportions to Space, and perhaps of
different Densities and Forces, and thereby to vary the
Laws of Nature, and make Worlds of several sorts in several
Parts of the Universe."90
I can find no necessity either in Newton's theology or
in his natural philosophy, no trace of Leibniz's God of
sufficient reason or Descartes' God of immutable decrees.
Newton's God, as Koyr~ has noted, was not merely a
philosopher's God, an uninterested, impersonal first cause.
He was rather the God of the Bible, "the effective Master
and Ruler of the world created by him."91

Created--it is

an important word, conveying the irreducible fact that the
world was not made by men.

Therefore it might not be made

as men would have made it.

Therefore an a priori science

90. Query 31 (Opticks, pp. 403f.
The contrast with
Descartes' Le Monde is instructive. Also cf. Leibniz's use
of the principle of sufficient reason to deny that God
could create particles of matter in varying proportions to
space--he could create only one continuous matter (see note
58 above).
91. From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe, p. 225.
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could not be a science of nature at all, but only a
romance.

To Newton the public scientist we owe so much of

the modern understanding of nature, but to Newton the
private theologian we owe no less: the attitude that what
God has freely done can be learned not by inventing it, but
by discovering it.

CONCLUSION:
THE IMPACT OF VOLUNTARISTIC THEOLOGY ON
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY NATURAL PHILOSOPHY

Science seems to me to teach in the highest and strongest
manner the great truth which is embodied in the Christian
conception of entire surrender to the will of God: Sit down
before fact as a little child, be prepared to give up every
preconceived notion, follow humbly and to whatever abysses
nature leads, or you shall learn nothing.
--T.H. Huxley, letter to Charles Kingsley,
23 September 1860

As we see, empiricism and metaphysics, and even a very
definite kind of metaphysics, the creationist, are closely
linked together. What other means, indeed, but observation
and experience can we possibly use for the study of a world
freely created by an Infinite God?
--A. Koyre, From the Closed World to the Infinite
Universe, p. 20
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I began this dissertation by posing a general
question: What was the relation of religion to science in
the seventeenth century?

Drawing on the insights of M.B.

Foster and his followers, I narrowed the scope of my
inquiry to the following, very specific question in
intellectual history: Was there in the seventeenth century
a connection between theological voluntarism and empirical
science?

The four case studies which comprise the bulk of

this dissertation were intended to answer this question as
definitively as possible within the obvious limits of my
research.
My conclusion is that Foster was correct, at least for
the individuals I have studied.

Theology impinged on

natural philosophy through the doctrine of creation, in
terms of which the four subjects of this essay approached
the problem of scientific knowledge.

How God had made the

world, how he continued to uphold it, and how the human
mind was related to the divine all had implications for
natural philosophy.

Ultimately it was a question of which

divine attributes received the most attention--perfection,
power, reason (and wisdom), or will.

An emphasis on the

divine will went hand in hand with a belief in the primacy
of phenomena~ a lack of emphasis on the divine will was
accompanied by an~ priori attitude toward nature.
For Galileo, divine reason and power were uppermost.
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An omnipotent God had perfectly imposed mathematical forms
on nature, the obedient executrix of his commands.

Made in

the image of the divine mind, our own minds could
participate in God's absolute knowledge of his creation
through the deductive certainty of geometry, to which
physics was essentially reduced.

Our failure completely to

know nature was due, not to the exercise of an inscrutable
divine will, but to our finite capabilities.
Descartes began with the unfettered freedom of God's
will, but then mitigated that freedom almost totally by
stressing divine perfection.

Because perfection entailed

immutability, God always acted in the same way.

A perfect

God could not change his mind and could not deceive us by
allowing us clearly and distinctly to perceive false
propositions.

Thus the human mind became the touchstone

for created reality~ what it could not comprehend God
obviously had chosen not to create.

If God was free to

produce the particulars of nature in a variety of ways, he
could have made only one kind of world in general, a world
which conformed absolutely to the innate truths he
implanted in our souls.

Grounded upon such a theology of

creation, Cartesian natural philosophy was largely~
priori~ the appeal to experience was required to augment
pure reason only where the vestiges of divine will
remained.
Boyle never claimed, as Descartes did, that God could
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have made a different set of eternal truths.

He never

exempted God's creative activity from the law of
contradiction.

Yet in every other respect, his theology of

creation was more voluntaristic than Descartes'.

God, when

he made the world, had been under no obligation to conform
to human thoughts or wishes.

Rules by which God freely

regulated his own actions, the laws of nature were not
necessary truths and could have been otherwise.

Therefore

they had to be inferred from the phenomena and treated as
hypotheses, contingent truths subject to change in light of
future discoveries.

As purblind mortals, we could know

neither God nor nature from essences and innate ideas~
truths about both had to be gathered from his two
revelations, nature and scripture.
Divine will was also primary for Newton, who upheld
God's freedom to do as he pleased both in creating the
world and in sustaining it.

Nothing limited God to

mechanical causes alone or prohibited him from acting
miraculously in the cosmos.

The sovereign Lord governed

matter and motion directly by his will, in accordance with
laws of his own choosing.

Knowledge of nature, like

knowledge of God, was attained by induction from the
phenomena, not by vain speculation from supposed necessary
truths.
Am I claiming that their voluntarism "caused" Boyle
and Newton to advocate empiricism instead of conceptualism,

239
to use McMullin's terms?l

That depends on the sense in

which the word "cause" is employed.

Even in natural

science causation is an elusive concept which some would
prefer to avoid.

Causation in history is considerably less

clear, yet historians frequently claim to be explaining the
events they have recorded and almost always use language
that implies causality--conjunctions like "because" and
"since," and adverbs like "thus" and "therefore."

I have

certainly made similar claims in the present essay.
Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary states that the
term cause "applies to any event, circumstance, or
condition or any combination of these that brings about or
helps bring about a result."

Thus I claim that voluntarism

"caused" Boyle and Newton to advocate empiricism in that it
helped bring about their rejection of conceptualism and
their acceptance of an alternative science of nature.
There is no sense, however, in which I wish to claim
that voluntarism "caused" early modern science.

I can find

no significant references to divine freedom by Copernicus,
Vesalius, or Galileo, without whom the scientific
revolution as I understand it would never have happened.
Voluntarism impinged on a scientific revolution which was
already under way.

If many natural philosophers were

1. For a discussion of his article "Empiricism and the
Scientific Revolution," in Art, Science, and History in the
Renaissance, ed. Charles s. Singleton (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins UP, 1967), pp. 331-69, see page 32 of this essay.
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convinced that the Aristotelian world view had to be
replaced, they were not yet willing to abandon the notion
that science contains necessary truths.

The adoption of a

more modest conception of science was left to the
voluntarists, for whom a necessary knowledge of nature was
incompatible with divine freedom.
It has been a fundamental assumption of this essay
that religion and science were inextricably intermingled
during the crucial, formative years of the modern
scientific world view.

For too long historians have taken

Galileo's encounter with the Holy See as normative of that
relationship.2

The analysis presented in the preceeding

pages suggests that this view is much too shallow to stand
scrutiny.

At a much deeper level than the superficial

disputes over the interpretation of scripture, religion
exerted a subtle but significant influence on seventeenth
century science.

In subsequent years the source of that

influence--the voluntarist notion of a God who does
whatever he pleases--was set aside by deists and
2. The confrontational nature of this episode and others
like it lends credence to the classic polemical accounts of
John William Draper, Histor of the Conflict between
Religion and Science New York: Appleton, 1874), and Andrew
Dickson White, A History of the Warfare of Science with
Theology in Christendom (2 Vols.~ New York: Appleton,
1896). The shortcomings of the "warfare" school of
historiography are, however, so serious as to warrant its
wholesale rejection.
See the first part of James R. Moore,
The Post-Darwinian Controversies (Cambridge: UP, 1979), and
the introduction to the forthcoming book Science and
Christianity: A History, ed. David c. Lindberg and Ronald
L. Numbers.
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freethinkers.

But the result of that influence--an

empirical attitude toward nature--was retained.
Divine freedom as a significant influence on early
modern science?

To the modern mind, accustomed to a

radical separation of religion from almost every aspect of
intellectual life, that sounds like a contradiction.

But

the modern world was not erected overnight by modern minds:
it has emerged slowly from an older world shaped by minds
not quite so modern._ That it still bears the marks of its
history should not be surprising.
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